NOTE

This Microfiche meets the quality requirements of the American National Standard for Microfiche of Documents (ANSI PH5.9-1975). However, because of imperfections in the document from which it was made, it contains images that are illegible or difficult to read. The source document for this microfiche is the best copy that could be obtained prior to filming.

CIS

Congressional Information Service, Inc.
Washington, D.C.

99th Congress
1st Session

COMMITTEE PRINT

S. PRT.
99-56

STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM

FOR THE USE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

JUNE 1985

1

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
48-474 O
WASHINGTON : 1985

S522-4

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina, *Chairman*

CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland
PAUL LAXALT, Nevada
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
ALAN K. SIMPSON, Wyoming
JOHN P. EAST, North Carolina
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
JEREMIAH DENTON, Alabama
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, Ohio
DENNIS DeCONCINI, Arizona
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
HOWELL HEFLIN, Alabama
PAUL SIMON, Illinois

Dennis W. Shedd, *Chief Counsel and Staff Director*
Diana L. Waterman, *General Counsel*
Deborah G. Bernstein, *Chief Clerk*
Mark H. Gitenstein, *Minority Chief Counsel*

Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism

JEREMIAH DENTON, Alabama, *Chairman*

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
JOHN P. EAST, North Carolina
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
DENNIS DeCONCINI, Arizona

Joel S. Lisker, *Chief Counsel and Staff Director*
Fran Wermuth, *Chief Clerk*

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism,
Washington, DC, June 12, 1985.

Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee,
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Chairman: As you know, on May 15, 1985, we concluded joint hearings of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the subject of International Terrorism, Insurgency, and Drug Trafficking. Transcripts of the three days of hearings are now in preparation for publication.

To augment these very important hearings, I believe that you will agree with me that it would be useful to have for the committees and subcommittees, and in the public domain, an extensive report on State-sponsored terrorism which has been prepared by Dr. Ray S. Cline and Dr. Yonah Alexander of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. As you know, my staff has provided some of the research for this report and reviewed it several times in draft. I believe the product is a very good one.

Both Dr. Cline and Dr. Alexander have testified extensively during these hearings and referred to this study in detail during the course of their testimony.

It is my pleasure to transmit this report to you and to commend Dr. Cline and Dr. Alexander for the excellent reference document which they have produced.

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism.

FOREWORD

This report on State-sponsored terrorism was prepared by Dr. Ray S. Cline and Dr. Yonah Alexander of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University.

Some of the basic research for the document and much of the review of the manuscript was undertaken by the staff of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism.

During 3 days of joint hearings on International Terrorism, Insurgency, and Drug Trafficking there were repeated references to the text of the report.

In order to augment the published transcripts of those proceedings and provide a ready reference on the topic of State-sponsored terrorism for members of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Judiciary Committee has chosen to publish this report.

STROM THURMOND,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary.

CONTENTS

Page

Letter of Transmittal III

Foreword V

Preface IX

Executive Summary XI

CHAPTER I—THE PROBLEM 1

CHAPTER II—HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF A NEW AGE OF TERRORISM 4
  Factors Contributing to Contemporary Terrorism 6
  Legacy of the Age of Andropov 8
  Proliferation of State-Sponsored Terrorism 11
  Wild Cards in the Mideast 15
  State-Sponsored Attacks 19
  Prospects for Increase of State-Sponsored Terrorism 21

CHAPTER III—DEFINING STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM 25
  Basic Elements of and Anatomy of Terrorism 25
  Intergovernmental Definitions 26
  Attempts by Foreign Governments to Define Terrorism 29
  U.S. Perceptions of Terrorism 30
  Lack of Consensus in Non-Governmental Definitions 33
  The U.S. Federal System 34
  Role of the U.S. Congress 35
  The Executive Branch 36
  A Working U.S. Definition 39

CHAPTER IV—STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 47
  Defining Low-Intensity Conflict 48
  Insurgency 53
  Guerrilla Military Operations 54
  Political Revolution 55
  War of National Liberation 56
  Nature of State Sponsorship 58
  Forms of State Sponsorship 61
  State Sponsorship by More Than One Government 62
  Operations in Central America 64
  Southern Africa 64
  Outreach of State Sponsorship 65
  State-Controlled Groups 66
  Impact of State-Sponsored Terrorism on Terror International 67
  State Sponsorship: Advantages and Weaknesses 67
  The Future of State Sponsorship 69

CHAPTER V—RESPONSES TO STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM 73
  The Chain of Command on Anti-Terrorism Planning 75
  The Role of the U.S. Army 79
  Adoption of Active Response Policy 87
  The Case of Nicaragua 88
  U.S. Responsibility 91
  Range of U.S. Countermeasures for State-Sponsored Terrorism 92
  The Role of Military Force 96

CHAPTER VI—CONCLUSION 104

Page
APPENDIXES 108

Documents:
- Selected Definitions of Terrorism 109
- Soviet Bloc-PLO Training 119
- Islamic Republic of Iran on the Creation of an Independent Brigade For Carrying Out Unconventional Warfare in Enemy Territory 122
- Selected Terrorist Groups 135
- Selected Bibliography 176

Maps and Graphs:
- Spectrum of Conflict 51
- International Terrorist Incidents Against U.S. Citizens and Property 113
- Overview of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide, 1981-1984 114
- Terrorist Groups Around the World Supported by the PLO 115
- Regions of Soviet Political and Military Domination as of 1983 116
- Terrorist Incidents Against U.S. Diplomatic and Military Facilities and Personnel: 1974-1983 Total Incidents by Geographic Region 117
- Terrorist Incidents Against U.S. Diplomatic and Military Facilities and Personnel: 1974-1983 Total Incidents by Country for the Top Seven Countries 118

PREFACE

This study defines and analyzes the steadily increasing phenomenon of state-sponsored terrorism, as requested by the Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, on August 17, 1984. It also suggests appropriate responses from the viewpoint of the United States.

The authors have drawn their material solely from open, unclassified sources. The information is, however, in many cases not available in data banks in the United States because it was collected in research conducted in many countries over a long period of time under the auspices of the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, State University of New York.

The analytical and interpretative statements in this report, not identified as derived from specific research material, reflect the authors' judgment based on reviewing the totality of this evidence accumulated during their many years of study of terrorism and the history of international behavior of certain states that have encouraged or assisted terrorist acts.

The conclusions of this study are based on the authors' scholarly findings and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Army, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, or the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, State University of New York.

May 30, 1985

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The goal of psychological terror and physical violence employed by totalitarian dictatorships is to maintain total control of their own peoples and to expand this kind of control over other regions and other peoples.

At present, communist states, especially the Soviet Union, and a number of other militant totalitarian regimes like Iran, Libya, and Syria, are actively exporting terrorists and terror techniques into other countries whose governments they wish to injure or overthrow. Thus, their activity is a manifestation of transnational state-sponsored terrorism. They indoctrinate, fund, train, and arm sub-state groups of diverse national origins to act as their tools, using psychological warfare and propaganda to create severe psycho-social or political conflict in contemporary life.

Since the late 1960s, there has been a vast proliferation of international terrorist violence. Shortly after Yuri Andropov became head of state security in May 1967, Moscow adopted a policy of supplying training, arms, and ammunition in generous quantity to Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), under Yasser Arafat. The PLO, with this kind of encouragement and support, has reached out in all directions against U.S. "imperialist forces." As a result, the projection of Soviet military influence has spread from continent to continent and from ocean to ocean.

Neither the client states of the Soviet Union--Syria, Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, and Vietnam--nor the independents--like Libya and Iran--are held accountable in world opinion for sponsoring the work of the quasi-private groups who follow their bidding in carrying out terrorist attacks.

In starkest terms, state-sponsored terrorists, whether holding forth on radio and television or firing a gun, engage in a kind of conflict involving a clash of cultures across an ethical gulf that is nearly impossible for the free world to bridge. The incidents themselves are equally difficult to prevent or counter, and they are likely to increase both at home and abroad in the coming months and years. The gun that may destroy the democracies today, unless they learn to contain the danger, is the gun not in the hand of the soldier but in the hand of the terrorist, encouraged and supported by hostile states.

The semantic confusion over the precise definition of terrorism, particularly the subset of the species that can be identified as state-sponsored, has hindered formulation of national and military policy by nations of the free world. There is a proliferation of terms dealing with the entire spectrum of conflict below the level of what is traditionally perceived as an internationally recognized state of organized war.

Only now is opinion in the United States beginning to crystallize in a way that permits a serious attempt to form a consensus on this menacing phenomenon. The heart of the problem of the definition is that the use of violence for political purposes, real or hidden, cannot be viewed as value-free. Americans must make the most of the fact that self-defense is a legitimate posture in the defense of society and institutions as well as individual human beings.

In the U.S. context, it is now possible to derive a working definition that reflects American social and political values and has useful policy and operational benefits for democratic societies. It is suggested that state-sponsored terrorism is:

> **The deliberate employment of violence or the threat of use of violence by sovereign states (or sub-national groups encouraged or assisted by sovereign states) to attain strategic and political objectives by acts in violation of law intended to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened.**

It is further suggested that recent history indicates:

> **The main goal of this state-sponsored terrorism now at the end of the twentieth century is to undermine selectively the policies, the psycho-social stability, and political governability of pluralist states with representative governments.**

Not the least of the virtues of this two-part definition is that it reflects the spirit of the attitudes of serious-minded American citizens as well as the recent policy positions voiced by President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz.

When terrorism is state-sponsored, it is plainly in some sense a form of secret or undeclared warfare that is inconvenient internationally to designate as such. Because of fears of military escalation in today's miniwars, it is becoming common to call this kind of violence low-intensity conflict. Modern weapons are so expensive and destructive that a number of nations, ideologically inclined to fight and destroy other states they perceive as enemies, restrict themselves systematically to low-intensity conflict. They attack their enemies but confine their violence to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, well away from the high-intensity of open, organized military hostilities.

All phases of low-intensity conflict--and especially insurgency, guerrilla military operations, and political revolution--may involve state sponsorship of terrorism. A "war of national liberation," is a term that can be applied to any low-intensity conflict the Soviet Union chooses to support. It fits into almost any category of the spectrum of conflict and is a constant element of the early phases of political propaganda or subversion, furthering a climate of discontent in countries where communist states seek greater power.

To be precise, state sponsorship is the direct or indirect instigation, by a government, of official and non-official groups to exercise psychological or physical violence against political opponents, another government, or other entities for purposes of coercion and widespread intimidation to bring about a desired political or strategic objective. What distinguishes state sponsorship of terrorism is the extent to which the groups carrying out the violence are furthering the policy of an established government outside the territory in which the conflict occurs. It has the option of plausible denial and lack of public accountability.

A terrorist group acting in conjunction with or for a foreign government can be used to affect a target country's political stability, commercial ties, and diplomatic relations in ways which direct military confrontation cannot or will not achieve.

Examples of various types of state sponsorship include the ideological encouragement communist governments have given to various Marxist terrorist groups active around the world. After a cooperative relationship is established, intelligence, diplomatic, or even high-level political contacts are maintained between the sponsor government and the terrorist group.

An international terrorist network permits two or more governments to be involved in a terrorist operation. Cases in which a consortium of governments take part in the conceptual and planning stages of an operation appear to be on the increase. The open infusion of large quantities of funds, training, armaments, and political support from the Soviet Union and other governments to such mainline umbrella organizations as the PLO has enabled aid to be passed to smaller, connected factions and terrorist groups operating in Europe and elsewhere.

Although it is difficult to predict the future, it is nevertheless clear that state sponsorship of terrorism will increase. Operations have become more effective, wider in scope, more sophisticated, and with a higher destructive potential. It can be assumed that U.S. adversaries will continue to utilize terrorism—"warfare on the cheap"—as a significant strategic tool of their foreign policy.

The formulation of adequate responses to counter low-intensity conflict, especially when it involves state-sponsored terrorism, presents a dilemma to all free-world nations. To be effective, the response should neutralize terrorism not only by preventing the terrorist act, when possible, but also by imposing some kind of penalty or punishment on the successful terrorist to deter him from acting again. In practice, the response of the United States has been mainly passive, defensive, and reactive. Working out a strategy that imposes costs on the terrorist and the state sponsors requires planning procedures and sensible decision-making systems, elements that have tended to be neglected in the field of terrorism for too long a time.

The chain of command on anti-terrorism planning, coordination, and policy formation in the United States runs from the President through the National Security Council (NSC) to the many executive departments of government with responsibility for some aspect of terrorism. This chain runs through an interagency group chaired by the State Department with representatives from Justice, Defense, Energy, Treasury, Transportation, and the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of the Vice President. The U.S. Army has a lot of work to do in its own bailiwick.

Plans for a new Defense Department agency to coordinate special forces operations and devise new counter-terrorism equipment were begun in October

1982. The Joint Special Operations Agency was officially created January 1, 1984, to exercise command and control of military operations when coping with terrorist incidents. What appears to be lacking from the vast apparatus of civilian and military organizations concerned with terrorism is a common definition of the problems they face and a coherent doctrine for management of terrorist incidents of crisis proportions.

It is time for the U.S. Army to press for tightened chains of command up to and including the Special Situation Group in the White House. If U.S. Army forces are committed to a counter-terrorist task, the looseness and vagueness in the current decision-making process are sure recipes for disaster.

The primary challenges to the Army are to continue to develop a first-rate counter-terrorist strike force capability, to insure its activities are coordinated with other agencies, and to elaborate the doctrine of justifiable military response to state sponsorship of terrorism as an optional last-resort element of self-defense in an undeclared low-intensity conflict.

The U.S. Army is responsible for the protection of its own personnel and bases, for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, and for certain government-owned contractor-operated defense facilities. When appropriately ordered to do so, the Army must take measures to protect endangered civilian targets at home and abroad in protracted emergencies. It may be called upon to assist friendly foreign governments in dealing with major terrorist attacks.

Probably the most important first step for military services, and certainly for the U.S. Army, is to develop a comprehensive program of awareness, education, and response training.

The U.S. Army must be prepared for three situations:

1. To give military assistance to civilian authorities when the appropriate

law enforcement system is unable to deal with political and ideological violence on a wholesale or protracted basis;

2. To respond to a prolonged cross-border paramilitary terrorist or guerrilla campaign, conceivably at home but, at present, more likely against a foreign military base; and
3. To send special military squads for hostage rescue and other emergency counter-terrorist operations, when called for, in cases where the civil authorities or police are clearly inadequate.

U.S. responsibility must be prepared to have recourse to a full range of countermeasures for state-sponsored terrorism. They include:

1. Intelligence,
2. Cooperation with allies,
3. Economic and security assistance,
4. Political and diplomatic pressures,
5. Economic sanctions,
6. Information campaigns and foreign broadcasts.

The U.S. military responses include:

1. Clandestine counter-terrorist infiltrations of terrorist organizations,
2. Covert support for foreign counter-terrorist military operations,
3. Overt U.S. military pre-emptive operations,
4. Overt U.S. military operations against identified terrorist bases and forces used against American targets.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has pointed out that military force may have to be used to contain and control terrorism to protect national interests and carry out national policy. If armed forces are used, they must be deployed in a timely manner and be fully trained and prepared to act before they must engage in military operations. Political and military objectives must be established in advance of commitment of military forces either on peacekeeping missions or on combat operations. Finally, U.S. national will must be mobilized so that U.S. armed forces will be permitted to engage in battle for as long as it takes them to win.

A coherent and firm U.S. policy on responding to state-sponsored terrorism with effective countermeasures will be able to win public understanding and support. It is crucially important to move vigorously in this direction in order gradually to reduce the emerging strategic threat to free democratic societies implicit in state-sponsored terrorism.

Chapter I

THE PROBLEM

The twentieth century is likely to go down in history as unique in the extraordinary scale of psychological terror and physical violence employed by totalitarian dictatorships in pursuit of political purposes. Their goal has been to maintain total control of their own peoples and to expand this kind of control over other regions and peoples.

Violence and fear have always been commonplace as a result of man's inhumanity to man. Simple terrorism observed in every part of the world is most commonly and correctly described as the use of criminal violence or the threat to use it against persons or property with the intent to further a political or ideological objective. As long as human beings pursue different objectives and some of them are inclined to take violent steps to gain their goals, the phenomenon of terrorism will persist.

Exporting terrorist skills and weapons across national borders, however, adds an entirely different dimension. Moreover, if the political or ideological purpose is the strengthening of one state at the expense of another, transnational terrorism may have important strategic consequences.

The 1980s clearly mark a high point in a new age of terrorism, much of which is aimed at weakening and destabilizing the more open, politically pluralist societies of the world.

The sponsorship of ideological, religious, and political violence by one sovereign state in the territory of another state, using methods short of overt warfare, is the main ingredient of today's systemic conflicts. It is a phenomenon that cries out for careful definition and analysis by officials responsible for the national security of the United States. The delivery truck driven by a suicide terrorist and clandestinely packed with high explosives may turn out to be the most destructive weapon of this era, not the SS-18 or the SS-20 ballistic missile.

The primary problem posed in this study is to formulate a precise definition of terrorist activity by certain sovereign states that are acting in ways threatening to undermine the values and stability of the U.S. body politic and to jeopardize vital American security interests around the world.

The secondary problem, even more difficult, is to identify the kind of responses that the U.S. Government and military forces can legitimately take, both at home and abroad, in defense of the American socio-political system against this type of threat.

This study concentrates on totalitarian dictatorships that sponsor terrorism both at home and abroad. Sponsorship may range from simple diplomacy and propaganda designed to encourage a climate of discontent in another country to direct logistic and financial support of terrorist acts.

Domestic terrorism has risen to a high level of brutality at many times. Stalin's collectivization of agriculture and purges of party and armed forces of the 1920s and 1930s is a prime example. It is rivalled only, perhaps, by Mao Tse-tung's murderous Great Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. This report, however, focuses on contemporary international terrorism and does not deal with these domestic tragedies, horrible as they were. Nor does it deal with smaller authoritarian states like Uganda in the days of 'Idi Amin, Haiti, or Chile at various stages of recent history, when these oppressive regimes employed internal terror apparatuses to control their own people.

The analysis presented here is exclusively concentrated on current examples of state-sponsored terrorism projected across national borders in ways likely to have strategic implications for the United States and its allies. This kind of terrorism, if it continues, will require a response appropriate to the strategic challenge that it poses.

The overall objective of this study is to provide guidelines that will be useful in broad planning of U.S. strategy and policy concerning present-day manifestations of terrorist activities with a genuine transnational strategic dimension.

Chapter II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF A NEW AGE OF TERRORISM

The powerful dictatorships of the twentieth century have brought to bear all of the communications, weapons, and other elements of repressive police and military technology in a way that makes this era a new age of fear and violence. Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung are the three greatest practicing terrorists of this century—all geniuses of oppression for their own political benefit. They all owed to earlier theorists, Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin, the concept of using revolutionary terror to seize, keep, and increase dictatorial power. All three dictators developed slogans urging their followers to destroy the landlord class, the imperialists, the rich peasantry, the intelligentsia--in other words, the established social and legal order.[1]

Hitler and Stalin added wrinkles of their own, including separate brands of anti-Semitism, to what they called a struggle against the enemies of the people--namely anyone critical to their dictatorial rule. Their regimes were classic examples of governance by the deliberate employment of terrorism by state organs against their own people. The correct definition of this behavior is state terrorism. It is different from, though often associated with, transnational terrorism, where the violence is fomented in another country.

Mercifully, these enormously vigorous and cruel tyrants are dead. The system of using violence to frighten people in order to gain ideological and political goals, however, has survived them. Worse, it has spread outside national borders and, in the last few decades, created grave international disorders on every continent.

The communist states, especially the Soviet Union, and a number of other militant totalitarian states like Iran, Libya, and Syria are actively and enthusiastically exporting terrorists and terror techniques into other countries whose governments they wish to injure or overthrow.

Not content with terrorizing their own populations, these dictatorships of today have come regularly to act across national borders to encourage or support terrorist operations to their own benefit in foreign countries. Thus, domestic state terrorism turns into transnational state-sponsored terrorism. State sponsorship runs the gamut from ideological, theological, and political encouragement and propaganda or diplomatic assistance to outright support in the form of money, training, and weapons. This kind of terrorist activity is too little noted as characteristic of political conflict in our time and even less recognized as a form of strategic attack in the international arena.

These totalitarian governments illustrate the complex nature of present-day terrorism. They indoctrinate, fund, train, and arm groups of diverse national origins acting below the level of state sovereignty. Many of these substate organizations are directly supported or indirectly guided and encouraged by a country different from the one whose stability they are attacking. If so, they become tools of the sponsoring state. They might continue to pursue their goals without outside help, but they would not, in that case, be nearly so dangerous.

They are truly menacing internationally when they serve as client or surrogate strike forces conducting state-sponsored terrorist operations across national borders, more or less covertly, on behalf of a sovereign political entity. The international moral and ethical accountability for such crimes or threats is exceedingly murky, and international law does not provide an obvious remedy.

Now widely spread throughout the world, such groups plan and execute acts of terror that create severe psycho-social or political conflict in contemporary life and cause universal nightmares in the societies they claim to want to save. These terrorists are often marginal antisocial elements, conspiratorial adventurers, underground reactionaries, pseudo-ideological extremists, political visionaries, religious fanatics, or racial bigots. Their activities become so widespread and often so devastating when guided and equipped by experts with sophisticated state support, that they are one of the most disruptive elements in the fabric of civilized order on the face of the earth.

What is critical to understand is the fact that state sponsors of terrorism have introduced into contemporary life in the past few decades a new brand of psychological warfare and propaganda in terms of combined threat and victimization. If sabotaging men's minds with distortion, deception, or what is now called (after Soviet usage) "disinformation" does not produce the desired results, the terrorists, in addition, turn to the use of physical violence. After the violence, they usually revert back to psychological means to deepen and spread the effects of the chaos. They repeat the combination of propaganda and force as long as the impact pays off.

Factors Contributing to Contemporary Terrorism

In spite of national and international efforts to control terrorism, the level of ideological, religious, and political violence remains high. Terrorism is a continuation of war by other means for the purpose of compelling an adversary to submit to specific demands. The factors for this situation are diverse but include the following:

1. There is no universal agreement about who is a terrorist because the political and strategic goals affect different states differently. There is no value-free definition.
2. The causes of sub-national violence are so diverse that experts disagree on whether to blame confrontation between ideologies of left or right, political disfranchisement and desperation, societal inequities, economic disequilibrium, or several or all of these factors.
3. The media assure terrorists an extensive and often not unfavorable publicity forum for their enunciated causes and wanton acts. They provide a rapid and wide diffusion of various motivations that make the acts appear justifiable.
4. The world's tolerance and, at times, even its support have permitted terrorist organizations to employ religious symbols, terms, and ideas to achieve their secular ends.
5. Some states tolerate, appease, and frequently glorify terrorists as heroes. Conflict of moral standards in the world community tends to reinforce the momentum of terrorism.
6. Liberal democracies frequently have lost their resolve to take the necessary steps to deal effectively with terrorism, despite the fact that these governments are aware of the dangerous and seriously disruptive effects on the quality of life in their nations.
7. Weak punishment results in low risks for the perpetrators, and democratic societies tolerant of pluralist views tend to be very reluctant to penalize what can be viewed as "political crime."

8. States violate international law. Although international anti-terrorist legal instruments do exist, they have no value unless signatories live up to their obligations.
9. An international network or infrastructure of substates supporting terrorism contributes to ideological, religious, and political violence. This relationship covers different levels of collaboration, including financial support, training, supply of combat material, forging of documents, provision of safe houses, and proxy and coordinated operations.
10. Terrorism is escalating into the struggle for power as a form of surrogate warfare, whereby small groups with direct or indirect support from a foreign state are able to engage in low-intensity, cheap, and relatively risk-free conflict at the national level. They ultimately may even alter the balance of power on the international scale.

Legacy of the Age of Andropov

It is not surprising that the leaders of dictatorships have found the turbulent environment of the past 40 years extremely promising for manipulating local violence for their own political advantage. Indeed, the communist theoreticians of the Soviet Union consider ideological warfare against capitalist states not only just and fair, but mandatory. They seek to exploit indigenous difficulties in other countries, to disrupt social order, and to promote communist revolution, alternately threatening and cajoling everyone who resists.

In the past two decades, the enormous power of the Soviet state has been placed squarely behind creating a climate of terror to eliminate any dissent at home and to manipulate violence-prone groups abroad to gain Soviet strategic goals beyond the borders of the USSR.

The main objectives and modus operandi of the Soviet Union in its strategic approach to international affairs are well documented in Soviet doctrinal literature and political conduct for over 65 years. Soviet political leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev have articulated and followed as best they were able a coordinated, coherent, long-range political philosophy calculated to advance Soviet national and ideological goals and enhance Soviet power in the world arena.

The Soviet rulers have found leaders of client communist states like Fidel Castro (Cuba) and Kim Il-Sung (North Korea) to do their bidding. They have also found imitators like Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi (Libya), Hafiz al-Assad (Syria), and the Ayatollah Khomeini (Iran) to accept Soviet aid directly or indirectly to enable them to add to the disruptions. By no means does the Soviet Union cause all the violence loose in the world. In certain areas, however, they have gained political and strategic benefit by exploiting it.

In many ways, the most authentic representative of pure Soviet foreign policy since Stalin was Yuri Andropov. His long tenure as secret intelligence (KGB) chief and his short term as head of the Soviet state confirmed, as a key part of Soviet behavior, an extraordinarily dangerous adventurism and willingness to support revolutionary movements in the use of terrorist tactics. This legacy marks an era. It covers the 1970s and extends into the 1980s at least until now, mid-decade.

History may well conclude that Andropov's greatest achievement in the field of terrorism was carrying out a policy of indoctrination and training of a core of energetic ring leaders who can on call collect passionate bands of youths, wives, and mothers eager to demonstrate against any buildup of U.S. weapons anywhere, especially in Europe, which has been defended against Soviet domination for 40 years. Their demonstrations have been so carefully orchestrated that the effect has been to stress the wickedness of American military might while Soviet power grows unheeded and the USSR's missiles line the borders of West Europe in ever increasing numbers and modernity.

In Andropov's heyday, on the side of more "active measures," as Moscow terms covert warfare and disinformation, the Soviet Union succeeded in the exploitation of hundreds of regional grievances around the globe to create lavishly equipped irregular or unconventional armies in many of its client states, especially North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), Vietnam, Syria, and Cuba. Moscow encouraged and assisted each to fund, recruit, train, and arm local fighting units dedicated to undermining and destabilizing neighboring states, all of them of strategic value to the United States.

Since the late 1960s, shortly after Andropov became head of state security in May 1967, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat but dominated by the most extreme Syrian controlled wings of the PLO, has served as a transmission belt for the export of KGB terrorist techniques and skills for subversion to other regions of the world. The USSR has supplied training, arms, and ammunition in generous quantity to Syria and the PLO. Moscow adopted this policy in 1968 and 1969 when the first trainees went to study at military camps in the USSR. Many PLO trainees have followed and have become instructors in other areas, as well as active irregular warriors. Thus Moscow has solidified the linkage with every strategic region in the world. The PLO, with this kind of encouragment and support, has reached out in all directions against U.S. "imperialist forces." This infrastructure continues to this day.

As a result, the projection of Soviet military influence has spread from continent to continent and from ocean to ocean.

In the Mideast, for example, Syria is the political base, Lebanon is the intermediate target, and Israel the ultimate target whose destruction would gravely damage U.S. interests in the region.

In Central America, Cuba is the client state, a base for exporting revolution to Nicaragua and throughout Central America and the Carribbean, the vital seaway constituting much of the southern frontier of the United States.

In Africa and Asia, other clients like Angola, Ethiopia, and Vietnam are so economically dependent on the Soviet Union that they have no viable alternative.

In the climate of permissiveness of state-sponsored violence, encouraged by the anti-capitalist ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, other states, less consciously submissive to Soviet wishes but with their own axes to grind, enter this game with a vengeance--most notably the Libyans and the Iranians.

Neither the client states of the Soviet Union nor the independents like Libya and Iran are held accountable in world opinion for sponsoring the work of the quasi-private groups who follow their bidding in carrying out terrorist attacks. Only when circumstantial evidence is found, as in June 1982 when the Israelis overran the heavily armed Palestinian camps in Lebanon, was the sorry story disclosed of the extensive, though indirect, Soviet connection with this form of covert warfare.[2] Even then, the lesson has been slow to sink in.

Proliferation of State-Sponsored Terrorism

Since the late 1960s, there has been a vast proliferation of international terrorist violence. By the 1980s, terrorism has become one of the gravest threats to the strategic interests of the West. For the groups involved and their sponsors, terrorism is a full-time occupation.

In 1983, Risks International recorded 2,574 domestic and international incidents involving terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or organization against foreign nationals, institutions, or governments. A total of 10,159 persons were killed, including 301 Americans. More than 80 percent of the incidents were bombings or other forms of attack on installations. In 1984, the total incidents increased to 3,282. Assassinations continued to be high: 362 in 1983; 414 in 1984.[3]

Concentrating on American targets, the U.S. Department of State has reported that 400 international terrorist attacks took place against U.S. diplomatic and military facilities and U.S. personnel between 1973 and the end of 1983. Most occurred in West Europe, Latin America, North Africa, and the Mideast. The casualties resulted from bombings, murders, kidnappings, and malicious vandalism, and 83 percent of these were in the Mideast (because of the large number of casualties at the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut on October 23, 1983).[4] (See summary tabulations, pp. 113-114.)

In a classic example of state-sponsored terrorism, Iranian militants, with the support of their government, seized the American embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979. They took 63 persons hostage and kept 50 of them in captivity for 444 days. Three weeks after the seizure, the Ayatollah Khomeini released a statement to the U.N. Security Council accusing the United States of having an "espionage den" in Iran. Denying that the hostage case should be studied in any court, he declared, "the signs and evidence of the crimes are in Iran and are not transferrable abroad."[5]

The intense propaganda campaign that followed kept the world's attention focused on the success of the militants and the lack of an effective U.S. recourse to get the Americans free. U.S. influence in the Mideast decreased as well as its standing in NATO as teams of pro-militants kept the story alive, and a highly visible attempt to rescue the hostages in 1980 conspicuously failed. Meanwhile, Iran itself remains under the despotic rule of Khomeini, who offers no stability to the region, wages full-scale war against Iraq, and dispatches terrorist agents to organize Shi'ite Moslem communities to oppose his enemies throughout the Mideast.

On May 13, 1981, a Turkish terrorist, trained and armed by the Bulgarian secret intelligence service, attempted to assassinate Pope John Paul II in front of St. Peter's Cathedral in the Vatican. Strong evidence is now emerging that the trail of the plot may end inside the headquarters of the KGB in Moscow. The USSR could have gained strategic benefits by killing the pontiff because he was perceived by the Soviet leaders as a mortal enemy, encouraging Solidarity in Poland and strengthening opposition to Soviet rule throughout East Europe.

On October 9, 1983, North Korean military personnel set off a powerful bomb at the Martyr's Mausoleum in Rangoon, Burma, killing 17 South Korean (Republic of Korea) officials, including the deputy prime minister and three other senior members of the cabinet of President Chun Doo Hwan. President Chun escaped death by only a few seconds. Although Kim Il-Sung has never claimed responsibility for the violence, the government of Burma vouched for the facts in the case. The South Korean Foreign Ministry has concluded that the attack, intended to assassinate President Chun, was staged to support a popular uprising in South Korea in the hopes of causing the collapse of the regime in Seoul by a terrorist attack in a third country.

The Rangoon assault punctuates a series of efforts, begun some 35 years ago, by the North to unify the Korean peninsula by force and deception. The sequence of events has often depended upon non-military threats, slander, and infiltration of provocateurs, but they have pointed to the same objectives, the consolidation of communist rule over the whole Korean peninsula, with USSR support. The aim, of course, would not only include the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from South Korea, but the decline, and hopefully, the elimination of U.S. military involvement in Northeast Asia.

It is interesting to note that the day before the Rangoon bombing, North Korea secretly passed a proposal through Chinese officials requesting the United States to join in negotiations for the unification of the peninsula. This completed a double-barrelled approach, suggesting willingness to talk after the bomb had done its damage. President Chun's fortunate survival, of course, scuttled this politico-terrorist strategy for a time, but probably not indefinitely.

On December 4, 1984, five Shi'ite Moslem terrorists seized a Kuwaiti airliner in flight and ordered it to go to Tehran. These hijackers are believed to be closely connected with the Iranian-backed Shi'ites responsible for the bombing of the U.S. embassy and Marine headquarters in Lebanon in 1983. Although they demanded the release of 14 Kuwaiti prisoners convicted of bombing American and French installations in Kuwait, Kuwaiti officials refused to comply. What followed was a six-day ordeal during which the hijackers killed two American passengers and subjected others to constant brutality.

Iranian authorities appeared to be cooperating with the hijackers. They facilitated press access to the plane and transmitted the Shi'ite demands through the Iranian press agency. On December 9, when the hijackers seemed to have abandoned hope in obtaining their objective, Iranian security forces, disguised as members of a cleaning crew, stormed the plane and released the hostages.

A Belgian group known at the Combatant Communist Cells (CCC) bombed a U.S. Army facility in Brussels on January 15, 1985. It appears to have cooperated with the German group, the Rote Armee Fracktion (RAF) and the French Action Directe, which were said in letters delivered to news media in Paris on that day to have formed a joint "political-military front" in West Europe to attack NATO.[6]

Ten days later, on January 25, 1985, General Rene Audran, director of international affairs in the arms sales division of the French Defense Ministry, was shot six times and killed as he arrived at his suburban home. NATO security experts believe this is another of many recent anti-NATO incidents closely associated with the Soviet KGB.[7]

Wild Cards in the Mideast

In the Mideast, the intertwined chain of terrorist groups reaches from Moscow through the PLO to three wild cards who perpetrate acts of terrorism particularly against Israel, the United States, and its Western allies. They are Iran's Khomeini, Syria's Assad, and Libya's Qadhafi.

Khomeini's regime organizes, plans, and assigns the missions of terrorists, mainly Shi'ite Moslems, operating in the Mideast and beyond. Qadhafi contributes monetary aid and arms, at least to a limited extent. Assad gives local approval to proposed operations since he controls the bases from which the missions are launched. All three Moslem states coordinate their efforts, including not only logistical support but also a steady flow of propaganda, especially when the targets are Israel, the United States, or France. All three strive to expel what they call the aggressive forces of these target nations.

The Moslem Shi'ites, who make up 93 percent of Iran's population and who are spread throughout the Mideast in lesser numbers, are the most militant. No doubt the least educated and poorest elements of society, they concentrated on religious feuds within the Moslem sects and had little or no interest in politics until their success in removing the Shah of Iran from power in 1978. Since then, their extremist deeds, held in horror in the West, seem to give them great satisfaction and pride.

Iran: In 1981, Khomeni's government established the Islamic Revolutionary Council to spread revolution throughout the Arab Mideast. The nations targeted by the council for terrorist activity are Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco. The council oversees such groups as Al Dawa (The Call), Amal Islami (Hope), and Hezballah (Party of God). In Afghanistan, Turkey, India, and Malaysia, it guides the actions of the pro-Khomeini political parties.

Some two thousand terrorists from more than 20 Islamic nations have recieved tactical training in the Iranian city of Qum before they are sent home by the council as "messengers of the true Islam." Some three to five-hundred Lebanese and Iraqi Shi'ites have undergone religious, political, and military training at the Qum center. Suicide truck drivers are said to be trained and then recruited from this center.

These groups receive operational support from approximately 350 Iranian Revolutionary Guards based in Baalbek, in the Bekaa Valley of eastern Lebanon. The Hezballah, composed of a variety of Shi'ite Moslem militants and led by Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, is closely identified with the revolutionary guards.[8] At the national level, these terrorist groups have considerable backing, and some degree of direction, from the Ministry of Islamic Revolution in Tehran, whose chief is Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's personal candidate to succeed him.[9]

Syria: Syria, also, has established an extensive infrastructure for recruiting and training terrorists who operate against Israel, the United States, Turkey, and the Arab Mideast. Stationed with diplomatic status in Syrian embassies throughout the major capitals of Europe, members of the ruling Ba'ath party and officers of the intelligence services enlist Syrian university students in terrorist activities. They provide diplomatic assistance to such terrorist groups as Abu Nidal, Sa'iqa, the Eagles of the Revolution, Hezballah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (DFLP-GC). These organizations maintain offices in Damascus and receive arms through the diplomatic pouch when they are abroad. Until its expulsion, Al Fatah, under Yasser Arafat, met regularly in Damascus, and Fatah rebels, led by Colonel Abu Musa, continue to maintain an office there.

The Syrian diplomatic corps provides passports, and the Syrian army provides basic military and special weapons training to such groups as Sa'iqa and the DFLP-GC. Weapons for training flow from the Soviet Union through Syrian depots and warehouses to

Fatah rebels. Syria opens its safe houses to terrorists seeking refuge in its Lebanese-controlled areas.

According to intelligence analysts, the two trucks used in the October 23 bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut were rigged by Syrian professionals stationed in the Bekaa Valley and even driven into Beirut along a route guarded by Syrian militias.[10]

Libya: Libya's Qadhafi has a long record of employing his diplomatic service to support any group claiming to be anti-Israeli or anti-American. In twenty camps throughout Libya, he has trained more than seven thousand African and Arab volunteers in the use of Soviet weapons. His government is known to have forged passports and to have smuggled money and arms to terrorist groups operating worldwide. In 1972, Libya sent arms to and provided safe haven for the Palestinian terrorists involved in the Munich massacre of Israeli athletes at the Olympic village. In 1981 and 1982, it furnished funds and arms to the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas in Nicaragua. In 1983, Libya partially funded the Point Salines airstrip in Grenada, under construction by Cuban workers.

Libya has made inroads into Africa with a great deal of success. For example, Libyan intervention in Chad has gained de facto control of the Auzu airstrip in the north, with access to rich uranium deposits. Five thousand Libyan military troops secure the area.

From Chad, Libya is reaching out into Egypt's soft underbelly—to Cameroon, Niger, the Central African Republic, and

Sudan, where Qadhafi's government has tried to topple the pro-Western regimes. His tactics are aimed to exploit political and religious groups by supplying them with funds and weapons through his embassies abroad, even as far away as Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.[11]

On June 11, 1984, he boasted, "We are now in a position to export terrorism, arson, and liquidation to the heart of America--and shall do so if necessary."[12]

On March 28, 1985, Qadhafi cheered his followers at the People's Hall in Tripoli by saying, "The lesson is that America was kicked out of Lebanon when an individual Arab was able to kill 300 Americans....An armed people will never be defeated, but regular armies are unreliable."[13]

State-Sponsored Attacks

The Islamic Jihad first surfaced on May 24, 1982, with its bombing of the French embassy in Beirut. Since then, groups which ascribe to Islamic Jihad have claimed to have carried out 20 terrorist acts in 24 months. The most dramatic, as well as the most costly in American lives, were the truck bombings of the embassies in Beirut and Kuwait, the U.S. embassy annex in Aukar, East Beirut, and the U.S. Marine headquarters as well as the French paratroop base of the multinational peacekeeping force. In all, they killed 363 persons, including 252 Americans. The Islamic Amal, the Hezballah, and even one member of the Palestine Liberation Organization admitted participation in these acts although full credit was taken by the Islamic Jihad. This group seems to be a kind of shadowy umbrella organization for propaganda and coordination on behalf of the Shi'ites.

The perpetrators of these acts received funding and political support from Iranian officials.

Lebanon, the setting in 1983 and 1984 for the most lethal attacks against U.S. military forces and U.S. diplomatic personnel and their installations, generated untold propaganda and psychological values for the terrorist groups. They received extenstive television, radio, and press coverage for audiences at home and abroad. They created a state of extreme fear and panic in the target area and even succeeded in causing the withdrawal of the entire multinational peacekeeping force (including U.S. military units), as well as bringing about the beginning of a staged withdrawal of Israeli military forces. The results were valued as strategic gains for the Soviet Union.

These terrorist victories took place as the culmination of about ten year's of savage fighting between various groups and combinations of Israeli, PLO, Syrian, and Lebanese military forces. When the PLO, split and disorganized, began its evacuation in August 1982, the multinational peacekeeping force moved into Beirut. Its mission built around following standard military security procedures in a technically non-combat situation was almost impossible in the charged international political atmosphere of that time and place. The scene in Lebanon, much of which was in rubble, was over-ripe for terrorist covert operations.

When questioned by the press on February 7, 1985, about his policy for retribution for the bombings in Beirut and the hostages in Iran, President Ronald Reagan admitted the U.S. Government was still searching for ways to locate the source of the terrorist acts.

"What we now, I think, are looking at is the possibility that some terrorists actually do have national support and backing," he said. "With that established, then you can let that government know that there is going to be redress against that government if these acts continue."[14]

Prospects for Increase of State-Sponsored Terrorism

In starkest terms, state-sponsored terrorism, whether holding forth on radio and television, or firing a gun reveals a kind of conflict involving a clash of cultures across an ethical gulf that is nearly impossible for the free world to bridge. The concept of politically inspired terrorism overriding the rights of man and human life is difficult for Americans to justify, and the incidents themselves are equally difficult to prevent or counter.

There are several reasons why contemporary terrorism is likely to increase both at home and abroad.

1. Terrorism has proved successful again and again in attracting publicity, disrupting government and business, and in causing significant death and destruction.
2. Arms, explosives, supplies, financial support, and secret communications are readily available.
3. International covert connections among states, especially between the Soviet Union and the internationally less disciplined governments of the Third World, can and do greatly facilitate terrorist activities.
4. Eighty percent of terrorist groups in the world are at least superficially Marxist-Leninist in their political thinking and claim the right of support from the Soviet Union and its client states.

Pragmatic realism requires the United States to approach the analysis of present-day state-sponsored terrorism with a straightforward appreciation of the strategic exploitation of contemporary situations by the leaders of the Soviet Union, their client-state surrogates, and some of the "wild card" non-communist nations.

These policymakers have always believed in the maxim enunciated by their one-time Chinese comrade, Mao Tse-tung, that political power grows from the barrel of a gun. The gun that may destroy the democracies today, unless they learn to contain the danger, is the gun not in the hand of the soldier but in the hand of the revolutionary terrorist, encouraged or supported by hostile states.

NOTES

1. Terrorism, as viewed by V. I. Lenin, was a "science." On the Board of *Iskra* he wrote, "In matters of tactics, social democracy does not tie its hands....It recognizes all methods of struggle....We have never rejected terror in principle, nor can we ever do so."

   During the Russian insurrection of 1905, he spelled out the duty of every revolutionary. "The killing of spies, policemen, gendarmes, the blowing up of police buildings, the seizing of government funds for use in the uprising, cannot be premature. Has not the Polish Socialist Party, under Pilsudski, already begun them? Why are we Bolsheviks lagging?"

   These directives, the editor states, are unique in the history of modern socialism. "Neither in Russian Social Democracy nor in the entire International was there another man who could have given these coldly calculated directives and urged them so ardently." See Milorad M. Drachkovitch, ed., *Marxism in the Modern World*, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1965, pp.70-72.

2. Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*, New York: Crane Russak, 1984, pp. 83-139.

3. *Quarterly Risk Assessment*, Alexandria, Va.: Risks International, Inc., January 1985. Risks International explains its data base as follows: "For purposes of the data base, terrorism is defined as the threatened or actual use of force and violence to attain a political goal through fear, coercion and intimidation. Materials contained in the Risks International data base relate *only* to significant actions carried out by terrorist groups operating within the United States and overseas, excluding communist countries. Actions by criminal elements are *not* recorded in the data base."

Terrorist operations included in the data base are categorized by type of activity. Categories used are: (1) assassinations; (2) attacks against facilities; (3) bombings; (4) kidnappings; (5) maimings; and (6) hijackings.

4. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Brief, December 21, 1984.
5. "Transcript of Khomeini's Attack," New York Times, November 28, 1979.
6. Early Warning, Vol. II, No. 2 (March 1985), pp. 9-10.
7. Ibid.; see also U.S. Department of State, Special Report, No. 88, "Soviet 'Active Measures,' " October 1981.
8. "The Islamic Revolutionary Council: Exporting the 'Revolution,' " Al Datsur, (Lebanon), August 27, 1984.
9. Early Warning, Vol. II, No. 12 (January 1985), p. 10.
10. New York Times, December 30, 1984.
11. U.S. Department of State, Special Report, No. 111, "The Libyan Problem," October 1983; Jerusalem, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Report, n.d.
12. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Middle East and Africa, June 12, 1984, p. Q 11.
13. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Middle East and Africa, April 1, 1985, p. Q 4.
14. The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 1985.

Chapter III

DEFINING STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

The semantic confusion over the precise definition of terrorism, particularly the subset of the species that can be identified as state-sponsored, has hindered formulation of national and military policy by nations of the free world. Consequently, it has been hard to formulate authoritative and systematic doctrinal and policy recommendations on initiatives to prevent, deter, and decrease the effectiveness of terrorist acts, or to punish identified terrorists after the fact.

The general uncertainty over what constitutes terrorism is linked to a proliferation of terms dealing with the entire spectrum of conflict below the level of what is traditionally perceived as an internationally recognized state of organized war.[1] Each agency or office of government has approached the problem of definition from its own point of view and responsibilities. Only now is opinion in the United States beginning to crystallize in a way that permits a serious attempt to form a consensus on this menacing phenomenon.

Basic Elements of an Anatomy of Terrorism

An analysis of the most carefully phrased definitions indicates that an effective definition must deal with the following components or elements of terrorism:

1. Nature of the Act: The concept embraces violence or threat of violence, other criminal, unlawful, politically subversive, or anarchic acts; piracy; hijacking of aircraft; and taking of hostages.
2. Perpetrators: States ought to be identified as perpetrators, along

with individuals and private groups; although clearly states sponsoring terrorism are the chief international troublemakers today.

3. Strategic Objectives: Certain states sponsor terrorism as part of a campaign of geographic expansion of political control by one-party dictatorships at the expense of existing state structures based on political pluralism and representative government. A striking shortcoming in current definitions is that no mention is made of this important variable of the 1980s.
4. Intended Outcome: Fear, extortion, and radical political change are most often the expected results.
5. Targets: Human beings and property are specific targets of terrorist acts, with special focus on heads of state, diplomats, and public officials. Military targets should be included because soldiers in non-combat or peacekeeping roles are often primary victims.
6. Methods: Threats, as well as the actual resort to sabotage, hostage-taking, murder, kidnapping, and bombing (including letter or parcel bombing) involving the use of automatic weapons, grenades, and rockets are common methods of terrorists in spreading fear among targeted populations; weapons of mass destruction cannot be excluded.

Intergovernmental Definitions

Historically, the earliest treatments of the definition of terrorism in this century are in treaties between states that have defined specific actions appropriate to deal with specific crimes, e.g., piracy or the taking of hostages. [2] In the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (Geneva, November 16, 1937), 23 signatories defined terrorism as "criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons, or the general public." [3]

On the same date in conjunction with this treaty, the League of Nations drafted a parallel Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court to make "progress in the struggle against offences of an international character." [4] Although this instrument never entered into force, it was the first international attempt to establish judicial machinery to deal with the offense of terrorism as defined by the league in a time of increasing violence. The collapse of the league and the advent of World War II, of course, brought all of this early twentieth century thinking to naught.

After World War II and especially in the last two or three decades, terrorism has once again spread widely. It occurs frequently with more and more disastrous results, but attempts to progress beyond the abortive international efforts made in 1937 have so far also failed.

When Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim of the United Nations initiated discussion of a policy on international terrorism promoted by the growing number of incidents as long ago as 1972, he did not anticipate the depth and intensity of the Third World's resistance to efforts to define terrorist offenses as crimes. Instead, he was forced to change his central focus from terrorist acts themselves to the misery, frustration, and grievances allegedly giving rise to these acts. This focus seemed to imply tolerance or even justification of terrorism.

While the United Nations has not succeeded since that time in its attempts to provide a global concensus on the meaning of terrorism, it has been more effective in identifying some specific offenses and in taking some juridical steps to cope with them. This was the case when major nations shared a common concern over the danger. These offenses are set forth in An International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages drafted by the General Assembly and signed in 1978.[5]

Moreover, several of the U.N. specialized agencies have concentrated on categories of terrorist activities directly related to their mandates. In 1963, they dealt with the unlawful seizure of aircraft;[6] in 1971, they covered the offenses of sabotage;[7] in 1974, they passed an article prohibiting explosive, flammable, or other dangerous substances in letters;[8] and in 1979, they categorized as criminal offenses acts involving the theft of or threatened usage of nuclear material to cause death or serious injury.[9]

Following endorsement by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) on June 30, 1970,[10] of efforts to prevent and punish acts of terrorism and a similar resolution by the Council of Europe on January 27, 1977,[11] many member states of these organizations signed conventions urging effective measures for the suppression of terrorist crimes like kidnapping, extortion, or attack against life or liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents.

The problem facing the intergovernmental organizations is not the availability of substantial conceptual elements of international law condemning particular aspects of terrorism, but the vagueness and confusion about the implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of the law.

Attempts by Foreign Governments to Define Terrorism

The definitional focus of each sovereign government depends first and foremost on the nature of its internal and external policies. Every sovereign state reserves to itself the political and legal authority to determine what is and what is not terrorism in the context of domestic and foreign affairs. For instance, the United Kingdom applies the term to the Irish Republican Army, and Israel regards all PLO acts as terrorist.

Certain states have complicated the definition of the nature of terrorism by dealing with it solely as a part of their own politically motivated psychological warfare and propaganda. A case in point is the exploitation of the terms "liberation struggle" or "war of national liberation" by the Soviet Union as a defense against criticism by the United States of Soviet-sponsored terrorist acts.

For instance, on April 27, 1981, welcoming Libya's Colonel Qadhafi to Moscow as a "comrade in the struggle for the rights and freedoms of peoples," President Brezhnev scornfully repudiated the views of the United States critical of Qadhafi, saying that, "Imperialists have no regard either for the will of the people or the laws of history. Liberation struggles cause their indignation. They describe them as 'terrorism.' "[12]

Similarly, Marshal Dimitri Ustinov, until his recent death a Member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party and Minister of Defense, defined terrorism as the actions of "neofascism." He further pointed out that the "evil-minded" charges against Moscow were intended to "cover up Western subversion of Poland and other countries." In general, Ustinov concluded, terrorism is "one of the most terrible manifestations of the moral and political crisis of capitalist society and the embodiment of lawlessness."[13]

From these statements it is not hard to understand how the USSR opened up all its propaganda outlets to blame the United States for allegedly assassinating Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in October 1984. There was no shred of evidence to support this ridiculous allegation, but Moscow sought to muddy the waters of international opinion by trumped-up charges. The concept of Moscow and Washington on these matters is cultural worlds apart.

The Soviet Union has only defined specific acts as terrorism, such as hijacking, when its own interests are at stake. Thus, the USSR signed bilateral treaties on the hijacking of aircraft with Afghanistan (1971), Iran (1973), and Finland (1974).[14] Similarly, Cuba also entered into bilateral agreements on hijacking with the United States (1973),[15] Canada (1973),[16] Mexico (1973),[17] and Colombia (1974).[18]

Nations in the free world have recognized a need to define a wider range of acts of terrorism in order to determine their policy goals. Each one concentrates on its particular experience to relate them to its choice of terminology. Argentina calls terrorism a "flagrant violation of human rights....(and) incompatible with the concept of human dignity."[19] France states terrorism is a "heinous act of barbarism."[20] Venezuela emphasizes that it is any act that "endangers or takes innocent human lives, or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms."[21]

U.S. Perceptions of Terrorism

The United States as a pluralist democracy speaks with a bewildering variety of voices on the subject of terrorism. The vast literature accumulating throughout the U.S. Government and the private sector reveals that terrorism has countless causes, forms, and effects. It is ancient, it is pervasive although cyclical in intensity, and it is plainly on a very high plateau after a rising trend over the past 20 years. The vagueness in the American public consciousness about its character and meaning is due to the diverse and protean forms and alleged purposes of the terrorist act itself, as well as to official and unofficial disagreements concerning its nature, scope, and appropriate responses. The prevailing tendency has been to view each terrorist act as an individual incident without political pattern or strategic dimension. This attitude is naive in view of the accumulating evidence of collusion among states sponsoring violence against pluralist democracies, particularly the United States and its allies abroad.

When all the definitions and legislative formulas have been reviewed, the elements of commonality bring one back to the normal usages of careful students of the English language. The Oxford Dictionary includes two primary meanings of terrorism:

> First, it is government by intimidation as directed and carried out by the party in power in France during the revolution of 1789-1794: the system of terror (1793-4).
>
> Second, it connotes a policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing.

The first meaning is exactly what should be called state terrorism, as practiced by Lenin, Stalin, and Mao. The second meaning is broader, embracing "employment of methods of intimidation" by any individual or group. When a state supports or encourages "the fact of terrorizing" by individuals or groups acting outside its own border, the phenomenon is state-sponsored terrorism, a missing element in the standard dictionary.

The heart of the problem of the definition is that the use of violence for political purposes, real or hidden, cannot be viewed as value-free. The purposes make the difference. The cultural, moral, and political values of the society that has evolved in the United States during 200 years of constitutionalism and representative government must enter into the official American working definition of this troublesome phenomenon. Officials and military services must reflect the basic standards of American citizens' judgments about the aim of terrorists to determine what it is and whether it is culpable.

Terrorism is obviously perceived differently by perpetrators, victims, and observers. To the attackers, "whoever stands by a just cause cannot possibly be called a terrorist." [22] On the other hand, the diverse origins and semantic justifications of this sort of act are irrelevant to the victims. The unaffected observer determines the pejorative or favorable view of the act from the political perspective of the ultimate international results.

Here the United States must take a principled stand on the high ground of devotion to the defense of freedom. Self-defense is a legitimate posture in the defense of society and institutions as well as individual human beings. Americans should make the most of this fact. History bears out that terrorism begets more terrorism, usually resulting in diminished freedom and restricted human rights unless firm and well-defined defensive measures are taken. In the context of Soviet strategic aims and conduct of Soviet client states, terrorist activity of the kind Moscow labels "wars of national liberation" leads to political oppression and tyranny, not to the improvement of society. Unless Americans see this clearly, it will be impossible to cope with the dark impulses of the legacy of Yuri Andropov. This fact is why it is imperative to define terrorism of the 1980s in its full strategic dimension, reflecting its geopolitical purpose.

Lack of Consensus in Non-Governmental Definitions

Expert writers or spokesmen, working in the media or in academe, have not produced a uniform working definition of terrorism. In fact, the proliferation of definitions in these fields underscores the diversity of attitudes.

The problem is compounded by the fact that the free media in democratic societies are based on competition and profit. They see terrorism as attention-grabbing news and seldom worry about consistency of categorization. It is inevitable, in view of the terrorist search for publicity, that the media become an integral part of the terrorist act. Describing this phenomenon, Ford Rowan, host of the International Edition, Independent Network News, observed, "Terrorism is an act of theater and, unfortunately, the media are its stage. The press, and especially the electronic media, seem to thrive on the sensational. The terrorists for their part, manufacture sensations to capture the attention of the fascinated public." [23]

Similarly, articulation by academics and experts in the United States of what is and is not terrorism has been so disorganized and diverse that it has left us in a kind of intellectual and moral limbo. As Secretary of State George Shultz said of the difficulty of responding adequately to the terrorist threat, the United States risks becoming a "Hamlet of nations."[24]

Indeed, a survey of the literature illustrates the difficulty in determining scientifically the nature and meaning of terrorism. There is a proliferation of variables connected with the psychological effects. They include fear, intimidation, coercion, anxiety, and mental distress. Attribution of motives to terrorists ranges from manipulating psychological attitudes to committing genocide. Only a handful of writers speak of political or strategic objectives based on competing social and political values leading to terrorist crimes.

The U.S. Federal System

Under the U.S. federal system, each state determines what constitutes an offense under its criminal or penal code. An increasing number of states have defined terrorism generically as a crime, thus evading the use of specific statutes covering selected criminal acts identified as terrorism. These state laws characteristically deal with criminality of particular acts of violence but not with sponsorship by foreign nations nor military aspects of the problem.

A typical example of state statutes is Arkansas Criminal Code. It declares:

> A person commits the offense of terroristic threatening if with the purpose of terrorizing another person he threatens to cause death or serious physical injury or substantial property damage to another person.
>
> ...a person commits a terroristic act when, while not in the commission of a lawful act, he shoots at or in any manner projects an object with the intent to cause injury to persons or property at a conveyance which is being operated or which is occupied with passengers.[23]

Since state statutes focus only on domestic expressions of terrorism, it is the mandate of the U.S. Congress to define state-sponsored terrorism.

Role of the U.S. Congress

The conceptual effort to define the meaning and nature of terrorism and its relation to the whole spectrum of conflict has in fact in recent years engaged the attention of the U.S. Congress. Congress has over several years held hearings, considered more than 70 bills, adopted resolutions, and passed laws on terrorism. Nevertheless, a comprehensive working definition that can address the different forms of terrorist activity has not emerged from the Congress thus far.

A case in point of a very serious approach to the subject is Senate bill S.2236 of 1977 aimed "to strengthen federal policies and programs and international cooperation to combat international terrorism." Senator Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, introduced the bill, known as An Act to Combat International Terrorism, in the Senate on October 25, 1977. The bill's definition included the following components:

> First, the definition builds on crimes defined under certain international conventions.
>
> Second, the definition includes descriptions of the other unlawful actions.
>
> Third, the definition concerns itself with the place--the international context.
>
> Fourth, the definition provides that to be criminal in the context of the bill, such acts must be targeted at least in part against the interests of state or international organizations.
>
> Fifth, the definition provides that essentially military operations are not to be considered acts of terrorism.

More comprehensive definitional treatment was offered along the same lines in the U.S. environment by Senator Jeremiah Denton, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee of the Judiciary, in his introduction to the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1984. He said:

> ...terrorism means the knowing use of force or violence against any person or property in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, territory, possession, or district, with the intent to intimidate, coerce, or influence a government or person in furtherance of any political or ideological objective.[26]

Despite the enunciation of this broad definition, more serviceable in these times than most, Senator Denton himself adopted a narrower approach under different circumstances of congressional consideration. In the Act of Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts (98th Congress, 2nd Session, H.R. 5612), the senator limited terrorism to those acts which are intended:

> (A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
>
> (B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or

(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.

Moreover, Congress has tended to define terrorism mainly in terms of specific criminal offenses with an international aspect. The congressional acts include Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,[27] Crimes Against Aviation,[28] and Crimes Against Taking of Hostages.[29]

The Executive Branch

Numerous working definitions of terrorism are beginning to be formed in the official statements issued by the executive branch in attempts to define policy in the face of proliferating terrorist violence. In the late 1970s, statutory definitions encompassed most of the elements typically incorporated within the category of international terrorism, but they did not deal with the special problem of state sponsorship or consider terrorism as a form of international conflict, e.g., covert warfare. In the next decade, these two definitional elements are finally being regularly accepted by most senior officials.

In 1980, the Central Intelligence Agency specified that "international terrorism is terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or organization and/or directed against foreign nationals, institutions, or governments."[30]

In 1984, Louis O. Giuffrida, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, stated that "it is only inevitable that more and more terrorism will be state-sponsored because it is the cheapest and least hazardous way to fight an undeclared war."[31]

It is not surprising that the Department of Defense, when reporting on the truck bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut, emphasized the "unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization."[32] The Department of the Army, although adhering in general to the "violence" theme, adds, "Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims."[33]

This linkage between terrorism and psychological warfare is also underscored by the Department of State, its officials, and a number of representatives of other governmental agencies.

In June 1984, Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, then U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, explained emphatically, "Terrorism is a form of war against a society and all who embody it....Terrorist war is part of a total war which sees the whole society as the enemy, and all members of a society as appropriate objects for violent action."[34]

Secretary Shultz, who has primary responsibility for determining the meaning of terrorism for the entire executive branch, has developed and explained his own perceptions of terrorism in increasing awareness of the current techniques of international resort to violence. On June 24, 1984, he equated terrorism roughly with war and spoke of the rise of state-sponsorship.[35] On October 25, 1984, he called terrorism "a form of political violence" that is "neither random nor without purpose."[36]

"But the overarching goal of all terrorists is the same," he said in his October statement. "They are trying to impose their will by force—a special kind of force designed to create an atmosphere of fear....they want people to lose faith in their government's capacity to protect them and thereby to undermine the legitimacy of the government itself, or its policies, or both."

"We must understand, however," he continued, "that terrorism, wherever it takes place, is directed in an important sense against _us_, the democracies--against our most basic values and often our fundamental strategic interests."[37]

A few months later, on February 4, 1985, when speaking of defense against terrorism, Shultz declared, "Terrorism poses a direct threat not only to Western strategic interests but to the very moral principles that undergird Western democratic society. The enemies of the West are united. So too must the democratic countries be united in a common defense against terrorism."[38]

On March 6, 1984, President Reagan sent a package of four anti-terrorism bills to the Congress designed to deal with some of the dangers posed by international terrorism. They included proposed legislation against aircraft sabotage, against the taking of hostages, and against training and support of terrorist organizations. The fourth established a reward for information concerning terrorist acts. In the closing days before the election recess, Congress passed three of the bills, all except the one calling for prohibition against training or supporting terrorist organizations.

At the time he submitted these bills, the president pointed out that over the past decade almost 6,500 terrorist incidents had taken place and that approximately 40 percent of these had been targeted against American citizens. He deplored the increased emergence of state terrorism, which, he said, was "starkly manifest in the recent spectacles of violence in Beirut, Rangoon, and Kuwait." State-sponsored terrorists, he continued, pose a severe challenge to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy as well as to the security of U.S. citizens.[39]

This whole legislative exercise was in part an educational effort to communicate the serious meaning of terrorism to the Congress and to the American people.

A Working U.S. Definition

All U.S. agencies soon must adopt a final coordinated position on the meaning of the most complex and troublesome international danger of the 1980s. Terrorists resort to a variety of means to cause conflict or unrest in the entire ideological, political, social, economic, and strategic spectrum. Physical violence, naturally uppermost in U.S. media and public concern, is only one of the modes of creating terror. Threats, psychological destabilization, and political pressure are often equally dangerous to social stability. The destructive effect of all forms of terrorist action is obvious both in the damage to social and political tranquility it causes as well as in the destruction of lives and property.

The Army's formulation of this phenomenon provides a reasonable working definition of terrorism. Army Regulation 190-52 states that terrorism is:

> the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals political, religious, or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.

From all the foregoing history and analysis, it is possible to go beyond this formulation to derive a working definition of state-sponsored terrorism, as a subset of terrorism. It must reflect American social and political values and have useful policy and operational benefits for democratic societies. This definition specifically includes members of the armed forces, since military service personnel in non-combat roles are frequently finding themselves among possible targets. They are seldom included in current conceptualizations of the phenomenon of modern terrorism or appropriate responses to it.

It is suggested that state-sponsored terrorism be defined as:

> **The deliberate employment of violence or the threat of use of violence by sovereign states (or sub-national groups encouraged or assisted by sovereign states) to attain strategic and political objectives by acts in violation of law intended to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened.**

It is further suggested that recent history indicates:

> **The main goal of this state-sponsored terrorism now at the end of the twentieth century is to undermine selectively the policies, the psycho-social stability, and political governability of pluralist states with representative governments.**

This somewhat cumbersome but carefully crafted two-part definition has many advantages over most other formulations in current use. Not the least of its virtues is that it reflects the spirit of the attitudes of serious-minded American citizens as well as the recent policy positions voiced by President Reagan and Secretary Shultz.

In international affairs legal concepts are seldom juristically value-free since 170 sovereign nations make their own laws governing their own practices and policies. It is crucial for the United States to employ a realistic definition of terrorism that effectively deals with the international behavior actually being encountered today and also makes sense in the context of the American political culture.

This working definition of state-sponsored terrorism meets the following criteria while systematically describing the main elements in the earlier outlined anatomy of terrorism (see pp. 25-26):

1. An act of violence, whether threatened or carried out is criminal and terroristic if it is in violation of national or international law and if it is aggressive rather than in defense of a legitimate political order.

2. A political organization exercising sovereign powers, whether a nation-state or an organization claiming sovereignty (such as the Palestine Liberation Organization) must be among the perpetrators or must be actively encouraging or directly supporting the perpetrators of acts of violence in another country. Only then is terroristic behavior identified as fitting the pattern of state-sponsorship.
3. Various political goals may be claimed for terrorists acts but from the viewpoint of national security interests of the United States, the classical case of state-sponsored terrorism is one where the strategic consequence will be major enhancement of the power of an ideologically totalitarian regime or the serious weakening of a state structure attempting to establish or maintain pluralist representative government.
4. The outcome of state-sponsored terrorism must include creating overwhelming fear in a broad population being targeted for radical psychological, social, political, and, hence, strategic change.
5. It should be understood that the targets of violence within the threatened population targeted for change include military forces on non-combat or peacekeeping missions as well as officials and businessmen.
6. Any methods employing or threatening violent attacks against human beings or state and private property qualify an act as terrorism and if the perpetrators include sovereign political organizations--as state-sponsored terrorism.

The anatomy of modern politically and ideologically oriented acts of violence involving sovereign states is better outlined in the suggested working definition presented here than in any other commonly used definition. It should be considered for adoption by the armed services and the U.S. Government as a whole.

NOTES

1. This analysis is based on a comprehensive survey of several hundred definitions utilized by governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations, the media, and the academic community. During September-December 1984, the authors of this study sent out a questionnaire to gather this information.
2. The first treaty is called "Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals and for the Protection Against Anarchism," Mexico City, January 28, 1902. The signatories were the Argentine Republic, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, the United States, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, the United Mexican States, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Yonah Alexander, Marjorie Ann Browne, and Allan S. Nanes, eds., Control of Terrorism: International Documents, New York: Crane Russak, 1979, pp. 3-9.
3. Ibid., pp. 19-29.
4. Ibid., pp. 31-42.
5. U. N. General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Sixth Committee, Agenda item 120, A/C.6/33/L.6, 15 November 1978.
6. 20 UST 2941; TIAS 6768; entered into force December 4, 1969.
7. 24 UST 564; TIAS 7570; entered into force January 26, 1973.
8. UKTS, No. 57 (1976), Cmnd. 6538; in force since January 1, 1976.
9. Brian M. Jenkins, "International Cooperation in Locating and Recovering Stolen Nuclear Materials," Terrorism: An International Journal, v. 6, no. 4 (1983), p. 572.
10. TIAS 8481.

11. Dur. T.S., No. 90 and Great Britian. Papers by Command Condor: Her Majesty's Stationary, 1977. (Cmnd. 7031).

12. Washington Post and New York Times, April 28, 1981. Cited in Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection, New York: Crane Russak, 1984, p.22.

13. Strategic Review, v. I, Spring 1981, p. 9. Cited in Cline and Alexander. Op. cit., pp. 22-23.

14. Alona Evans and John Murphy, eds., Legal Aspects of International Terrorism, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978, p. 48, n. 119.

15. 24 UST 737; TIAS 7579. This agreement was denounced by Cuba in October 1976, with effect from April 15, 1977 (for alleged complicity in sabotage for a Cuban aircraft).

16. Canada Treaty Series, 1973, no. 11.

17. Terrorism: An International Journal, v. 7, no. 2 (1984), p. 145.

18. Ibid.

19. Terrorism in Argentina (a document prepared by the Argentine government addressed to the Argentine people), January 7, 1970, pp. 12.

20. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, U.N. General Assembly, 28th Session, Supplement no. 28 (A/9028), New York, 1973, p. 350.

21. Ibid., p. 352.

22. Yasser Arafat at the U.N. General Assembly, 1974, quoted by Secretary of State George Shultz before the Park Avenue Synagogue, New York, October 25, 1984.

23. Leonard Theberge and Yonah Alexander, eds., "Terrorism and the Media in

the 1980s," (Conference Report), Political Communication and Persuasion: An International Journal, v. 2, no. 3 (1984), p. 300.

24. Secretary Shultz, Op. cit., October 25, 1984, p.6.

25. Arkansas Criminal Code, Title 41, Section 41-1608 and Title 41, Section 41-1651.

26. Congressional Record, v. 130, no. 35 (March 22, 1984), p. 2.

27. Public Law 92-539, October 24, 1972, amended the Criminal Code (Title 18, U.S.C.).

28. Public Law 93-366, August 5, 1974.

29. Public Law 98-473, October 10, 1984.

30. "Pattern of International Terrorism: 1980," a research paper prepared by the National Foreign Assessment Center, Washington, D.C., p. ii. (This is a Central Intelligence Agency publication and is based on information available as of December 31, 1980).

31. "How Can Terrorism be Stopped? The Domestic Front," remarks before the Jonathan Institute's Second Conference on International Terrorism, Washington, D.C., June 26, 1984, pp. 2 and 5.

32. Report of the Department of Defense Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (December 20, 1983), p. 122.

33. Army Regulation 190-52.

34. Address before the Jonathan Institute's Second Conference on International Terrorism, Washington, D.C., June 24, 1984, p. 2.

35. Ibid., p. 1.

36. Secretary Shultz, Op. cit., October 25, 1984, p. 1.

37. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

38. Address by Secretary Shultz before the American Society for Industrial Security, Arlington, Virginia, February 4, 1985, p. 2.

39. American Bar Association, Standing Committee, Law and National Security Intelligence Report, v. 6, no. 7, July 1984 and v. 6, no. 11, November 1984.

Chapter IV

STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

The conceptual debate surrounding what constitutes terrorism becomes more confused when it is linked to other terms traditionally associated with the broader spectrum of violent conflict so prevalent today. When terrorism is state-sponsored, it is plainly in some sense a form of secret or undeclared warfare that is inconvenient internationally to designate as such. On the other hand, "peace" is a euphemism. In conventional phraseology in both official and media usage, it is the absence of declared war, not the absence of violent conflict.

As General Carl von Clausewitz said long ago, "War is a mere continuation of policy by other means," in other words, "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will." [1]

State-sponsored terrorism is precisely such a pursuit of policy. Or, conversely, as scholars have noted, such a policy is a continuation of war by other means.

Because of fears of military escalation in today's miniwars, it is becoming common to call this kind of violence low-intensity conflict. This is probably the best term to use provided that it is understood that such conflict can be extremely intense, destructive, and destabilizing.

What is also important to understand is that Clausewitz' formula on war is the rationale of state-sponsored terrorism because it has as the ultimate objective the compulsory submission of the enemy to the will of the aggressor.

A dramatic example of this reality is the bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut. The Department of Defense Commission investigating the incident concluded:

> The systematic, carefully orchestrated terrorism which we see in the Middle East represents a new dimension of warfare. These international terrorists, unlike their traditional counterparts, are not seeking to make a random political statement or to commit the occasional act of intimidation on behalf of some ill-defined long-term vision of the future. For them, terrorism is an integrated part of a strategy in which there are well-defined political and military objectives.[2]

Terrorism, then, can be another tool for nations to use to project military and political power. When the tool is successfully employed in areas of important national interest to the United States, it presents significant challenges to the U.S. Government and specifically to the role of the Army in countering terrorism. It is essential to address the question of how state-sponsored terrorism relates to the spectrum of conflict ranging from isolated individual acts of violence (domestic crime) and normal diplomatic and economic international pressures to organized military hostilities between political entities (overt warfare). The answer is that it may fit into any of the intervening categories commonly identified as low-intensity conflict. Terrorism is an instrument that can be brought into action whenever a state wishes to project its power into the territory of another without accepting the responsibility, accountability, and risks of avowed belligerency. The choice is a matter of how to achieve policy goals.

Defining Low-Intensity Conflict

It has been fashionable among romantic-minded observers of international affairs to believe that terrorism can be considered the poor man's warfare, the ultimate weapon of the weak with a righteous cause for redressing grievances against established authority. The damage done is condoned on the grounds of the desired goals visualized, whether or not the goals are realistic or ever can be gained and whether or not the harm done to society is greater than any possible gains. Some writers and officials maintain, for instance, that terrorist tactics used against strong adversaries by repressed people suffering from discrimination, restraints, or injustices should be condoned or actively supported by the international community. Terrorists, they say, need only determination, dedication, political motive, money, weapons, logistic support, training, and a safe sanctuary, and they have a right to these latter concrete forms of assistance from supportive states.

Essentially, this is the view of the Soviet Union and its client states, plus maverick nations walking a parallel but separate path like Libya and Iran. They call any conflict in which they support the political attack a justifiable war of national liberation, and they condone terrorist campaigns as part of a preferred, cost-effective, reduced-risk strategy.

Coming at the problem from a different angle, modern weapons are so expensive and destructive that a number of nations, ideologically inclined to fight and destroy other states they perceive as enemies, restrict themselves systematically to low-intensity conflict. They attack their enemies but confine their violence to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, well away from the high-intensity of open, organized military hostilities. Their initial aim is often simply to create a climate of social discontent. In this context, the psychological and destabilizing impact of terrorism may be an integral element in any phase of low-level or low-intensity conflict. Terrorist actions may be the decisive turning points in the kind of hostilities that are always conducted on a small scale compared to conventional full-scale military operations.

The U.S. Army, speaking of low-intensity conflict (LIC), suggests a definition that clearly articulates the challenges. It reads, LIC is:

> A broad term describing political-military struggle, short of conventional warfare between national armed forces, to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures through terrorism to insurgent war. The military aspects of LIC are characterized by constraints on the level of violence, weaponry, and tactics. LIC includes such activities as demonstrations of forces, security assistance, peacekeeping, rescue operations, terrorism counteraction, special operations, and limited direct use of regular military forces.[3]

A schematic spectrum of conflict, encompassing a number of elements often creating conditions leading to state-sponsored terrorism, is on the following page.

This schematic reveals the dilemmas inherent in semantic overlap and deliberate confusion about these terms. Diplomatic pressure includes economic sanctions and military suasion of the kind implicit in demonstration of armed force capabilities or presence--"showing the flag." This kind of international behavior is continuous and normal. The truth is, there is a strong streak of veiled hostility in most relationships between nations. Diplomacy is the way international conflicts are managed at the lowest level of the spectrum of conflict. If successful in avoiding resort to any kind of violence, diplomacy is credited with keeping peace, in other words, confining conflict to less abrasive and fundamentally non-violent dimensions.

At the opposite end of the spectrum lie overt military hostilities, the last resort of a sovereign political entity seeking to win its strategic objectives against the resistance of another. Hostilities may be large or small in scale and in the destructiveness of the types of weapons used. War may be declared, although since the end of World War II, hostilities have usually been fought undeclared. Overt hostilities create a climate of organized violence in which terrorist acts may occur

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT


Normal Diplomatic and Economic Pressure
Low-Intensity Conflict (Beyond Diplomacy--Short of War)
Overt Hostilities (Warfare by Organized Military Forces)
Creating Climate of Discontent
Political and Economic Destabilization
Hostile Propaganda, Subversion
Armed Insurgency Measures
Guerrilla Military Operations
Armed Revolution to Overthrow State Authority
"War of National Liberation" (Conflict of Strategic Benefit to the USSR)
State-Sponsored Terrorism (Illegitimate Optional Tactic in Low-Intensity Conflict)

*** The U.S. armed forces do not endorse or engage in terrorism. They must be prepared, however, to encounter terrorist tactics employed by hostile forces in any phase across the entire spectrum of conflict ranging from normal international relations up to overt hostilities.

but are no longer the strategically important element in the conflict, and the risks of escalation to greater and greater destruction are the paramount consideration. State-sponsored terrorism is in many ways thus a preferred substitute for overt hostilities, the strategy par excellence of unscrupulous states engaged by choice in the mid-range of conflict, e.g., low-intensity conflict.

The legitimacy of certain kinds of political resistance to established authority, e.g., the American Revolution of 1776 to choose an unexceptional case, must be remembered. Deciding what is legitimate and not is a crucial task of foreign policy. Certainly the successive phases of politically motivated violence ranging from illegal acts to create a climate of discontent through propaganda, insurgency, guerrilla war, to full-scale revolution, may be viewed as appropriate actions by a citizenry to defend itself against tyrannic usurpation of authority. In essence, these phases of conflict are legitimate when other remedies are closed off and when violence is directed exclusively at established authority (including police and military forces). Of course, the political grievances must meet the tests of the American Declaration of Independence referring to "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" and some valid demonstration of the "consent of the governed."

The Soviet Union and many other states in the twentieth century simply do not believe in the classical political ethics of Judaic-Christian philosophy and certainly do not believe in representative government. While they take refuge furtively in the rhetoric of revolutions to protect the rights of the governed, they in fact avowedly aim at dictatorship and absolute power for the state bureaucracy.

To avoid reminding people that the Leninist model of government is arbitrary and unrepresentative of the people under its rule, the Soviet Union devised the phrase "war of national liberation" to describe conflicts Soviet leaders and their agents want to enter. This phrase is so vague that it can apply to the whole spectrum of conflict and, on occasion, does. It originated decades ago when there were many European colonies seeking independence. It now seems to mean liberation from U.S. political influence and economic intercourse, something from which most of the peoples of the world show few signs of wanting to be liberated.

Usually today, when Moscow designates an area as the locus of a war of national liberation, it is simply signalling that the Soviet Union wants to diminish American influence and increase its own by low-intensity conflict that will not bring overt military hostilities. The phrase also suggests to Soviet client states, to ambitious local terrorists, and to victims in targeted regions that the Soviet Union will encourage and may directly support terrorist acts that will help in any phase of low-intensity conflict. In other words, propaganda, insurgency, and all of the measures leading to revolution are fair game for every destabilizing act designed to spread fear short of conventional warfare between organized national armed forces. This signal often lets loose forces Moscow does not control, but they are usually, nonetheless, assisted directly or indirectly in regions where disorder hurts the United States and its friends.

A brief further description of each phase of low-intensity conflict in which violence is customarily employed clarifies the relationship between conflict and state-sponsored terrorism.

Insurgency

Insurgency is a condition of armed revolt against a recognized government that does not reach the proportions of organizing a revolutionary government or being recognized as a military belligerent. Its targets are ususally military forces or installations, and it follows international rules of armed conflict. It actively seeks a basis of popular support for the goals it espouses and, if successful, would eventually conduct guerrilla military operations and organize a revolutionary regime.

The resort to terrorist methods by an insurgent group is a great temptation, particularly if a foreign state offers assistance in such tactics. These methods cannot be condoned, however, no matter how theoretically noble the objective may be. Insurgents using terrorist methods become outlaws in human society just as the nation state does that supports acts of terrorism.

Insurgency without terrorist acts is merely the first phase of a legitimate attempt at revolution in which military violence is used for specific political and military gains rather than for the purpose of spreading fear. It may succeed or fail. It may either adopt or eschew terrorist methods. Outside support for insurgency will normally depend on whether the goals are politically compatible with the values of the nation concerned.

Guerrilla Military Operations

Guerrilla warfare, literally "a little war," is one of the oldest forms of conflict. With the rise of Leninist and Maoist models of communism, and particularly in view of Soviet direct or indirect support of guerrilla armies in various non-communist countries in the post World War II period, the meaning of the term has been increasingly associated with terrorism. This may be partly because of popularization of the term "urban guerrilla," which indeed means a terrorist acting in the anonymity of the big city. Classical guerrilla operations may or may not employ terrorist tactics and methods.

> Guerrillas, while "irregular," are organized and operate from large bases (which they may move)....Guerrillas may be supported by, or may support, a regular military force, aim to develop into a regular force

> themselves, and strive for occupation and power.
>
> Terrorists are on the road, or in safe houses, or they hide abroad....Terrorists aim to terrorize, i.e., largely at psychological effects. If they kill, instead of unknown citizens, prominent persons, military, economic, and political leaders, they want to maximize the psychological effects, and possibly to achieve limited political effects.[4]

These distinctions suggest that guerrilla military operations are part of a campaign of combat against state authorities and armies that is progressing toward a full-scale revolution but has too few fighting forces and has them too dispersed to move into a formal political showdown battle. Guerrilla military operations may move on to this revolutionary attempt at seizure of power, or they may drop back to the sporadic, harassing operations best defined as insurgency. If the guerrillas confront oppressive dictatorships, if they avoid the temptation to win by spreading terror, and especially if they refuse help from another nation using terrorist methods, then their operations are a legitimate form of conflict.

Political Revolution

A revolution is a basic transformation of the political, economic, or social principles and institutions in a state, resulting from the overthrow of an established governmental order. It may be helped by outside forces, including foreign states. Thus, eighteenth century France secretly gave money and military aid to the American colonies in revolution against Great Britian. Such secret intervention is not terrorism unless terrorist methods are employed.

A revolution typically involves a popular uprising and the use of violence against the governing elite. When revolutionary leaders are able to occupy principal posts within the government of a state, they may be able to participate in making policies that achieve some of their goals.

In light of the more militant revolutionary traditions of Lenin's, Mao's, or

Castro's revolutions, this is only a temporary step on the way to total political control:

> the ultimate objective is the total destruction of the society, the government, and the administration of the area in which the conflict is occurring.[5]

Obviously, revolutions can be legitimate or illegitimate, depending on their strategic goals. They are justified if there is no other reasonable remedy or recourse by which to move away from arbitrary and oppressive dictatorship toward representative government, pluralism, and a society protective of minorities and individual human rights. On the other hand, if revolutions lead to dictatorship and suppression of liberties, they are definitely illegitimate regardless of what tactics are being employed. Unfortunately, the outcome is not always clear when groups begin the early process of propaganda and struggle for their cause. Nevertheless, the real outcome is the only definitive test.

War of National Liberation

This picture is substantially distorted by the introduction of the communist propaganda term, war of national liberation. It can be applied to any low-intensity conflict the Soviet Union chooses to support. Like terrorism, it fits into almost any category of the spectrum of conflict and is a constant element of the early phases of political propaganda or subversion, furthering a climate of discontent in countries where communist states seek greater power.

Soviet leaders have always espoused the right to fight a just war of national liberation, that is, to assist revolutionary fighters in what they call an effort to shake off external domination. They would say they have helped in wars of national liberation in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

In practical language, the term is simply Leninist double-talk for a conflict that destabilizes nations inclined toward cooperation with the United States. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union tolerates and often positively encourages the use of terrorist methods in pursuit of political goals that are advantageous. A proliferation of U.N. resolutions and declarations regrettably have consistently underscored certain fundamental principles in support of this Soviet concept.[6]

The Soviet formula for wars of national liberation is fiendishly simple. First, the Soviet Union acquires a political base for expansion in a region where its strategic ambitions lie. Then it sends Soviet advisers, money, weapons, and political propaganda. The Cubans provide troops for local security and tactical military training, as they have in Latin America, Africa, and the Mideast. The East Germans send trainers and advisers for intelligence services. In Southeast Asia, Vietnam does military proxy work in a manner similar to Cuba elsewhere. The North Koreans fought the first Soviet-sponsored proxy war of the century in the 1950s, and frequently dispatch assassination teams to kill their political enemies in South Korea or to teach other Soviet client states the techniques of terrorist strikes.

This process of changing the political structure of nations may not be well described as dominoes falling, since it has an intermittent quality determined by targets of opportunity. A more apt figure of speech would be an infection, a virulent disease spreading airborne wherever the winds of change and social conditions are receptive. It has been clear for more than two decades, nevertheless, that the Marxist-Leninist prescription of "liberation" is a recipe for destruction, one-by-one, of successive open societies trying to establish pluralist political freedoms. It is usually marked by state sponsorship of terrorism at most stages of development of the low-intensity conflict, especially if the Soviet Union formally designates the target area as the locale of a war of national liberation.

There are situations when insurgency and guerrilla warfare are legitimate political acts necessary to secure fundamental human rights, and the United States may want to assist such struggles of freedom. The Soviet propaganda classification of their kind of "liberation" is not such a case of legitimate conflict. It is most often a cloak for state sponsorship of terrorism.

Nature of State Sponsorship

With this background on the spectrum of conflict, it is possible and critically important to be precise about the exact nature of sponsorship by a state that introduces terrorist acts for strategic goals into a low-intensity conflict.

State sponsorship is the direct or indirect instigation by a government of official and non-official groups to exercise psychological or physical violence against political opponents, another government, or other entity for purposes of coercion and widespread intimidation to bring about a desired political or strategic objective. What distinguishes state sponsorship of terrorism is the extent to which the groups carrying out the violence are furthering the policy of an established government outside the territory in which the conflict occurs. What sets apart the use of terrorism from more conventional forms of coercive force at a sovereign state's disposal is the option of plausible denial or lack of public accountability. The method of operating secretly, often working through client states or foreign nationals, affords a sponsoring nation like the Soviet Union, Iran, Libya, or Syria a chance to avoid admitting its warlike behavior and accepting accountability in the court of international opinion.

The degree of state involvement with a terrorist group that can fairly be considered official sponsorship includes provision of support in moral as well as material terms, either directly or indirectly. Psychological conditioning, political indoctrination, and propaganda are often as important as material means. A campaign of terrorism is usually the end of a long and complex development process over a period of time. Outside help by an organized government in control of territory and state institutions is an enormous advantage to a terrorist group striving to create a climate in which it can strike effectively.

Generally, however, if a government is to be held responsible internationally for the actions of a terrorist organization, its assistance to that group has to be measured in concrete terms: e.g., direction of activities, supply of funding and armaments, permitting use of national territory, and assets for training and intelligence functions. Such a close level of involvement, however, is usually accompanied by an ideological, religious, or political affinity between a government and a group as well as propaganda support of one for the other. It is the role of accomplice or accessory to the crime, however, rather than the rhetoric that constitutes concrete and convincing evidence of sponsorship of terrorism.

In international affairs, it is not so commonly understood as in domestic law that a conspiracy to commit a crime is in itself a crime. This elementary concept applying to state sponsorship must be established in international opinion because it justifies self-defense measures and retribution. A terrorist group acting in conjunction with or for a foreign government can be used to affect a target country's political stability, commercial ties, and diplomatic relations in ways which direct military confrontation cannot or will not achieve. This can be the case both in situations where a state of war exists between the sponsor and target governments or in which no official hostilities are in effect. It is most insidious and dangerous to democratic institutions in the latter case.

An example is Iran's activation of terrorist cells among Shi'ite Moslem populations throughout the Mideast. Before the Islamic Jihad made international headlines with the suicide truck bombings of U.S. installations in Lebanon, Iran had used its terrorist network as a complement to its war against Iraq. Iraqi Shi'ites recruited and trained by Iranians had carried out urban guerrilla actions in Baghdad and against key points of Iraq's economy. Terrorist operations were directed against Mideast governments backing Iraq and diplomatic and commercial assets of Iraq's European arms suppliers, namely the French. Thus the ripple of violence spread farther and farther.

The line of reasoning behind Soviet and Arab state support for PLO terrorism has plainly included resort to such tactics as an alternative to entering into direct military confrontation with Israel. PLO aircraft hijackings, hostage seizures, and other acts of that sort generally associated with terrorism, picked up when more conventional cross-border guerrilla operations into Israeli territory became more difficult as a result of the organization's expulsion from Jordan in 1970.

On March 25, 1985, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert C. McFarlane summed up the nature of state-sponsored terrorism as:

> Terrorism is a revolting phenomenon undertaken by those who by choice stand outside the pale of civilized people. It is a form of warfare directed against an acceptable schema of political and cultural life. We have no realistic choice but to meet it, and that means head-on, when nothing else works. The aim of terrorists and the ultimate objective of those who sponsor, train, and supply them is to undermine our values, to shatter our self-confidence, and to blunt our response.[7]

Forms of State Sponsorship

Examples of various types of state sponsorship include the ideological encouragement communist governments have given to various Marxist terrorist groups active around the world. This relationship now exists between radical Islamic regimes and violence-prone Moslem fundamentalist movements.

Once a group identifies ideologically and psychologically with a certain government, it is a fairly simple matter for a government to direct or at least influence the actions of that group. Official statements of hostility towards a certain target category, such as American imperialism or capitalism will tend to inspire attacks against assets or symbols of the mutually perceived enemy whether or not there is any positive outside direction or control.

After a cooperative relationship is established, intelligence, diplomatic, or even high-level political contacts are maintained between the sponsor government and the terrorist group. These can range from the indirect intelligence connections which the Bulgarian intelligence services are reported to have maintained with the Italian Red Brigades at the time of the 1981 kidnapping of U.S. Brigadier General James L. Dozier, to the official state-level recognition Moscow extends to the PLO.

A sponsor government can at this point facilitate any or all levels of material aid necessary for a group's survivability, growth, and operational capability. Such aid can range from a government lending sanctuary for individual members of a terrorist organization to the establishment of a full range of propaganda and logistical support facilities for a guerrilla movement.

Islamic and Palestinian terrorist factions can, for example, rely on such support in Iran, Libya, South Yemen, and Syria. Most leftist terrorist organizations operating in Latin America and even some in Europe can dispose of similar facilities in Cuba and Nicaragua.

Such a level of sponsorship is taken one step further when a government uses its own national military to arm and train a terrorist movement. The Soviet Union supplies armaments from its own inventory to the PLO and trains Palestinian guerrilla operatives at national military academies and schools. The same relationship exists between Cuba and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in Chile and between Iran and the Islamic Jihad, to name just a few.

When such a level of dependency is reached between a government and a terrorist organization, the latter can become an agent or instrument of state policy. The sponsor government can begin to fund directly or contract out certain operations. It can regulate the internal politics or development of a group by conditioning their funding and supply of armaments upon acceptance of specified tasks. Libya and Syria, for example, played a key role in conditioning the outcome of a power struggle that developed in the PLO during 1982 by shifting their support to the more radical factions challenging the leadership of Chairman Yasser Arafat.

State Sponsorship by More Than One Government

To be sure, there are situations in which two or more governments have been involved in a terrorist operation. This situation derives from the nature of the international terrorist network, involving links between many governments. A terrorist operation controlled by a Soviet satellite intelligence service, like the Bulgarian-supported attempted assassination of the Pope in Rome, must ultimately involve at least the tacit acquiescence of the Soviet Union. Syrian-directed Palestinian teams that carried out attacks against Jewish targets in Austria were staged in Czechoslovakia. Cases in which a consortium of governments are involved in the conceptual and planning stages of an operation appear to be on the increase.

Activities carried out in the name of Islamic Jihad usually involve more than one government. The truck bombing of U.S. installations in Lebanon and the mining of the Red Sea were both claimed by Islamic Jihad, Iran-Syria and Iran-Libya, respectively.

Syrian intelligence officers also guided the operation against the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut, facilitating contacts between the Shi'ite extremists and Syrian guerrilla operatives who provided the explosive and technical expertise for wiring the truck bombs.

Such double and triple involvement of governments in Islamic Jihad operations stem from their cooperation in forming this particular terrorist network. Before Islamic Jihad operations expanded to their present scope, Syria advised and assisted in the recruitment of terrorist personnel for Iranian efforts to mount Shi'ite guerrilla offensives against Iraq and some of the conservative Persian Gulf states. Following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Libya also became involved in sponsoring Islamic Jihad, reportedly by providing Palestinian operatives to train Shi'ite guerrilla cadre in Iran. Syria apparently also acted as middleman in the Iranian-Libyan exchanges.

The Iranians have been interested in forming such connections. During their occupation of Lebanon in 1982, the Israelis uncovered documents recording the activities of officials at the Iranian embassy in developing contacts with Palestinian guerrilla organizations. The records also indicate that an Iranian official involved in this operation was also working as a double agent for the Soviet Union.[8] This latter connection is highly significant in view of the recent creation of yet another terrorist combination involving radical Shi'ite members of Lebanon's Pro-Moscow Communist Party. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems, one of the names used by the new front, is reportedly playing a leading role in the guerrilla resistance to Israeli forces in South Lebanon. The same group has also claimed responsibility for recent assassinations of British diplomatic personnel in Greece.

Operations in Central America

Half-way around the world, the coming to power of the Sandanista regime in Nicaragua has allowed the establishment of yet another base for multi-government network sponsorship of terrorism. The Cuban and Nicaraguan governments closely coordinate in the supply, staging, and direction of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla war effort in El Salvador. Training camps in Nicaragua are staffed by Cuban, Libyan, and PLO personnel who provide instruction to terrorist cadre from all over Latin America. Such European groups with long-standing Cuban connections like the Spanish Basque Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (ETA) have also entered Nicaragua and staged international terrorist operations for the Salvadoran guerrillas and for the Nicaraguan government.

Southern Africa

The most important active terrorist groups in Southern Africa also benefit from state sponsorship. The revolutionary recipe of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) is based on the Cuban model. The strategy of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) rests on Mao's tactics of widespread terror. South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) has adopted a Moscow-oriented Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

The ANC and SWAPO receive weaponry and military assistance from the USSR, East Germany, and Cuba. The PAC was similarly supported by China in the past.

Several countries in the region, including Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, have allowed ANC, PAC, and SWAPO to use their territories as springboards to launch terrorist attacks directed against South Africa. They have also permitted members of foreign terrorist groups, such as the PLO, the Monteneros, the Tupamaros, the MIRs, and the Red Brigades, to establish linkages with African extremist movements.

Outreach of State Sponsorship

It is a matter of record that most major terrorist groups around the world have at some point maintained a direct or indirect connection with a state sponsor. The open infusion of large quantities of funds, training, armaments, and political support from the Soviet Union and other governments to such mainline umbrella organizations as the PLO has enabled aid to be passed to smaller, connected factions and terrorist groups operating in Europe and elsewhere.[9] The same holds true for the eventual disposition of training, supplies, and weaponry provided by Cuba and Nicaragua to recognized insurgent organizations, including FMLN in El Salvador. Bits of the inventory have ended up in the hands of terrorist groups in other Latin American countries, which have, in turn, carried out actions to support the FMLN's guerrilla war in El Salvador.[10]

Most terrorist groups operating in Europe today, although not enjoying the level of financial, military, and international recognition of the PLO, have benefited from the latter organization's state sponsorship. The pro-Soviet government of South Yemen probably is not directly sponsoring terrorist activity in Spain or West Germany. Elements of ETA and the German Red Army Faction

(RAF) have, on the other hand, undergone guerrilla training at camps in South Yemen run by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The Italian Red Brigades have received arms shipments directly from Soviet-supported PLO contingents in Lebanon. The Irish Republican Army has trained at PLO camps and entered into its own arms supply arrangements with Libya. The Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which originally trained with the PFLP, is now running facilities in Syria.

State-Controlled Groups

There are terrorist organizations which are at the exclusive service of certain states. The Palestinian Sa'iqa organization is, in effect, an agent of the Syrian government. Activities of Islamic Jihad are largely regulated by Iran, although Syria and Libya have some role here as well.

Various terrorist organizations operating in Latin America are largely under the control of Cuba. Operations of the Salvadoran FMLN are closely directed and advised by Cuban intelligence officers. The National Liberation Army (ELN) of Colombia, a group that has refused government overtures to enter into a truce (as more independent insurgent organizations in that country have done), is also directed closely by Cuba.

The Weather Underground Organization (WUO) in the United States grew out of Cuban influence over a violent faction of the leftist Students for a Democratic Society. WUO began terrorist action in North American cities following guerrilla training provided to a group who went to Cuba as part of the Venceremos Brigade in 1969. A Cuban intelligence officer working through Cuba's delegation to the United Nations became the control operative for WUO's leader, Mark Rudd. The Puerto Rican terrorist pro-independence Armed Forces of National Liberation

(FALN) and Boricua Popular Army (EPB) have also had members trained in Cuba and have drawn political direction and support from the Castro government.[11]

Impact of State-Sponsored Terrorism on Terror International

State-sponsored terrorism has affected the tendency for further international cooperation among terrorist groups. Collaboration among ideologically linked bodies and even among those without a common philosophy or political orientation has increased rapidly and substantially.

Clearly, the close Soviet-PLO linkage was critical in building relationships with revolutionary comrades throughout the world. It is evident that the PLO continues to be a useful tool in its capacity as a catalyst and resource center for various movements seeking to subvert non-communist regimes anywhere. In bringing the revolutionaries together into a collaborative and operational network of violence, they carry on low-intensity warfare in areas of significant geopolitical interest for the United States.

Cases in point are the strong links between the PLFP and the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Cuba, and Yugoslavia. The PLFP has, in turn, developed contacts with extremist organizations in Chile, Ireland, Japan, Cyprus, Denmark, Turkey, Greece, Spain, and Sri Lanka. These bilateral relationships have opened up various levels of collaboration, including training, supply of combat material, forging of documents, and joint operations.

As Yasser Arafat clearly explained: "We are a great revolution that can never be intimidated. We have connections with all the revolutionary movements throughout the world."[12]

State Sponsorship: Advantages and Weaknesses

State sponsorship for terrorist groups plays a critical and essential role in augmenting their capabilities and level of threat. Major operations carried out by

Islamic Jihad would not be feasible without the backing of Iran. The more radical factions of the PLO, which enjoy very minor political support among Palestinians, would present much less of a threat, if they could exist at all as organized units, without the support they receive from Syria and Libya. Instruction provided to members of Spain's ETA and West Germany's RAF in Palestinian camps in the Mideast have enabled them to expand the scope of their operations to include the use of light artillery weapons. The new ingredient making terrorism of the 1980s so ubiquitous and destructive is the infrastructure of state sponsorship.

But there are vulnerabilities inherent in such linkages and capabilities. Only a limited number of personnel from a certain terrorist group is likely to undergo advanced guerrilla instruction at an installation in the country of a sponsor government. Their international travel can facilitate their detection and identification (as can the cross-border movement of arms and supplies). Since they are likely to achieve or already are serving in positions of leadership in their respective groups, their arrest or capture can go a long way toward neutralizing a group.

The exposure of linkages between a terrorist group and a foreign government can also serve to undermine its popular support. Conservative Armenians in the United States and Europe, for example, are less likely to encourage support for ASALA if that movement's close connection with Marxist Palestinian organizations and pro-Soviet governments is made known.

The same principle can be applied to other terrorist organizations, such as the IRA, that base their appeals on ethnic or religious identities but have clear Marxist-Leninist leanings and Soviet connections.

Cuban efforts to exercise control over the Salvadoran guerrilla movement caused high-level defections and internecine fighting within the FMLN. This has assisted efforts to penetrate and expose the organization. Similar developments have taken place inside the PLO vis-a-vis efforts by Libya and Syria to control the Palestinian movement.

The Future of State Sponsorship

Although it is difficult to predict the future, it is nevertheless clear that state sponsorship of terrorism will increase. With active cells throughout the Mideast and Europe, it is very likely that states like Iran and Libya will seek to activate terrorist groups among Moslem populations in Southeast Asia and North America. Libya is already cultivating violence-prone black Moslem groups in the United States and supports the MORO National Liberation Front (MNLP) in the Philippines. Pro-Khomeini Moslem groups are engaging in violence in Indonesia.

Ethnic tensions are leading to more and more armed violence on the Indian subcontinent. It is only a matter of time before governments seeking to destabilize India approach the Sikh insurgent movement as it mounts a guerrilla war in the Punjab. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), already activating an insurgency among the northern population in Sri Lanka, counts with the active collaboration of the PLO and North Korea. Communist guerrillas in the Philippines, such as the New Peoples Army (NPA), could soon be supplied with upgraded training and armaments by North Korea and possibly China and Vietnam.

Another likely development might be Cuban and Nicaraguan efforts, possibly through Salvadoran agents, to cultivate terrorist cadre among radical Mexican-American or Chicano movements in the southwestern United States. Chicano groups like the Raza Unida Party and Crusade for Justice have already been involved in the supply of explosives for Puerto Rican FALN bombing operations in the midwest and northeast states.

The Movement of National Liberation, the main umbrella organization for radical Puerto Rican and Mexican-American groups, is already calling for armed struggle to take back Mexican territories captured by "U.S. imperialistic wars," (The Mexican War of 1848).

Moreover, state-sponsored terrorism has taken on new tactics and new dimensions. Operations have become more effective, wider in scope, more sophisticated, and with a higher destructive potential. The mining of the Red Sea is the first terrorist operation to affect commercial navigation over an entire geographical area. The truck bombings of U.S. installations in Lebanon succeeded in reducing Western leverage, and in that country shifted control of events away from the moderates and towards the more radical forces.

The lessons that terrorists and their state sponsors are drawing from Lebanon are that high-explosive attacks against strategic installations with maximum casualty levels are successful. It would be highly dangerous if this set of tactics were applied in Europe, against NATO installations, with the objective of weakening the alliance. As long as state sponsors continue to provide the large quantities of explosives needed for such operations, the eventuality of such a European scenario ranges from the probable to the certain.

The mining of the Red Sea represents an escalation in amphibian or naval terrorist operations. The IRA has previously engaged in sea mining operations. The ETA has also engaged in underwater demolition.

The terrorist trend towards using high explosive attacks to decapitate entire governments is highly disturbing. This was evident in the North Korean-directed operation against the South Korean cabinet that succeeded in killing key ministers. The IRA similarly attempted the same kind of attack against the Thatcher administration in Britain with its recent bombing of the Conservative Party Conference in Brighton. More attacks of this sort can definitely be expected.

Outright assassinations of heads of state through dissident members of national armed forces penetrated by terrorist organizations also appear to be on the increase. Anwar Sadat in Egypt and Indira Ghandi in India are two recent victims.

Finally, state-sponsored terrorism makes the use of weapons of mass destruction more likely. It facilitates the availability of sophisticated armaments and the training in their use. There is little question that if nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological weapons were to become available to such governments as those of Libya and Iran, they would be deployed for terrorist operations.

The Soviet Union is the only terrorist supplier with control over nuclear and bacteriological weapons at the present time. So far, Soviet leaders have not cooperated with such Soviet clients as Qadhafi in providing his government with these technologies. Whether Libya, Iran, or some other terrorist sponsor government manages to acquire nuclear or bacteriological weapons through other channels is another question.

Notwithstanding this mass destruction issue, it can be assumed that U.S. adversaries will continue to utilize terrorism--"warfare on the cheap"--as a significant strategic tool of their foreign policy. A realistic American response to this challenge must, therefore, become a national security requirement.

NOTES

1. General Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Colonel J.J. Graham, London and Boston: Routledge, & Kegan Paul, 1969, v. 1, pp. 2 and 23.
2. Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983. December 20, 1983, Part Nine, I.C., p. 123.
3. Army Low Intensity Conflict Study Group (unpublished document, 1985).
4. Personal communication with Stefan Dossony, October 14, 1984.
5. Brian Jenkins, "Definitions," Readings on Terrorism, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, October 4, 1983, p. 3.
6. Kader Asmal, "The Legal Status of National Liberation Movements (with particular reference to South Africa)," United Nations, Centre Against Apartheid, Lagos: Nigeria, August 13-16, 1984, Document no. 84-17233.
7. Speech delivered at the Defense Strategy Forum, National Strategy Information Center, Inc., International Club, Washington, D.C., on March 25, 1985.
8. An undated document written in Persian by Syed Mehsan Musawi, Temporary Charge d'Affairs, Iranian Embassy in Beirut, addressed to Mr. Louasani, Director General of Asian-African Affairs, Iran.
9. Cline and Alexander, Op. cit.
10. Grenada, A Preliminary Report, Preface, released by Department of State and Department of Defense, December 16, 1983.
11. Quoted by the Associated Press, April 14, 1981.
12. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommitee on Security and Terrorism, The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism Subversion, Hearings, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., March 4, 11, and 12, 1982.

Chapter V

RESPONSES TO STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

The formulation of adequate responses to counter low-intensity conflict, especially when it involves state-sponsored terrorism, presents a dilemma to all free-world nations. To be effective, the response should neutralize terrorism not only by preventing the terrorist act when possible but also by imposing some kind of penalty or punishment on the successful terrorist to deter him from acting again. It is not necessary to become involved in every low-intensity conflict, but the stability of international relations depends on some restraint being placed on the spreading incidents of terrorist violence. Of course, if intelligence about terrorists is good enough to permit pre-emption, the best time to move against them is before they have committed the violent acts.

As principal target and the major power in the world capable of imposing costs on terrorists for their conduct, the United States has a unique strategic responsibility. Yet, the counsels of government in Washington, as elsewhere, appear to be divided as to what to do. Reasoned discourse on the nature of the problem in the media and particularly in Congress is the most urgent need.

In all developed industrial societies there is a tendency to hold back from taking firm measures against terrorists on the usually spurious grounds that the trouble can be eliminated or alleviated by improving social, economic, or political conditions. Outside influences that exploit such conditions and make them virtually irremediable are often ignored even though they are crucial as partial causes and important accessories to terrorist crimes. It is neither local conditions exclusively nor outside exploitation that causes terrorism in most cases today. It is both. While many other aspects of terrorism warrant study, it is time for official agencies of the U.S. Government to focus on the role of states sponsoring destabilizing behavior in areas of American strategic interests.

In practice, the response of the United States has been mainly passive, defensive, and reactive. It is anti-terrorist, but it does not involve active steps to counter terrorism. The U.S. Government has applied non-violent pressure invoking existing criminal legislation and international conventions, making bilateral diplomatic representations, and taking diplomatic action in multilateral organizations or economic sanctions to persuade a country harboring or supporting terrorists to cease and desist. All these measures are to the good, but the missing ingredient is a clear indication that terrorists will pay a heavy cost for mounting their operations against Americans and their foreign friends.

U.S. corporations, for their part, have limited their operations abroad and have allowed themselves to be forced to pay ransoms for top executives. U.S. embassies stress defensive physical security and have converted their facilities to forbidding fortresses in many countries. The U.S. Government has signed international conventions to outlaw hijacking, aircraft sabotage, and attacks on diplomats. In some cases, the United States has applied political and economic sanctions on countries that support or sponsor terrorist activity, but these have not been especially effective because other countries have moved in to supply commodities if the United States does not.

The trend in public and official thinking is now moving toward frustration with passivity and long-suffering defensiveness. The tide of state-sponsored terrorism is rising, especially against the United States, and many American citizens are coming to believe that only strong counter measures can check it or, even better, reverse it.

The way to deter nations from sponsoring terrorist acts or supporting terrorist groups is to let them know in advance that the cost of acting in such a fashion will be high and then make sure that is true. The measures that would hurt the terrorists and their state sponsors the most are the ones that should be given the most emphasis. A cost-imposing strategy in the field of low-intensity conflict is the soundest course, just as it is in warfare. When terrorist acts become a systematic element in these conflicts, it is time to counteract--not merely to react. Working out a strategy that imposes cost on the terrorist and the state sponsors requires planning procedures and sensible decision-making systems, elements that have tended to be neglected in the field of terrorism for a long time. What is clearly required is a capability to make quick decisions and adopt offensive counter-terrorist measures as appropriate.

The Chain of Command on Anti-Terrorism Planning [1]

The chain of command on anti-terrorism planning, coordination, and policy formation in the United States runs from the President through the National Security Council (NSC) to the many executive departments of government with responsibility for some aspect of terrorism. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism is the principle coordinating committee under the NSC devoting attention to this problem. This interagency group is chaired by the State Department (the Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism and Emergency

Planning) with representatives from Justice, Defense, Energy, Treasury, Transportation, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the NSC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Office of the Vice President (staff level).

Of course, if a terrorist incident becomes a recognized national crisis, the Vice President would assume crisis management authority as head of a Special Situation Group, in which policy decisions would be taken at the NSC-Cabinet level and direct contact would be maintained with the President. In that event, the Interdepartmental Group would become simply a support mechanism.

While this broadly representative group has been given responsibility for policy planning and management of crisis situations of all kinds, the lead agency for responding to terrorist incidents overseas is the State Department. State is supposed to alert top officials in the event of such an incident, and to assume a managerial and administrative role during the crisis. The Justice Department, especially the FBI, would be the lead agency if a terrorist incident of national proportions occurred on the territory of the United States.

The Defense Department has the responsibility for protecting its own personnel and property at home and abroad and for participating with the Energy Department in operating a Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center, which stores information on the location of specialized Defense and Energy teams needed in case emergency nuclear accidents occur. The U.S. Army has a special duty of protecting some extremely important and vulnerable facilities, such as waterways and utilities that have been built by the Army Corps of Engineers as federal projects.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has responsibility for anticipating and dealing with disasters of all kinds in the United States, including civil defense in the event of a nuclear attack.

The CIA is the lead agency in providing intelligence information on foreign situations. The FBI is the lead federal agency for providing domestic intelligence on terrorism. The Justice Department and the FBI are, of course, in contact with all law enforcement agencies in the United States, and the FBI serves as liaison, through its legal attaches in the U.S. embassies abroad, with police and law enforcement in friendly foreign countries. The Department of Transportation monitors aviation security measures and conducts airport security surveys abroad. Treasury is responsible for customs and secret service as well as uncovering financial data that might give clues to funding of terrorism.

An operations center in the State Department is the focal point for receiving reports on terrorist incidents from overseas or from other agencies. In the State Department itself, there is an Office of Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, whose director chairs both the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the much more broadly constituted Advisory Group on Terrorism. It operates under the supervision of the Undersecretary for Management and has coordinating responsibilities involving work with every agency in the Executive Branch.

At the U.S. missions overseas, the prime responsibility for anti-terrorist security is assigned to the chief of mission in an embassy (the ambassador), the deputy chief of mission, and the chief administrative officer. Regional or post security officers implement the program. Each installation has a security watch committee and an evacuation committee.

This description gives a general picture of the way the U.S. Government is set up to cope with international terrorism. The number of separate bodies involved indicates that anti-terrorism cuts across many traditional agency lines and operations. All of them have a piece of the problem and want some share of the planning and policymaking activity. This fact has led to the normal coordination problems and to a diffusion of responsibility among the agencies involved. This criticism does not even address the question of liaison with the military organizations, which tend to be somewhat remotely involved in these interagency plans and coordination processes.

Indeed, the military has a lot of work to do in its own bailiwick. It recently moved to strengthen its machinery for implementing an active defense against terrorism in keeping with presidential directives. According to a spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, preparations for establishing a new Defense Department agency to coordinate special forces operations and devise new counter-terrorism equipment and plans was begun in October 1982, a year before the bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut.

The Joint Special Operations Agency, established as a result of this process, was officially created January 1, 1984, to exercise command and control of military operations to cope with terrorist incidents. Thus the chain of command goes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This new command and control component, in addition to carrying out the functions mentioned above, is also charged with responsibility for joint planning of training and exercises conducted by the special operations groups of each service: the Army Special Forces and Rangers, the Navy SEALS (sea, air, and land operations teams), the Air Force Special Operations Wing, and the Marine Corps reconnaissance units. All four of the military services have trained and equipped these special forces. They are still normally under the jurisdiction of their respective services, but the mechanism for joint action is in place. If military action is ever decided upon by the President, the strike forces will be more tightly integrated and more effective than the failed DESERT ONE hostage rescue mission in Iran in 1980.

What appears to be lacking from the vast apparatus of civilian and military organizations concerned with terrorism is a common definition of the problems they face and a coherent doctrine for management of terrorist incidents of crisis proportions. All of the agencies are sorting through these problems, but none have yet clearly established logical, sophisticated principles for recognizing and dealing with terrorism as an endemic threat rather than isolated episodes of violence. The field is open for some element in this packed field to suggest the guidelines that would produce a reasonable conceptual unity. This study is intended to stimulate thinking along these lines and to convey basic information on the subject to government staffs and the interested public in an unclassified, easily assimilable fashion.

The Role of the U.S. Army

Under the U.S. Constitution and laws, a certain carefully delimited role in combatting domestic terrorist crimes is clearly established for the U.S. Army, but it is normally completely subordinate and supportive to federal and state civil authorities. Terrorist offenses are defined as crimes under state and federal statutes, and local or federal law enforcement bodies will deal with these in the first instance. The U.S. Army is a resource of last resort.

The Department of Justice, through the Deputy Attorney General, is responsible for managing the U.S. Government's coordinated response to major acts of terrorism committed within the country. If the terrorist action involves the safety of an aircraft in flight over the U.S. airspace, then the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has responsibility for law enforcement, although in practical terms it would have to bring in the FBI.

The agencies that normally carry out actions determined to be appropriate federal responses to such incidents are, in addition to the FBI, the Federal Protective Service, the FAA, the Inspections Division of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Customs Service, and a special unit in the Industry and Trade Administration of the Commerce Department. The FBI special hostage rescue team publicized at the time of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics was built on the model for similar units in other organizations.

It is easy, however, to envision a domestic terrorist incident, particularly a paramilitary or high-technology weapons operation, beyond the capabilities of the FBI, other federal agencies, or state and local authorities to deal with. In that case, military units might be called on by appropriate civil authorities to restore order and preserve lives. It is also necessary to think about the possibility of a terrorist nuclear threat/attack that might necessitate a military response, perhaps even a pre-emptive military strike on U.S soil. For all these reasons, the interface between the FBI (Department of Justice) and the military services ought to be improved.

Legislation set forth in the 1869 Posse Comitatus statute specifically delimits the domestic use of federal military force in a law enforcement role.

> The Posse Comitatus Act encompasses legal constraint on the use of military force to combat domestic acts of terrorism. The option to direct a federal military response, however, is available to the President under the provisions of 10 USC 332 and 333 or a proclamation under 10 USC 334 would be necessary to implement such action. If a federal military response were required, coordination between the Departments of Justice and Defense would clearly be necessary to integrate civilian and military forces.

It is essential, as experts suggest, that procedures in this kind of emergency should:

> closely parallel existing contingency plans for the use of military forces in connection with civil disturbances.[2]

For these reasons, as well as the menacing international situation, a counter-terrorist military capability similar to and probably larger than those possessed by Israel, Great Britain, and West Germany is essential.

The U.S. Government has trained forces and equipment from all four services to cope with terrorist incidents. Command and control elements for these forces exist and have been exercised. These elements report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as do other command and control elements for military operations. For security reasons, details concerning the circumstances under which these forces may be deployed and their identity are not available.

The creation of such a capability and some publicity about the skills assembled for the purpose seem likely to serve as an element of deterrence. These counter-terrorist units would have to be able to deliver appropriate military blows if they meet armed opposition. The units might have to deliver a sharp, surgical blow to overcome resistance from armed forces in a state in whose territory they have to conduct operations because of its sponsorship of a terrorist crime against Americans.

Some specialists in managing responses to terrorist incidents believe that any counter-terrorist strike force should be thoroughly integrated, self-sustaining, and mobile, without having to rely on the separate services for units of manpower, transport, supplies, weapons, and communications. It would also have its own airlift capability. Air strikes might be launched either independently or as support for a special forces operation.

It has been suggested that the need for close bureaucratic communication among the agencies involved in active counter-terrorist defense should lead to the establishment of what would amount to a joint civil-military agency to carry out this effort of complex countermeasures against state-sponsored terrorism. It would be staffed by experienced civilian and military officers with specialized knowledge of terrorist movements and tactics in different parts of the world, who would be given extensive training in counter-terrorist planning. In such a unit members of State, DOD, CIA, the FBI, and other concerned agencies would all work together in one unit with members of the appropriate elements of the armed services.

Such a counter-terrorist program would have to be headed by a director who would have the rank and prestige to work directly with the secretaries of State and Defense and the National Security advisor. He might well be a military officer with relevant foreign experience, quite possibly a retired Army officer recalled to duty.

Whether such an elaborate joint force is needed and cost-effective is a question that demands careful study and monitoring to insure resources are being built up in fact, not just on paper. It is time, however, for the U.S. Army to press for tightened chains of command up to and including the Special Situation Group in the White House. If U.S. Army forces are committed to a counter-terrorist task, looseness and vagueness in the current decision-making process are sure recipes for disaster.

The primary challenge to the Army is to continue to develop a first-rate counter-terrorist strike force capability, to insure its activities are coordinated with other agencies, and to elaborate the doctrine of justifiable military response to state sponsorship of terrorism as an optional last-resort element of self-defense in an undeclared low-intensity conflict.

The Army should also urge the other military services, together with appropriate civilian agencies, to continue the search for the most effective command and control procedures for joint planning and coordination of counter-terrorist systems and tasks. A further challenge is to develop cooperative ties to the corresponding military services of other countries with effective counter-terrorist forces, to learn whatever we can from them.

A growing number of countries in the world pursue an active counter-terrorist strategy. Perhaps the best known of these is Israel, which pursues both overt and covert methods of fighting terror. Israeli agents may attempt to assassinate identified Arab terrorists, something U.S. intelligence agencies are expressly prohibited from doing. The Israelis have mounted pre-emptive attacks on countries that, in their assessment, were supportive of terrorists through permitting them to find sanctuary in their territory, providing them training facilities, arms, and other assistance. The well-known Entebbe rescue mission was an example of Israel's outreach with its armed commando counter-terrorist capability.

Other Mideast countries that have counter-terrorist forces include Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. In the case of countries such as Syria the counter-terrorist forces can be used to repress internal subversion; indeed, in Syria, they have been used for that purpose. The Saudis are presumably interested in a counter-terrorist capability because of the attempt to seize the Grand Mosque at Mecca in 1979.

West European countries that are known to possess counter-terrorist forces are Great Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, and France. The British used their counter-terrorist forces (Special Air Services) to rescue hostages being held in the Iranian embassy in London in 1980, while the Germans freed a Lufthansa plane under control of hijackers on the ground at Mogadishu, Somalia, several years earlier. The Dutch used their forces a number of years ago to storm a train that had been seized by South Moluccan terrorists on Dutch territory. Of course, these military strikes become more difficult and risky as terrorists become more sophisticated and better armed. The U.S. Army should know the history of all such rescue and commando operations in great detail and critique their tactical performance in connection with establishing American doctrine and policy.

The nature of the counter-terrorism mission for the military in general and the U.S. Army in particular should be viewed in the context of the guidelines set forth in this study and should be translated into Army doctrine along the lines already pursued.

Since it is unlikely that counter-terrorist tasks can be performed effectively by civil authorities in cases of severe and protracted terrorist threats, the U.S. military's contingency role ought to be clearly spelled out in doctrine and policy.

The U.S. Army is responsible for protection of its own personnel and bases, for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, and for certain government-owned contractor-operated defense facilities. The U.S. Army, also, when appropriately ordered to do so, must take measures to protect endangered civilian targets at home and abroad in protracted emergencies.

American armed forces may be called upon to assist friendly foreign governments in dealing with major terrorist attacks. Protective measures should be coordinated with the host country. A certain amount of discreet publicity about the capability for such measures would do no harm and might assist in deterrence. Protective plans and procedures should consider vulnerabilities, manpower and fiscal restraints, and mission requirements.

Probably the most important first step for the military services, and certainly for the U.S. Army, is to develop a comprehensive program of awareness, education, and response training. The U.S. Army should be familiar with terrorist groups constituting threats, indicators of preparations for state-sponsored terrorism, and appropriate preventive measures.

While the investigative and operational responsibility for coping with domestic terrorism lies with the FBI, and host countries have responsibility overseas for planning, coordination, and implementation of precautionary measures, initial protective responses to terrorist actions against U.S. Army forces and bases remain a local U.S. military command responsibility in all locations.

Procedures, guidance, and policies for the protection of all U.S. personnel and property should be established and maintained at all Army installations. Clear instructions have to incorporate the concept of the inherent right of military self-defense--both passive and active--especially against state-sponsored terrorism.

In addition to the foregoing counter-terrorism activities, which the U.S. Army should prepare for, three situations should be carefully studied to insure readiness for future military action if it is required.

First, military assistance to civilian authorities may be necessary when the appropriate law enforcement system is unable to deal with political and ideological violence on a wholesale and protracted basis. The British Army deployment in Northern Ireland as a peacekeeping force is a case in point. The U.S. Army should know exactly what procedures to follow if this situation should ever arise in the United States. The Army should insure that its procedures are updated regularly to be realistic in the terms of current threats.

Second, the military may have to respond to a prolonged cross-border paramilitary terrorist or guerrilla campaign, conceivably at home but, at present, more likely against a foreign military base. This situation requires military force for protection duties, hot pursuit, and sanctuary for base destruction, as in the case of the Israeli Army's counter-insurgency deployment. The U.S. Army ought to study in great detail hypothetical situations in critical areas, like the Mideast, Central America, and Southeast Asia, where these special missions might be assigned as a result of adoption of new doctrine on active counter-terror policy.

Third, special military squads for hostage rescue and other emergency counter-terrorist operations may be called for in cases where the civil authorities or police are clearly inadequate in terms of personnel, training, or weapons to deal with an urgent crisis incident. Units should, of course, be deployed only in situations where appropriate authorities order the usage of military force. Non-military considerations, such as economic and civic action, political programs, security sanctions, and legal measures, should also be taken into careful account as alternative counter-measures. The Israeli, British, and German rescue operations provide classic examples. The U.S. Army ought to adopt readiness procedures for similar eventualities.

To be sure, the unique capability of the armed forces to protect the security and liberties of democratic states must be used with great care and normally as a last resort when other remedies have been found inadequate. Notwithstatnding, the military role is quite likely in the next few years to be a vital last line of defense for the United States, the protection of U.S. personnel overseas, and the guaranteeing of security for U.S. foreign bases. The U.S. Army must be prepared to play its indispensable ground combat role in this context.

Adoption of Active Response Policy

Without question, the U.S. Government is now finally, though perhaps belatedly in a policymaking process, articulating a new strategy on responding to terrorist acts against Americans and allied targets abroad. On January 31, 1985, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Shultz proposed, in the strongest language he has ever used when speaking of terrorism, the abandonment of a purely passive policy and the adoption of a policy that includes responding actively to terrorist acts when appropriate. The democratic world, he said, is facing "a new form of warfare" that is increasingly part of the present "international strategy resorted to by the enemies of freedom."[3]

His warning indicated the evident fact that the danger of a major war is not nearly so urgently threatening as terrorism. The reason is that a full-scale war is less probable than what he called the "vicious weapon"[4] now being used by the terrorists to destabilize democracies and particularly to separate the United States from its friends and bases abroad. These judgments by the Secretary of State are sound. They reflect the same understanding of the world situation that has been described in the analyses of state sponsorship of terrorism.

The Secretary also proposed integrating the capabilities of the U.S. Government in planning responses and, if necessary, arranging concerted thrusts with U.S. allies. He recommended both defensive precautions and preparation for active counter-measures to terrorism to include steps to:

1. improve security,

2. share information,
3. coordinate police efforts,
4. collaborate with foreign governments in all counter-terrorist measures,
5. develop political support for defensive and deterrent measures, and
6. deny terrorists their political and strategic goals.

The United States cannot permit terrorist blackmail to change American foreign policies, Secretary Shultz said. "We cannot yield position or abandon friends or responsibilities under this kind of pressure."[5]

This foreign-policy justification of a strategy of deterrence and denial is at the heart of any justification for a new and stronger national posture on dealing with state-sponsored terrorism. The argument was recently supplemented and endorsed on strategic grounds by the Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.

The Case of Nicaragua

In urging pursuit of an active response policy along the lines suggested by the Secretary of State, President Reagan concentrated attention on the highly controversial case of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. He gave the issue high visibility and succeeded in publicizing the fact that this small Central American nation has been accepting more and more military help from the Soviet Union and Cuba and has been attacking its neighbors since August 1979 in a revolution without borders.[6] This plain case of state-sponsored terrorism, aimed at Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador, the President argued, constitutes a threat not only to the nations of Central and South America, but to the United States. The case is especially poignant because the Sandinista regime itself used Soviet and Cuban help to seize power and soon repudiated the democratic goals originally espoused.

Thereafter the regime narrowed its membership and more nakedly adopted a Leninist dictatorship political structure internally and a policy of communist expansion against its neighbors externally.

President Reagan endorsed a U.S. policy for countering terrorism by aid to anti-Sandinista insurgents, commonly called "Contras," in accordance with the recognized right of individual and collective self-defense of all sovereign nations, enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. He asserted that the Soviet Union and Cuba were attempting to foment revolution in the whole hemisphere through a form of violent covert conflict that justified defending the institutions under assault from outside. Unfortunately, the debate became extremely confused, partly because the aid was intended to be covert and go through CIA. The highly public discussion over whether to conduct a covert operation turned some Americans against the President's proposal. Some simply did not want to help people using military force, and others simply opposed any U.S. political intervention against foreign governments, however bad they are.

As President Reagan sees it, Nicaragua is a classical case of a revolution that raised democratic hopes but then went sour in adopting the totalitarian model. Nicaragua thus became a state created by state-sponsored terrorism directly sponsoring further terrorism around it. The President argued that these facts justify measured but effective responses in defense of U.S. friends and critical strategic U.S. interests in Central America and the Caribbean.[7] The Sandinista employment of terrorist tactics gives further moral grounds to the strategic rationale for response to Nicaraguan behavior.

The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua definitely exhibits all the elements of state-sponsored terrorism as described in this study's working definition (p. 40). In this sense, the President's position was correct despite the legislative maneuvering on a somewhat partisan basis in the House of Representatives that caused his initiative in support of the "Contra" forces to fail. The criminal nature of the acts, the clear identity of the state sponsors as perpetrators, the admitted Leninist revolutionary strategic objective, the intended totalitarian outcome, pluralist targets, and violent methods can be seen in detail in the events that have taken place over six years.

The state sponsorship involves all stages of the spectrum of conflict, up to and including guerrilla war and revolution. It includes diplomatic pressure as well as, from time to time, overt military hostilities with neighbors and with anti-communist, anti-Cuban insurgents within their own boundaries. Soviet and Cuban military weapons and military advisory personnel are provided generously to Nicaragua for direct support of the "liberation" war in El Salvador.

U.S. motivation for giving assistance in collective self-defense of people fighting for their freedom is impeccable and fully justified in international law, if presented in this context (see pp. 40-41). The congressional vote on April 25, 1985, denying President Reagan's request for aid to Nicaraguans fighting against the Sandinista regime indicates how confused American opinion is on these matters. This issue will not go away, however. U.S. national security authorities will simply have to do a better educational job in delineating the Soviet role in the Central American challenge and getting the Congress to recognize the strategic responsibility of the United States to counter this insidious style of covert hostilities against the American political system and the U.S. sphere of security interest.

U.S. Responsibility

To implement an active countermeasure policy against state-sponsored terrorism, the United States must be prepared to have recourse to a full range of responses. There is no easy solution that guarantees success. The world cannot be expected to satisfy all aspirations of political activists and meet all demands for relief from economic and social grievances, even legitimate ones. The United States, on the other hand, must meet its own responsibilities to defend American interests and the interests of friendly states or groups abroad in order to maintain American ideals and goals. The hardest decisions have to be made when hostile acts of state-sponsored terrorists succeed in disrupting the fabric of democratic society in many parts of the world, yet do not reach the point of open war anywhere.

Secretary of State Shultz has recently concentrated on voicing U.S. policy reasons for defending against and deterring terrorist violence in a number of his major statements. His approach is to make an all-out effort using all options short of war when appropriate, necessary, and effective, just as these options are used against the United States routinely.

In speaking of the United States and the Soviet Union in a broader strategic dimension, the secretary said, "The United States seeks an international environment that enhances the freedom, security, and prosperity of our own people, our allies and friends, and of all mankind. We know that such a promising future depends above all on stability and global security. It cannot be achieved in a world where aggression goes unchecked and where adventurous foreign policies succeed." [8]

Advocating the resolute shouldering of U.S. responsibilities as leader of the free world, he said, "If we shrink from leadership, we create a vacuum into which our adversaries can move. Our national security suffers, our global interests suffer, and yes, the worldwide struggle for democracy suffers." [9] Since the most urgent challenge today is terrorism, Shultz's logic is at last bringing the country to face up to this pressing strategic hazard of the 1980s, just as NATO and strategic weapons have dealt with the threat of war over the past forty years.

Range of U.S. Countermeasures for State-Sponsored Terrorism

The strategic circumstances confronting the United States in the 1980s, as outlined in this study, provide a guideline for appropriate responses. The range of possible countermeasures that are fitting to the threat can be defined as follows:

1. Intelligence: Intelligence about menacing world situations, violence-prone groups in every conflict area, histories of regional resort to terrorist violence, and the record of sponsorship of terrorism by a nation or nations must be collected and analyzed more fully and effectively than the restrictive traditions of recent years have permitted in the United States.

   High quality intelligence operations and research are of utmost importance, the basic and indispensable ingredients of policies and programs to prevent state-sponsored terrorism from destabilizing democratic institutions. While a passive measure, rather than active, intelligence must be aggressive, inventive, and sophisticated if it is to provide sound evidence for deciding on and justifying the countermeasures that come to public attention. Wider public dissemination of information on terrorism that does not reveal intelligence sources and methods is in the public interest.

2. Cooperation with Allies: The United States must create a feeling of harmony with its allies, whose security is essential to world order and, therefore, to U.S. interests. It must join with its allies in supporting international laws that condemn terrorist crimes and be willing to provide intelligence and other direct aid to friendly governments in the line of fire yet possessing fewer resources than American authorities can bring to bear.

"Our influence with friendly governments is a precious resource," Secretary Shultz declared. "Therefore, we stay engaged."[10] Active diplomacy is a positive countermeasure if it is infused with strategic information and consciousness-raising about the dangers of state-sponsored terrorism.

3. Economic and Security Assistance: When international security is at stake, the United States has a moral obligation to support friendly democratic governments by providing economic and security assistance. This can include military aid and ought to, as in the 1960s, permit guidance and training for internal security organizations and police agencies so as to indoctrinate them in the subtle nature of responsible and humane law-enforcement in a strategic conflict fought with terrorist methods.

"The more we can lend appropriate help to others to protect themselves," the Secretary of State reasons, "the less need will there be for more direct American involvement to keep the peace."[11] In this option, the Secretary mentioned friendly nations on the front line--like Pakistan, Thailand, or Honduras and Costa Rica--who are threatened immediately by the Soviet Union or proxies. This remedy, while in a sense active, does not involve the use of force. It makes friendly countries better able to defend themselves.

4. Political and Diplomatic Pressures: If state-sponsored terrorism is already putting a democracy in jeopardy, political and diplomatic countermeasures are an appropriate initial step. The United States should stand ready at all times to find ways through discussion and negotiation to deter or stop terrorist actions.

"For freedom and the rule of law, and for human rights," the Secretary said, should be "pursued insofar as possible through peaceful and political means."[12] In fact, enunciation of a policy of active response is one of the most useful deterrents to the spread of terrorism. It will not stop the hardcore terrorist criminals, but it may give pause to the local innocents whom the state-sponsored terrorist infrastructure attempts to exploit.

If specific countermeasures are required, the United States, as first steps, can withdraw recognition of the offending nation or nations, expel diplomatic personnel, reduce consular office staff, impose travel restrictions, and even send students home. Any or all of these options will cause discomfort and yet can be lawfully inflicted for cause. It is high time to make sponsor states internationally accountable and impose some costs on them for their behavior.

5. Economic Sanctions: When political and diplomatic options do not suffice, then embargoes on trade and the freezing of assets may be invoked to strengthen the U.S. pressure in the direction of reducing or

eradicating the terrorist action. These sanctions must be applied resolutely and kept in place for as long as needed to change the policies of the offenders. This countermeasure is severe but completely legal and appropriate, as well as non-violent.

6. Information Campaigns and Foreign Broadcasts: Information campaigns at home and foreign broadcasts that arouse world opinion on state sponsorship may assist in isolating those states practicing and fostering terror. At present, sponsorship is virtually risk free and without cost to international reputation. Nations that do not engage in terrorism themselves but condone it should also be mentioned in comments on terror. They may be convinced by unfavorable publicity that their long-term interests are endangered by such an attitude. This countermeasure requires precise, accurate intelligence. It can be successful if skillfully handled in specific cases. Exposing the fact is still often an effective weapon against wrongdoing.

Information campaigns should also give encouragement to people in communist states who would opt for freedom if they could but have an opportunity. "Our radios will continue to broadcast the truth to people in closed societies," the Secretary of State promised.[13] The truth about state terrorism and state sponsorship is a damning indictment of the sponsor states. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are powerful weapons to be used as countermeasures if fully exploited. Radio Marti can do the same thing in the Caribbean. While Americans tend to take psychological and ideological pressures casually, totalitarian states do not. They spend more money on jamming U.S. national radio broadcasts than the United States spends on international information programs.

At home similar campaigns of truth-telling would explain to the American people the nature of state-sponsored terrorist threat and its consequences. This simple public-service-educational effort is crucial. If the contents of this study were widely read, it would make a big input to countering terrorism. Better understanding of the whole issue would be an active and effective, though non-violent, countermeasure.

The Role of Military Force

Up to this point the suggestions for active responses do not call for the use of any kind of force. These responses are undoubtedly preferable if effective. Yet the current situation demands consideration of meeting violence with violence, including the option of employing the most powerful elements of force--military units organized for special commando or penetration operations.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger recently pointed out, "In today's world, the line between peace and war is less clearly drawn that at any time in our history....We must be prepared, at any moment, to meet threats ranging in intensity from isolated terrorist acts, to guerrilla action, to full-scale military confrontation."[14] Under certain kinds of provocation the United States must fight back with an armed force employed in defense of political freedom. To do so is no more wrong than the policeman on the beat using violence to stop the violent acts of a criminal or the United States fighting World War II to prevent Nazi Germany from dominating Eurasia.

Secretary Shultz expressed this principle simply on February 22, 1985: "America also has a moral responsibility. The lesson of the postwar era is that America must be the leader of the free world; there is no one else to take our place."[15]

He added: "What we should do in each situation must, of necessity, vary. But it must always be clear whose side we are on--the side of those who want to see a world based on respect for national independence, for freedom and the rule of law, and for human rights. Wherever possible, the path to that world should be through peaceful and political means; but where dictatorships use brute power to oppress their own people and threaten their neighbors, the forces of freedom cannot place their trust in declarations alone." [16]

While the secretary did not specify when or how military force should be employed, he made it clear that both covert paramilitary assistance and open military support can be extended to "those struggling against the imposition of communist tyranny" on the basis of the "inherent right of individual and collective self-defense against aggression"--whether the aggressive behavior involved naked military aggression or covert terrorist acts of destabilization. [17]

This concept automatically raises the question of what paramilitary or military responses to terrorist acts might be undertaken short of full-scale military confrontation. The main categories are:

1. Clandestine Counter-terrorist Infiltrations of Terrorist Organizations: The object is to neutralize terrorist acts by secretly sabotaging them on the spot or by revealing them in advance to law-enforcement agencies or paramilitary operations units. Abroad this is a CIA function and at home an FBI function. If military intelligence or counterintelligence agencies are indirectly involved in supporting such operations, their role is strictly governed by military regulations, limiting their participation according to law. Clandestine pre-emptive measures abroad by the CIA would be conducted under the powers of

the President as Commander-in-Chief. They might be able to deal effectively to prevent individual incidents if the threat is detected in time. Here secrecy at all echelons would be the main ingredient of success.

2. Covert Support of Foreign Counter-Terrorist Military Operations: Again the main actor would be CIA, but U.S. military forces' training and logistic support of foreign commando strike forces are often indispensable. It requires timely intelligence adequate to permit a pre-emptive operation against terrorist units. While this kind of operation must be dealt with in accordance with the congressional intelligence committees' oversight procedures, the President has the authority to move rapidly if American lives or national security interests are at stake.

3. Overt U.S. Military Pre-emptive Operations: Secrecy and good intelligence are prerequisites for mounting U.S. military operations if U.S. lives are at stake. They can, after the fact, be publicly disclosed, particularly if American targets were in jeopardy and the operation is effectively conducted. Prevention of the loss of life by American civilian or military personnel is legitimate if no local protective forces can be relied on to pre-empt the terrorist attack in the foreign area where the lives are endangered. These circumstances will be rare, but deployment of a commando team may be essential if there is no other recourse.

4. Overt U.S. Military Operations Against Identified Terrorist Bases and Forces Used Against American Targets: If state-sponsored

terrorism continues to be a major weapon in the 1980s conflict, and American targets are commonly involved, the U.S. armed forces may have to undertake post-incident military strikes. Again secrecy and good intelligence are prerequisites, but if time is available to mount such defensive operations they may be worthwhile for their future deterrent effect. The justifying conceptual groundwork is now being laid, and the Department of Defense must join in the information campaign to prepare the Congress and the public for what will undoubtedly be criticized by some as punitive and retaliatory rather than defensive and deterrent.

This last step in counter-terrorist policy is peculiarly the military services' responsibility. As a last resort, it is the response short of organized military warfare that may put a serious dent in terrorist ranks and capabilities. It will be especially effective if an extreme case of a terrorist outrage occurs and solid intelligence is available to link it with a terrorist base or force inside the territory of a sponsoring state like Nicaragua or Syrian or Iranian controlled Lebanon. A strong U.S. military response in such a case would put a real dent in state sponsorship of terrorism and may be the only way to do so.

Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger agree that direct employment of the U.S. armed forces against terrorists must be the last resort. Mr. Weinberger is naturally concerned with the conditions under which military force might be applied and how military units are organized and equipped to fight.

"Under what circumstances, and by what means, does a great democracy such as ours reach the painful decision that the use of military force is necessary to protect our interests or to carry out our national policy?" Secretary Weinberger asks.[18]

In reply he has outlined his official responsibilities. "Because we face a spectrum of threats--from covert aggression, terrorism, and subversion, to overt intimidation, to use of brute force--choosing the appropriate level of our response is difficult."[19] The options he proposes, therefore, are:

1. Deployment of Forces: If military forces are to contain and control terrorism, they must be deployed in a timely manner and be fully prepared to act before they must engage.
2. Peacekeeping Missions: The United States can send forces on peacekeeping missions, as to the Sinai and to Lebanon, but the troops in that case are not armed for combat and should not be expected to take offensive measures without clear-cut authorization in advance.
3. Engagement of U.S. Forces: U.S. armed forces should be sent into combat only if a vital U.S. national interest is at stake. In that case the United States must commit the military forces in sufficient numbers to gain their assigned objectives. Their political and military objectives must be defined precisely, and they should be deployed only if their orders reflect a clear national intention of winning.
4. National Will: U.S. national will--including congressional judgment--must be mobilized to support the U.S. armed forces for as long as it takes them to win the battle to which they are committed.

This requirement is valid whether it is a hostage rescue mission, a preemptive or post-incident attack on identified terrorists, or in the worst case protracted counterinsurgency or counter-guerrilla military operations. Whatever other lessons may have been learned from American experience in combat in Vietnam, most Americans now perceive the need to insure a match between national purpose and military mission. There should never be again a repetition of anything like the deliberate U.S. withdrawal in the face of Vietnamese, Chinese communist, and Soviet military triumph in a terrorist war of national liberation. This conclusion of the battle in Indochina drastically changed the world balance of power to the disadvantage of the United States and other free nations.

NOTES

1. For relevant information see, for instance, Executive Committee on Terrorism, "The United States Government Antiterrorism Program," an Unclassified Summary Report, June 1979; Robert M. Sayre, "Combatting Terrorism: American Policy and Organization," Address before the Third International Civil Aviation Security Conference, Washington, D. C., July 21, 1982; Department of State, Bulletin, August 1982, pp. 1-7; U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, FBI Oversight and Budget Authorization, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 14, 1984; U.S. Army, "Military Operations: U.S. Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction," March 19,1984, TRADOC PAM 525-37; and Robert B. Oakley, "Combatting International Terrorism," U.S. Department of State, Current Policy No. 667, March 5, 1985.
2. James B. Motley. U.S. Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Terrorism, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1983, p. 46.
3. U.S. State Department. Current Policy No. 650, "The Future of American Foreign Policy: New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," Secretary Schultz' statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., January 31, 1985, p. 6.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. New York Times, January 25, 1985.
7. Ibid.

8. U.S. State Department. Current Policy No. 624, "Managing the U.S.-Soviet Realtionship Over the Long Term," Secretary Shultz' statement before the Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, Los Angeles, California, October 18, 1984, p. 3.

9. U.S. State Department. Current Policy No. 659, "America and the Struggle for Freedom," Secretary Shultz' statement before the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, California, February 22, 1985, p. 3.

10. Ibid., p. 4.

11. Ibid., p. 4.

12. Ibid., p. 5.

13. Ibid.. p. 4.

14. News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary for Defense (Public Affairs), No. 609-84, "Remarks prepared for delivery by the Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, November 28, 1984.

15. Current Policy No. 659, Op. cit., p. 3.

16. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

17. Ibid., p. 4.

18. News Release, No. 609-84, Op. cit.

19. Ibid.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

The approach and general conclusions of this study demand a major reconsideration of civil-military roles--particularly in the case of a major terrorist incident in the United States. The U.S. Army will need to carry its due share of the burden as a principal residual resource to counter totalitarian nations that rely on fanaticism and terror to disturb the stability of the free world.

Technology assists military forces up to a certain point, but the final assault on a terrorist group relies on the strength and skills of individual soldiers. Tolerances are very slight, and mistakes occur at the expense of innocent lives. The real solution as far as U.S. Army and other military units are concerned is sound doctrine and effective training.

Non-violent responses to counter terrorism are to be preferred if there is any chance of success. Exposing terrorist leaders to law enforcement constraints and public disapproval are better remedies than military counter-terrorist attacks. Sometimes, however, there is no alternative to active military response.

If the lives of Americans ever are held in peril in a potentially very destructive terrorist situation within U.S. borders--a contingency that can never be completely ruled out--the President has the power under the provision of 10 USC 332 and 333 (2) to call for a federal military response, as has happened in connection with large-scale civil disturbances in the past.

In such instances, the Army has traditionally and appropriately played a role in supplementing the police authorities, the National Gaurd, and U.S. Army reserve forces. Yet an attack involving tremendous economic or social disturbances--for example, disruption of banking, computer, or electric power systems--would require more comprehensive Army participation than is customary, just in terms of the sheer manpower needed for maintaining civil order until a return to normalcy. A threat of the employment of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction would probably require a federal emergency.

The general American public attitude toward handling counter-terror operations tends to support the sensible notion that, if military force is required, U.S. strength should be adequate to meet any needs. There is no substitute for success. Thus, the U.S. Army capabilities must be greatly improved and U.S. Army doctrine clarified in preparation to cope with potentially more serious and nationally significant terrorist incidents which may occur in the 1980s and 1990s.

This whole problem is much larger and beyond the scope of the legitimate responsibilities or authority of the U.S. Army. There is no reason, however, that the U.S. Army cannot take a leadership role in conceptualizing the strategic dimensions of the current prevalent kind of terrorism--state-sponsored--and urging that all elements in the chain of command deal with the challenge in an active and imaginative way.

State-sponsored terrorism is such a fundamental challenge to the security and strategic interests of the United States that a major effort should be launched to adopt definitions and doctrine to establish an active counter-terrorism policy and a cost-imposing deterrent strategy. The U.S. Army cannot solve all the problems, but it can take the lead intellectually in finding solutions or urging at all echelons of the chain of command that solutions be found.

The logic of the definitions and analysis presented in this study is clear. The basic guidelines for U.S. Army doctrine, strategy, and policy emerging as imperative from these concepts are the following:

1. Collect and analyze intelligence on terror-prone groups worldwide as well as their links with one another and with state sponsors.
2. Collect and analyze intelligence on the terror infrastructure and the specific operational methods of state sponsors.
3. Codify actual or threatened terrorist incidents according to evidence on the six basic elements of state-sponsored terrorism (pp. 40-41).
4. Adopt for government-wide use a comprehensive definition of state-sponsored terrorism along the lines developed by the authors herein (p. 40).
5. Continue top-level U.S. Government official declarations of the international dangers inherent in state-sponsored terrorism and U.S. determination to take measures of self-defense and deterrence (see President Reagan and Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, pp. 87-101).
6. Reiterate the six non-violent options of imposing costs on terrorists or their state sponsors when evidence supports taking countermeasures (see Shultz, pp. 87-88).
7. Without publicity, take covert action to spoil or pre-empt terrorist incidents when intelligence permits it without losing sources (see intelligence option, p. 92).
8. In cases of last resort, use special configuration military forces for selective active counter-terrorist operations attacking terrorists or their state-sponsored supporting infrastructure (see three military measures, pp. 85-86).
9. Pre-empt or destroy terrorists or their infrastructure as a countermeasure short of full-scale warfare motivated and justified by the inherent right of self-defense and the strategic imperative of deterrence.
10. Enunciate firmly this cost-imposing strategy as necessary and appropriate for all democratic states because there is no other remedy when states sponsor or resort to terrorist tactics in the endemic low-intensity conflict of these times (see Spectrum of Conflict, p. 51).

Following these guidelines will require maximum support for a search for solid intelligence indicating when a sovereign state is sponsoring the use of terrorist methods with strategic goals gravely adverse to the United States. If a case can be identified clearly and the perpetrators (terrorists and sponsors) are known, active countermeasures should be undertaken promptly by the United States or friendly forces under attack.

The American response often may be purely non-violent but it must be active. Secretary Shultz has outlined strong responses that do not employ force, basically non-military, yet can impose costs on terrorists.

It may also, however, be necessary on some occasions, and it is certainly legally and morally justifiable to use force covertly or overtly in pre-emption or in an extended role of military self-defense and deterrence. In these cases, covert action by intelligence agents or direct military responses are justifiable. When necessary as a last resort, U.S. Army troops, as well as units from other military services, may legitimately be directed to capture or, if no other recourse is available, destroy terrorist groups as well as the agencies and institutions involved in the infrastructure of sponsorship of terrorism. A firm U.S. policy along these lines will gradually bring this new strategic peril of the 1980s under control.

APPENDIXES

SELECTED
DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM
(pp. 109 - 112)

I. Governmental

1. Department of Defense

"the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for political or ideological purposes."

Source: Directive 2000.12--quoted in Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (20 December 1983), p. 122.

2. Army

"the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals political, religious, or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims."

Source: Army Regulation 190-52

3. State Department

"premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents."

Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983
U.S. Department of State, September 1984.

4. CIA

"the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock or intimidate a large group wider than the immediate victims."

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Patterns of International Terrorism, 1980 edition, p.ii.

5. FBI

"Terrorism is defined as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

A terrorist incident is defined as a violent act or an act dangerous to human life in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."

Source: FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the U.S., 1983 . by Terrorism Research and Analytical Center, Terrorism Section, Criminal Investigative Division, "preface."

6. Department of Justice

"violent criminal conduct apparently intended:
1) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
2) to influence the conduct of a government by intimidation or coercion, or
3) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping

Source: testimony by Victoria Toensing, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 5 June 1984

7. States

1. "A person commits the offense of terroristic threatening if with the purpose of terrorizing another person he threatens to cause death or serious physical injury or substantial property damage to another person."

   Arkansas Criminal Code, Title 41, Section 41-1608

   "...a person commits a terroristic act when, while not in the commission of a lawful act, he shoots at or in any manner projects an object with the intent to cause injury to persons or property at a conveyance which is being operated or which is occupied by passengers."

   Arkansas Criminal Code, Title 41, Section 41-1651

2. "Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with intent to terrorize another or with reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing another, and who thereby either:

   (a) Causes another person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or hers or their immediate family's safety;
   (b) Causes the evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility used in public transportation;
   (c) Interferes with essential public services; or
   (d) Otherwise causes serious disruption of public activities, is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison."

   California Penal Code, Title 11.5, Section 422

II. Congress

1. "A violent attack on a non-combatant segment of the community for the purpose of intimidation, to achieve a political or military objective."

   Representative Larry McDonald (D-GA)
   quoted in: Congressional Record July 2, 1976, p.E3791.

2. "Terrorism involves the application of the principles of Clausewitz by undercover groups or individuals out of just personal vindictiveness. Clausewitz's theory allowed such operations on the battlefield in a war declared between two states."

   Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) in personal communication October 10, 1984.

3. "International Terrorism includes...any unlawful act which results in the death, bodily harm, or forcible deprivation of liberty to any person, or in the violent destruction of property, or an attempt or credible threat to commit any such act, if the act, threat, or attempt is committed or takes effect outside the territory of a state of which the alleged offender is a national; or outside the territory of the state against which the act is directed; or within the territory of the state against which the act is directed and the alleged offender knows or has reason to know that a person against whom the act is directed is not a national of that state, or within the territory of any state when found to have been supported by a foreign state...irrespective of the nationality of the alleged offender....

   ...the act of international terrorism is intended to damage or threaten the interests of or obtain concessions from a state or an international organization; and is not committed in the course of military or paramilitary operations directed essentially against military forces or military targets of a state or an organized armed group."

   Text of S. 2236 An Act to Combat International Terrorism, Section 3., October 1977.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS
AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS AND PROPERTY
BY TYPE OF EVENT
1973-1983

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	TOTAL
KIDNAPPING	22	14	23	9	6	8	8	9	9	7	10	125
BARRICADE-HOSTAGE	3	2	1	2	2	0	6	6	1	3	8	34
BOMBING	106	130	94	112	125	158	115	95	93	168	96	1292
ARMED ATTACK/ ASSASSINATION	12	8	15	22	11	19	16	25	21	11	32	192
HIJACKING	0	1	2	5	4	2	12	20	18	10	1	75
OTHER*	81	32	27	67	35	184	79	117	115	202	66	1005
TOTAL	224	187	162	217	183	371	236	272	257	401	213	2723

* Includes Arson, Shipping, Threat/Hoax

Source: U.S. Department of State
Patterns of International Terrorism: 1982 and 1983

OVERVIEW OF TERRORIST ATTACKS

WORLDWIDE

GEOGRAPHIC AREA	1981	1982	1983	1984
Europe	454	358	393	470
Latin America	1711	1694	1854	2218
Middle East/North Africa	352	143	137	161
Asia	83	65	105	330
Sub-Saharan Africa	79	42	71	94
North America	22	31	14	9
TOTAL	2701	2333	2574	3282

These figures include attacks both on domestic and international levels as derived from the data base of Risks International Inc., 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984.


TERRORIST GROUPS AROUND THE WORLD SUPPORTED BY THE PLO
GREAT BRITAIN & IRELAND
● ◤ * Provisional Irish Republican Army
Irish National Liberation Army
HOLLAND
● * Red Resistance Front
* Red Assistance
FRANCE
● * Front for the National Liberation of Corsica
Action Directe
SPAIN
* Euzkadi ta Askatasuna E T A
* Basque underground
PORTUGAL
International Workers Organization
USA
* Neo-Nazis (American National Socialist Party)
HAITI
PUERTO RICO
F A L N
GUATEMALA
● M R 13
NICARAGUA
* Sandinistas
EL SALVADOR
◤ National Liberation Front
COLOMBIA
* Movement of April 19
Colombian Terrorist Group
BRAZIL
* Vanguard of the Popular Revolution
BOLIVIA
E L N
URUGUAY
National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros)
M L N
CHILE
* Leftist Revolutionary Movement M I R
ARGENTINA
* Montenero Peronist Movement
E R P
People's Revolutionary Army
● Carlos network
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
● * Red Army Faction
Movement of June 2
Revolutionary Cells
◤ * Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann
● ◤ * Neo-Nazis (Adolf Hitler Free Corps)
GREECE
Popular Initiative Front
TURKEY
● ◤ Turkish People's Liberation Army
● ◤ * Marxist Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit
Turkish People's Liberation Front
◤ Dev Sol
● ◤ * Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
ITALY
● ◤ * Red Brigades
◤ Prima Linea
PAKISTAN
OMAN
THAILAND
Pattani United Liberation Organization
PHILIPPINES
Moro National Liberation Front
JAPAN
● * Japanese Red Army
ETHIOPIA
● ◤ * Eritrean Liberation Front
MALAWI
*
SOUTH AFRICA
* African National Congress
NAMIBIA
South West African People's Organization S W A P O
● Direct operational co-operation
◤ Arms and ammunition supply
* Training in PLO camps in Arab countries

Ariel Merari. PLO: Core of World Terror. Jerusalem: Carta, 1983, pp. 10-11.


Franz Josef Land
Arctic Ocean
North Land
New Siberian Island
Wrangel
Poland
E. Germany
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Rumania
Bulgaria
Mongolia
People's Republic of China
North Korea
Laos
India
Vietnam
Syria
Iraq
Yemen
Afghanistan
Ethiopia
Congo
Angola
Mozambique
Cuba
Nicaragua
Pacific Ocean
Atlantic Ocean
Indian Ocean
Pacific Ocean
LEGEND
■ I. USSR 1949
▨ II. Soviet Communist Sphere of Political and Military Domination
☐ III. Other Soviet Treaty Partners (1983)

TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL: 1974 - 1983

Total Incidents by Geographic Region



5890 12-84 STATE(INR/GE)

U.S. Department of State, 1984

TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL: 1974 - 1983

Total Incidents and Incidents by Country for the Top Seven Countries



5889 12-84 STATE(INR/GE)

U.S. Department of State, 1984

SOVIET BLOC - PLO TRAINING

(pp. 120-121)

These documents, found in PLO camps in Lebanon in the Summer of 1982, detail the close military training ties between the PLO and other states, particularly Soviet-Bloc nations. Many of the PLO graduates have served as instructors of Arab and non-Arab terrorists in the Mideast and beyond.

120

Courses Officers and NCOs Took in Foreign Countries

SUBJECT: List of Courses which officers and NCOs of the "September-Martyrs-Battalion"/Castel Brigade/Fatah took in foreign countries
Source: Handwritten list captured in Sidon
(Remark: The original list includes courses taken in Arab countries.)

No.	Military ID No.	Rank	Name	Date present rank received	Course, Date, Place
1.	31487	Major	Faisal Muhamed Alsheich Yusef	--	1. Military Academy, China; 2. Battalion Commanders Course, Moscow; 2. Staff Officers, Pakistan, 1979.
2.	44552	Capt.	Jamal Yakov Jadan	Feb. 1, 1976	1. Fadavin Commander, Moscow; 2. Armor, Hungary, 1980.
3.	41054	1st Lt.	Fchal Muhamed Otman	1975	1. Platoon Commander, Moscow, 1975-6; 2. Company Commander, Vietnam, 1977-8.
4.	44818	1st Lt.	Muhamed Abd Allah Slamah	Jan. 1, 1976	1. Company Commander, China, 1977; 2. Armor Company Commanders, Moscow.
5.	32242	1st Lt.	Juad Ahmed 'Abdul-Ghani	Jan. 1, 1976	1. Political training, China, 1978-9; 2. Political training, Bulgaria, 1979-80.
6.	31492	2d Lt.	Rateb Mussa Mahmud Abu-Samarah	1975	1. Infantry Company Commander, Moscow, 1977; 2. Armor, Hungary, 1979.
7.	31281	2d Lt.	Yassin Hatchar Muhamed	Sept. 1, 1976	1. Armor, Hungary, 1980; 2. Armor Company Commander, Moscow.
8.	13644	2d Lt.	Ahmed Mustafa Hamdan Ghana'im	June 1, 1977	1. Armor Company Commander, Pakistan, J.T.A., 1976.
9.	51009	2d Lt.	Ibrahim Shachda 'Amar	June 1, 1977	1. Armor Company Commander, Pakistan, 1978; 2. Armor Communication, Pakistan, 1979.
10.	74709	2d Lt.	Said Ibrahim al-Ghazzi	June 1, 1977	1. Armor Company Commander, Pakistan, 1978; 2. Armor, Hungary, 1979.
11.	46897	2d Lt.	Khaled Issa Abd Hassan	June 1, 1977	1. Armor (Preparatory Course), Pakistan, 1979; 2. Armor, Hungary, 1980; 3. Armor Company Commander, Pakistan.
12.	52524	2d Lt.	Hassin Muhamed Ahmed Said	April 27, 1978	Armor, Hungary, 1979.
13.	13463	2d Lt.	Zaki Muhamed Ibrahim Alsheich	April 27, 1978	Armor, Hungary, 1979.
14.	15361	2d Lt.	Mustafa Hassan Mustafa Kandeil	April 27, 1978	1. Social Studies, Bulgaria, 1979; 2. Armor, Hungary, 1980.
15.	31708	2d Lt.	Ahmed Hassin Ahmed Ja'Aber	April 27, 1978	Armor, Hungary
16.	15377	2d Lt.	Ibrahim Raja Zalah Alhamzat	April 27, 1978	Armor, Hungary
17.	73937	2d Lt.	Ahmed Muhamed Ahmed Mari Alsharkawi	April 27, 1978	A/A Company Commander, Moscow.
18.	22029	2d Lt.	Ahmed Fazal Muhamed Abu Halil	April 27, 1978	Armor, Hungary
19.	21008	Serg. Major	Sha'ar Mustafa Ibrahim Mustafa	Mar. 1, 1977	1. Armor Platoons, Pakistan, 1978; 2. Armor, Hungary, 1980.
20.	53477	Serg. Major	Abd Alrahman Ahmed Hassin Alsharif	April 6, 1977	1. Armor, Hungary, 1980; 2. Military Academy, Cuba, 1979.

Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander. Terrorism: The Soviet Connection, New York: Crane Russak, 1984, pp. 125-126.



МИНИСТЕРСТВО ОБОРОНЫ СССР

СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВО

АН № 13765

Настоящее свидетельство выдано капитану Абдул-Азизу Махмуду Абу-Феддаху в том, что он ... в окт. 1975 г. поступил и в марта 1976 г. окончил I Высшие Офицерские курсы „Выстрел"

по специальности: командир пехотного батальона.

Настоящее свидетельство дает право на самостоятельное выполнение работ, связанных с полученной специальностью.

Начальник I Высших „Выстрел"
генерал-полковник [illegible]
(Д. Драгунский)

М. П.

26 марта 1976 г.

Регистрационный № 3012/140

THE MINISTRY OF DEPENCE, USSR

CERTIFICATE

AN № 13765

This is to certify that Captain Abdul-Aziz Mahmood Abu-Feddah

entered in October 1975 and graduated from the Vystrel Academy

in March 1976

majoring in the course of Infantry Battalion Commander

The bearer of the Present Certificate enjoys the privilege for independent activity associated with the Major Subject.

Commanding Officer Vystrel Academy
Colonel-General of Armoured Corps
(D. Dragunsky)

S. P.

26 - March 1976

Registration № 3012/146

Graduation certificate of the Ministry of Defense, USSR, awarded to Captain Abdul-Aziz Mahmood Abu-Feddah. He completed a course for infantry battalion commanders in March 1976.

Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander. Terrorism: The Soviet Connection. New York: Crane Russak, 1984, p. 119.

Islamic Republic of Iran
on
The Creation of an Independent Brigade For Carrying Out Unconventional Warfare in Enemy Territory

(pp. 123-134)

This paper is an official document of the Islamic Republic of Iran marked "Top Secret." It presents the original Persian text preceded by an English translation.

This document is not classified by the U.S. Government. Its inclusion in this report serves to illustrate the role of Iran in state-sponsorship of terrorism.

TOP SECRET

Subject: CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT BRIGADE FOR CARRYING OUT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN ENEMY TERRITORY

In the process of obeying the orders of His Eminence ... Ayatollah Imam Khomeini ..., the great leader of our revolution, and the founder of the Islamic Republic, which were given in handwriting, I would be pleased if you attended a meeting at the building of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance on 5/3/1363 at 1600 hours. Should Your Excellencies' presence for some reason not be possible, then one of your deputies or, otherwise, one of your senior responsible staff with full powers of authority on your behalf should attend the meeting, and his name, qualifications and title should be relayed 48 hours before the meeting.

Signed on behalf of the Minister of National Guidance

Seyed Mohammed Khatami

List of recipients of the memorandum

- Chief of the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic Armed Forces
- Representative of the Imam in the Supreme Defence Council
- Commander of the Revolutionary Guards of the Islamic Republic
- Commander of the Ground Forces of the Islamic Republic
- Commander of the Air Force of the Islamic Republic
- Commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic
- Chief of the G2 Section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Chiefs of the Political-Ideological Offices of the various forces
- Chiefs of the Islamic Committees (Head of the combattant clergy organisation)
- The Representative of the Imam in Haj
- Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic
- Hojat-Ol-Islam, Mohammed Baquir Hakim (Islamic Revolution of our brother country, Iraq)

TOP SECRET

Official proceedings concerning the creation of an independent brigade for carrying out unconventional warfare in enemy territory

The meeting commenced with the speech of His Eminence, Ayatollah Khatami, the Minister of Islamic Guidance, who said the following:

"In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate, dear Brothers, I wish to welcome you on behalf of the International Islamic Movements Organisation, and to explain in brief why this meeting has been called. On 24th of "Ordibehesht", I, accompanied by the Head of this movement (Islamic World Organisation) were received by our beloved leader to whom we presented our progress report. His Eminence, the Imam, expressed dissatisfaction with the behaviour of the leaders of the sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf and of the Saudi regime. Of course, he was not pleased either with others who pretend to be leaders of Islamic nations. After moments of silence which were evidence of his deepfelt anxiety and dissatisfaction, His Eminence in his usual style of firmness concerning all living matters made certain comments which are as follows:

"From the beginning of the revolution, we have had many enemies, but our expectations from Muslims was something else. Unfortunately, all the rulers of Islamic countries are servants of foreigners and instead of learning from our advice and being in step with us in the direction of Islam and the Islamic "Ummah", they have chosen the path of hostility and have acted in the same fashion they acted with the prophet (Mohammed) at the dawn of the Islamic period, and have consequently stepped on all the laws and traditions of the Koran and have left the entire Islamic heritage in the hands of the foreigners - first of all Sadam (Hussein, President of the Iraqi Republic) began to fight against Islam. Although his situation is near termination, these poor people are also sinking in the well with him; by this I mean the reactionary rulers of Arabia who also consider themselves the guardians of the Holy Shrines, and others, Kuwait, etc. These people think that because their bosses are Russians or Americans that they can by strong guns and tanks face the Iranian Ummah which has given so many martyrs. The destiny of the Shah, Sadam and their bosses, America, has not been a lesson to them. Now, it is up to them. We have a heavy responsibility in the face of the Koran, His Holiness, the Great Mohammed (the Prophet) and Islam. We have to spread Islam everywhere, and in this path we have given a great deal of blood, and we will give more until, with the help of God, Islam becomes victorious. You should act according to your religious duties. Whatever is necessary to destroy them must be carried out. There is no longer any time for talk and advice. That´s it." (end of Khomeini´s comments).

The Minister for National Guidance continued:

"Our brothers are aware that for four full years we have been at war with Sadam (Hussein, President of the Iraqi Republic), and we have borne a lot of suffering, and until such time as we have destroyed him and liberated our brother Iraqi nation, we cannot stop. On the other hand, all the forces of world oppression have united against this righteousness and have begun to pull the strings of their puppets everywhere to damage our glorious revolution. Inside, groups which have sold themselves, and outside, countries like Iraq. Therefore, based on what has been said, we are encircled by such an enormous satanic force and we must accept this truth, that apart from fighting this imposed war we face thousands of other internal and external problems. Apart from this, as indicated by our beloved leader, we have a heavy duty towards Islam and as such we must prepare ourselves to face the challenges of any enemy until such time as we have carried out the wishes of our leader and our "martyr-raising" Ummah, and we have liberated all Islamic countries from the yoke of corrupt and reactionary rulers. Therefore, because of the present difficulties which have been mentioned, it is not possible for us to directly confront this enormous force that is supported by the super powers,based on a plan that has been prepared in almost 200 pages and on which you will be subsequently informed, it has been decided that the strikeforce which at present is composed of a few groups of 10-20 people each, who are currently serving in the Lebanon, should be increased to the size of a brigade. This force, for security reasons, and for the purposes of making sure that legal impediments do not delay its formation, will be formed under the aegis of either the Revolutionary Guards or the Armed Forces. Of course, the decision in this respect will rest with His Eminence, the Leader. At this time, we are concerned with its creation. This force will act independently and will present all its reports directly to the Commander in Chief. Because the carrying out of this plan required the assistance of all revolutionary organs, the matter was presented to His Eminence in that initial meeting, and he accepted the proposal. What has been said has been a brief introduction, and now we will enter the main substance and I shall pass the platform to Brother "Mirhashem", who is responsible for this organisation. Of course, all present here are fully familiar with his (Mirhashem´s) features´; however, please allow for prudence-sake that we refer to him as "Mirhashem"."

Brother Mirhashem thanked His Eminence, Ayatollah Khatami and all respected people present.

"From what was said at the beginning, there was some reference made to the creation of a brigade. For the information of all present, I must say that we have at present a number of dedicated groups who are ready for action and who have, to the outside world become known as suicide groups. These groups have already performed certain actions. But since regional reactionary forces out of fear from the Islamic Revolution and the hard blows of the fighters of Islam, with each passing day under different pretexts are preparing themselves more and more, and this in itself is a big threat for the continuation of the revolution, these groups that we have are by themselves inadequate. Also, the personnel in these groups are commited only because of their beliefs for which they are ready to do anything, but they lack warfare experience. Therefore, the personnel of this brigade must from the point of view of military combat experience be of a very high echelon. If we wish to commence this task from the beginning, that is from the training stages, by the time that we can prepare such people for utilisation at least one year will have elapsed, and this is something that will create an interlude in our activities and will award our enemies more time. Therefore, it has been decided to select dedicated religious and fully commited candidates from all combat (Nahad) organisations so as to prevent any interlude in the continuation of our operational activities.

For the purposes of dealing with the main substance, I will list our requirements for you so that all brothers present will be informed of the boundaries of their duties and contributions towards the creation of this brigade. It is pertinent here that I should remind all that as indicated in the invitation memo the name of this brigade is for carrying out unconventional warfare inenemy territory. To commence operations and confrontations we must have excuses. Therefore, we must begin by propaganda - and here this is the responsibility of the combattant clergy organisation and the Friday Mosque prayer leaders (throughout the country) who must in the course of their political-religious sermons propose the plan that the administration of the Holy Shrines belongs to all Muslims in the world and must be controlled through a trusteeship consisting of all Islamic countries, and also the question of renovating other religious shrines and buildings fo which I have no specific knowledge. I refer only to the heading which is in line with the wishes of His Eminence, the Imam, and the Friday prayer leaders are more than capable of dealing with the substance of these headings.

Second, propaganda and operations during the month of the Holy Pilgrimage which Hojat-Ol-Islam Moussavi Khoiniha, who is himself both a contributor to the original plan and an operator as well. If necessary, he can say a few words concerning the operational plan for Haj.

Third, the combat structure of the brigade which must be ready for operation in the waters, airspace and territory of the enemy.

A. At this time, we request the commanders of the various forces (Revolutionary Guards and the three regular forces) to introduce dedicated and religiously commited qualified candidates to the temporary staff of this brigade. These people must have obtained a high school diploma and must have participated in the four years war (with Iraq). They must not be more than 30 years old, preferably bachelors. Their candidature must be approved by the political-ideological offices and these people must be introduced no later than the end of the month of "Tir". I underline that these people must in the course of their total commitment to the path of Islam place no value on their life, and must be totally commited to martyrdom.

B. To train these personnel, it is necessary to have the services of officers and non-commissioned officers specialising in partisan warfare (ground forces). His Eminence, our leader, has agreed that should we at present be faced with a shortage of such people, we can invite former officers and NCOs with these qualification to return to work. In this respect, if necessary, our military attaches in foreign countries can prepare such invitations for military people who are, for whatever reason, living abroad, and they can give them whatever assurances that are necessary. The only point concerning personnel living abroad is that care must be taken that no recommendation be made of people who have acted in a hostile way towards the Islamic regime. Unlike combat personnel, there is no age criterial for these specialised trainers.

C. Specialised officers and NCOs for training people for naval activities - according to the information given by the Navy in the past and at present were in possession of a strikeforce which might still exist, personnel from this structure are also required by the brigade. If faced with a shortage of such personnel, the above instructions are also applicable in this case.

D. For training in the art of piloting light aircraft, it is essential that we introduce certain candidates to the Airforce. It would be better if the Airforce could create a training centre outside its present bases for it would be more secure. In this regard, more will be said later.

Another thing which is required is combat information, that is airforce intelligence, naval intelligence and ground force intelligence. For this, whatever information which at present is available concerning enemy territory within the various intelligence units of the forces must be made available to the temporary intelligence, and more intelligence officers should be sent to the countries under consideration, under the umbrella of the military attache's office. In this respect, I repeat once again the same proceedures as those applicable to specialised officers and NCOs are to be followed, and in this regard, utilisation can be made of former Savak agents and the counter intelligence files of Savak. Here, I have a very important and secret matter to divulge, and that is that so far our organisation has been assisted by five Muslim brothers of occupied Palestine who, for many years have served in "the Army of the occupiers of Qods" (Israeli Army) , and in the future they will be making all their knowledge available to us.

The target countries are as follows. The first tier is Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The second tier is Hashamite Jordan. The third tier is as needs be, France and other countries who will try and confront the Islamic Republic.

Our brothers are informed and as stated, know that the reactionary forces of the region with each passing day, either out of fear or for reasons of dependence on the super powers, are arming themselves to the teeth, which is not to the advantage of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and there is no way that we can bring them to their knees unless we are able to inflict relentless blows on them from within. That is, to neutralise them at every step. Here it is necessary that I give a word of caution, that to obtain information from enemy territory you should select and introduce officers who once they have completed their observations and have submitted their reports, do not omit the slightest bit of information which might be of intelligence value.

With regard to Iraq, with the assistance of the 12th Imam, the Sadam (Hussein, President of Iraqi Republic) regime is gasping its final breath, for operations inside Iraq the political organisation which has been through the tireless efforts of the son of Ayatollah Hakim and other brothers is capable of exercising great strength, and in the not too distant future they will enter into operation.

The final request of this organisation is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ensure that the fullest cooperation is given to all personnel who are to sent by the organisation abroad (to ensure that they can proceed without delay etc.).

And finally, before I end, I wish to remind you that all specialised and intelligence personnel unlike ordinary personnel must be introduced no later than the 10th day of "Tir" so that there is no interlude in our activities.

Concerning the number of personnel to be introduced, outside the meeting certain questions were asked to which I must respond in this fashion, that apart frôm the command and HQ staff, the ordinary personnel introduced must number between 1500 and 2000, so that proper selection (taking into consideration ideological, combat and other credentials) can be made. There is no objection if the number of candidates exceeds the allocated amount. The other matter is that for forthcoming meetings either for exchange of opinion or for analysing the plan between the various organisations present in this meeting, without resorting to writing, each organisation must introduce a responsible person no later than the 10th day of "Khordad".

I have nothing else to say."

Closing remarks by Ayatollah Khatami.

"With repeated thanks to all those present, I request that should any proposals for the further strengthening of this brigade come to anyone´s mind, they be submitted in writing by the chosen candidate who will deliver it by hand so that they can be utilised.

Also, since the above proceedings will appear on paper from a cassette disk, I would be grateful if it was accepted that all irrelevant discussions be omitted. If there are no more comments in this regard, we can end the meeting."

The meeting ended at 2400 hours, and this record of the proceedings, after the omission of unnecessary items from the tape was prepared and is certified by all of us.

The Secretary (signature)

The Head of the International Islamic Movement´s organisation - "Mirhashem"

بسمه تعالی
جمهوری اسلامی ایران
وزارت ارشاد اسلامی

بکلی سری

خیلی فوری

۱۳۶۳/۲/۲۹
دعوتنامه ۳-۱۲۱/۶۳
به ستهای دعوت شده (لیست)
س ـ ن ـ ج ـ ۱

درباره: تشکیل تیپ مستقل جنگهای غیر منظم در زمین دشمن

در اجرای فرمان حضرت آیت الله امام خمینی مدظله العالی رهبر کبیر انقلاب وبنیانگذار جمهوری اسلامی که طی دستخطی شرف صدور یافته، خواهشمند است در رأس ساعت ۱۶ روز ۱۳۶۳/۳/۵ در ساختمان وزارت ارشاد اسلامی حضور بهم رسانید چنانچه حضور جنابعالی بعلل موجه مقدور نمیباشد یکی از معاونین و در غیر اینصورت یکی از مسئولین عالی رتبه و تام الاختیار خود را اعزام فرمائید واسم و مشخصات پست شارالیه را ۴۸ ساعت قبل اطلاع دهید.

از طرف وزیر ارشاد اسلامی ـ سید محمد خاتمی

هاشمی
۶۳-۲-۲۹

بسمه تعالی

جمهوری اسلامی ایران
وزارت ارشاد اسلامی

تاریخ ۱۳۶۳/۲/۲۹
شماره ۶۳/۱۲۱-۳
ب دموگمم

خیلی سری

صورت دعوت شدگان:

ریاست ستاد مشترک ارتش جمهوری اسلامی
نماینده امام در شورای عالی دفاع
فرمانده سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی
فرمانده نیروی زمینی ارتش جمهوری اسلامی
" " هوائی جمهوری اسلامی
" " دریائی جمهوری اسلامی
رئیس اداره دوم ستاد مشترک ارتش جمهوری اسلامی
روسای ادارات عقیدتی وسیاسی نیروها
رئیس کمیته های انقلاب اسلامی (دبیرجامعه روحانیت مبارز)
نماینده امام در حج
وزیرامورخارجه جمهوری اسلامی
حجت الاسلام محمد باقرحکیم (انقلاب اسلامی کشورعراق)

۲۹-۲-۶۳

بسمه تعالی

جمهوری اسلامی ایران
وزارت ارشاد اسلامی

بکلی سری

تاریخ ۶۳/۳/۵ ۱۳ ساعت تشکیل جلسه ۱۷
شماره —
پیوست

صورتجلسه مشاوره درباره تشکیل تیپ مستقل جنگهای غیرمنظم در زمین دشمن

جلسه باسخنان حضرت آیت الله خاتمی وزیر محترم ارشاد اسلامی به شرح زیر آغاز گردید :

بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم ، برادران و سروران عزیز قبلاً تشریف فرمائی شما را بنا بدعوت سازمان نهضتهای جهانی اسلام خیرمقدم عرض نموده علت تشکیل این جلسه را بطور اختصار باطلاع میرسانم ، در روز ۲۴ اردیبهشت ماه اینجانب باتفاق مسئول نهضت بحضور رهبر عظیم الشان شرفیاب وگزارش عملکرد سازمان را بعرض رسانیده ، حضرت امام نسبت به رفتار حکام شیخ نشینهای خلیج فارس ورژیم سعودی اظهار نارضایتی فرموده ، البته از سایر مدعیان رهبری کشورهای اسلامی هم دل خوشی نداشتند . بعد از مدتی سکوت که حاکی از ناراحتی عمیق معظم له بود با قاطعیت همیشگی که در مسائل حیاتی اعمال می فرمایند مطالبی فرموده که محتوای کلامشان چنین است .

از آغاز پیروزی انقلاب ما دشمن بسیار داشته ایم اما انتظار ما از مسلمین چیز دیگری بود . متاسفانه حکام کشورهای اسلامی همگی نوکر اجانب هستند بجای اینکه از نصایح ما پند بگیرند و با ما یار باشند و در جهت اسلام و امت اسلام با ما همکاری کنند از در دشمنی درآمدند همان کاری را که در صدر اسلام با پیغمبر کردند با ما میکنند احکام قرآن وسنت را زیرپا گذاشته و بلاد اسلام را در اختیار اجانب قرار داده اند اول از همه صدام با اسلام بستیز برخاست در حالیکه کار او نزدیک به اتمام است این بیچاره ها هم با او به چاه میروند منظورم حکام مرتجع عربستان که خود را خادم الحرمین هم میدانند و دیگران کویت وغیره ، اینها خیال میکنند چون ارباب آنها روس و امریکاست و با انباشتن توپ وتانک میتوانند با امت این همه شهید داده ایران رودررو قرار گیرند . سرنوشت شاه و صدام و اربابشان امریکا برای آنها عبرت نشده حالا دیگر خودشان میدانند ما در مقابل قرآن حضرت رسول اکرم (ص) و اسلام وظیفه سنگینی داریم ما باید اسلام را در همه جا پیاده کنیم در این راه خونها داده ایم و باز هم میدهیم تا بیاری الله اسلام پیروز شود شما بوظیفه شرعی خود عمل کنید هرچه برای سرکوبی آنها صلاح میدانید انجام دهید موعظه ونصیحت کافی است والسلام.

برادران مستحضر هستند که ما چهار سال تمام در حال جنگ با صدام هستیم ولطمات شدیدی را متحمل شده ایم تا سرنگونی او ونجات ملت برادر عراق نمیتوانیم دست از کارزار برداریم و از طرف دیگر تمام نیروهای استکبار جهانی برعلیه حقانیت ما بسیج شده عروسکهای خیمه شب بازی خود را برای ضربه زدن به انقلاب شکوهمند ما در همه جا بازی درآورده در داخل گروهکهای خود فروخته و در خارج کشورهائی نظیر عراق بنابرآنچه که عرض شد ما در محاصره چنین نیروی عظیم شیطانی هستیم و این حقیقت را باید قبول کرد که ضمن جنگ تحمیلی با هزاران مشکل داخلی وخارجی روبرو ، از این گذشته ما بخاطر اسلام همانطوریکه رهبر عزیز فرموده اند وظیفه سنگینی داریم و باید برای مقابله با هر دشمنی خود را آماده تر کنیم تا به آرزوی رهبر و امت شهید پرور ایران جامه عمل بپوشانیم . تمام کشورهای اسلامی را از شر حکام مرتجع باید آزاد سازیم بنابراین چون در حال حاضر با مشکلاتی که عرض شد نمیشود مستقیم روبروی چنین نیروی عظیمی که از طرف ابرقدرتها پشتیبانی میشود قرار بگیریم براساس طرحی که در حدود دویست صفحه نوشته شده و بعداً از آن آگاهی پیدا خواهید نمود تصمیم گرفته شد یک نیروی ضربتی که در حال حاضر بیش از چند گروه ده الی بیست نفری در اختیار نداریم و آنها

بکلی سری

جمهوری اسلامی ایران
وزارت ارشاد اسلامی

سح ۵ - ۳ - ۱۳۴۳
ســ ــ
پـ ۲ برگ

هم در لبنان انجام وظیفه مینمایند آنرا تا سطح یک نیروی برابر سازمان یک تیپ کامل گسترش داده بوجود بیاوریم این نیرو از نظر کلی و برای رعایت حفاظت و اینکه اشکال قانونی پیدا نکند که وقفه‌ای در تشکیل آن بوجود آید در پوشش سپاه پاسداران یا ارتش جمهوری قرار خواهد گرفت البته در اینمورد تصمیم با مقام رهبری است. ما فعلاً به تشکیل آن خواهیم پرداخت این نیرو مستقلاً عمل خواهد کرد و تمام گزارشات کار خود را مستقیم به فرماندهی کل قوا معروض خواهد داشت چون برای پیاده کردن این طرح احتیاج به همیاری تمام نهادهای انقلاب بود مراتب در همان جلسه بعرض امام امت رسید و موافقت به اینکار فرمودند . آنچه که عرض شد مقدمه‌ای بود و حالا وارد کلیات میشویم و رشته سخن را به برادر میرهاشم مسئول سازمان میسپاریم البته تمام سروران حاضر با قیافه ایشان آشنائی کامل دارند لیکن اجازه فرمائید بنا به مصلحت ایشان را بنام میرهاشم بشناسیم.

سخنان برادر میرهاشم : با تشکر از حضرت آیت العظامی و تمام سروران حاضر در جلسه همانطوریکه مقدمتاً مطالبی فرمودند و در آن اشاره به تشکیل یک تیپ شد برای استحضار حاضرین باید عرض نمایم که ما در حال حاضر چند گروه ایثارگر آماده انجام وظیفه داریم که در جهان بنام گروههای انتحاری لقب گرفته و کارهائی هم انجام داده‌ایم اما با توجه به اینکه مرتجعین منطقه از ترس نفوذ انقلاب اسلامی و ضربات کوبنده رزمندگان اسلام هر روز بعناوین مختلف خود را مجهزتر مینمایند که این خود خطر بزرگی برای موجودیت انقلاب میباشد این گروهها برای مقابله با چنین خطر عظیمی کافی بنظر نمیرسد و دیگر اینکه این افراد فقط با نیروی ایمان بهر کاری دست میزنند و تجربه رزمی آنچنانی ندارند لذا افراد تیپ مورد نظر باید از کارآئی رزمی در سطح عالی برخوردار باشند . اگر ما بخواهیم کار را از اول یعنی از آموزش شروع نمائیم تا چنین افرادی را آماده سازیم برای بهره‌گیری حداقل یکسال وقت لازم است که این مسئله باعث وقفه در کار شده و فرصتی است برای دشمن لذا تصمیم گرفته شده افراد معتقد و مومن و ایثارگر را از میان کلیه نهادهای رزمی انتخاب تا در ادامه عملیات وقفه‌ای حاصل نگردد . برای آنکه به اصل موضوع بپردازم من فهرست وار خواسته‌ها را برابر طرح عنوان مینمایم که برادران مطلع شوند حدود وظایف آنها برای کمک به تشکیل این واحد چیست در اینجا لازم است که یادآور شوم همانطوریکه در متن نامه ذکر شده نام این واحد تیپ مستقل عملیات رزمی غیر منظم در زمین دشمن است .

برای شروع عملیات برون روئی با آنها باید سنخیتی داشته باشیم. بنابراین باید از تبلیغات شروع شود که در اینجا وظیفه جامعه محترم روحانیت مبارز و ائمه جمعه است که از هم اکنون باید در خطبه‌های نماز عبادی سیاسی جمعه طرح اداره حرمین شریفین را که متعلق به همه مسلمین جهان است تحت نظارت یک هیئت امناء مرکب از تمام کشورهای اسلامی را عنوان نمایند و دیگر موضوع بازسازی اماکن مقدسه من صلاحیت ارائه طریق ندارم فقط عنوان را عرض نمودم که خواست حضرت امام است و خطبای محترم نماز جمعه بیش از همه در این امور وارد هستند . دوم تبلیغات و عملیات در ماه ذیحجه و مراسم حج که حجت الاسلام موسوی خوئینی‌ها که هم خود نویسنده طرح میباشند و هم عمل کننده اگر در اینمورد صلاح بود ایشان بعضی مطالب را در رابطه با طرح عملیات حج بیان خواهند نمود . سوم سازمان رزمی تیپ که باید برای عملیات در دریا و هوا و زمین دشمن آماده شوند .

بکلی سری

جمهوری اسلامی ایران
وزارت ارشاد اسلامی

ح ۵ - ۲ - ۱۳۶۴
ماره —
ب ۳ برگ

الف ــ اکنون از فرماندهی سپاه و فرماندهای نیروهای سه‌گانه ارتش درخواست مینمائیم که افراد معتقد و مومن و کارآمد خود را هرچه زودتر به ستاد موقت این واحد معرفی نمایند . این افراد باید دارای تحصیلات دیپلم باشند در جنگهای چهارساله شرکت نموده باشند ، بیش از سی سال سن نداشته باشند ، اگر مجرد باشند مطلوبتر است ، تائید صلاحیت آنها از طرف ادارات عقیدتی سیاسی پس از بررسی‌های دقیق بشود ، این افراد حد اکثر تا آخر تیرماه باید معرفی شوند .
تاکیداً عرض مینمایم که آنها بخاطر ایثارگری در راه اسلام برای جان خود ارزشی قائل نباشند و عاشقان شهادت .

ب ــ برای تعلیم این افراد به افسران و درجه‌داران متخصص در امور جنگهای پارتیزانی نیاز کامل میباشد (عملیات زمینی) مقام رهبری موافقت فرمودند چنانچه در حال حاضر با کمبود چنین افرادی مواجه هستید از افسران و درجه‌داران متخصص گذشته دعوت بکار نمائید در این زمینه اگر لازم بود وابسته‌های نظامی در کشورهای خارج مقدمات دعوت از چنین افرادی را که فعلاً بعنوانی در خارج بسر میبرند بدهند و به آنها اطمینان کامل از هر نظر داده شود . در مورد افراد مقیم خارج باین نکته توجه شود آنهائی نباشند که برعلیه حکومت اسلامی اقدام خصمانه نموده‌اند (برخلاف افراد رژیم شرایط سنی برای متخصصین مطرح نیست) .

پ ــ افسران و درجه‌داران متخصص جهت تعلیم افراد برای شرکت در عملیات دریائی ، بنا به اطلاع نیروی دریائی در گذشته و حال دارای واحد تکاور بوده و شاید هم باشد ، این افراد نیز مورد احتیاج واحد میباشند . در مورد کمبود چنین افرادی دستورالعمل فوق جاری است .

د ــ برای تعلیم فن خلبانی هواپیماهای سبک که میبایستی افرادی به نیروی هوائی معرفی نمائیم اگر نیروی هوائی بتواند یک پایگاه تعلیماتی خارج از پایگاههای موجود احداث نماید از نظر حفاظتی شایسته‌تر است در این مورد بعداً صحبت خواهد شد .

مسئله دیگری که مورد درخواست است اطلاعات برای رزم است ، اطلاعات هوائی ، دریائی ، زمینی برای اینکار در حال حاضر هرگونه اطلاعاتی که از زمین دشمن در سرویسهای اطلاعاتی نیروها موجود است در اختیار ستاد موقت گذاشته شود و برای کسب اطلاعات بیشتر لازمه آن اعزام افسران اطلاعاتی در پوشش وابسته نظامی به کشورهای مورد نظر است . در این زمینه مجدد عرض مینمایم تامین کمبود کادر برابر روش در مورد افسران و درجه‌داران متخصص عمل شود و از این بابت از افراد سابق ساواک و پرونده‌های اداره ضد جاسوسی ساواک استفاده شود . در اینجا یک مطلب مهم و سری لازم بعرض میباشد و آن اینکه تاکنون سازمان را پنج نفر از برادران مسلمان فلسطین اشغالی که سالیان در ارتش اشغالگر قدس خدمت نموده‌اند ما را یاری داده و در آینده هم تمام دانش خود را در اختیار میگذارند .

کشورهای مورد نظر : مرحله یکم عربستان سعودی ، کویت ، امارات متحده عربی ، بحرین ، مرحله دوم اردن هاشمی ، مرحله سوم بنا به نیاز عملیات فرانسه ، و سایر کشورها که با جمهوری اسلامی به مقابله برخیزند .

برادران مطلع هستند همانطوریکه عرض شد مرتجعین منطقه هر روز که میگذرد با از سر ترس و یا بعلت وابستگی به ابرقدرتها تا دندان خود را مسلح ساخته و میسازند که به این صلاح جمهوری اسلامی ایران نیست و از هیچ راهی نمیتوان آنها را بزانو درآورد مگر اینکه از داخل به آنها ضربه‌های بی امان .

بکلی سری

جمهوری اسلامی ایران
وزارت ارشاد اسلامی

تاریخ ۱۳۶۲-۳-۴
شماره –
پیوست ندارد

زده شود، یعنی هرچه آنها میپسندند ما پخش کنیم. در اینجا لازم است تذکری عرض نمایم که برای کسب اطلاعات از زمین دشمن افسرانی انتخاب و معرفی فرمائید که وقتی موقعیت پایگاه دشمن را بررسی و گزارش مینمایند حتی یک وجب از محل مورد نظر دور از دید اطلاعاتی آنها نمانده باشد.
و اما در مورد کشور عراق، بیاری امام زمان هم صدام آخرین نفسها را میکشد و در مورد عملیات در کشور عراق سازمان سیاسی نظامی آن با زحمات خستگی ناپذیر آیت زاده حکیم و دیگر برادران از قدرت شایسته‌ای برخوردار شده و در زمان لازم که زیاد دور نیست وارد عمل خواهند شد.
آخرین درخواست سازمان از وزارت امور خارجه میباشد که در موقع لزوم نهایت همکاری را در مورد اعزام مسئولینی از سازمان را بنحوی که مقتضی میدانند در اسرع وقت انجام دهد. در خاتمه مرابنجم لازم بیاد آوری است که افراد متخصص و اطلاعاتی برخلاف پرسنل عادی حد اکثر تا دهم تیرماه معرفی شوند که وقفه‌ای در کار بوجود نیاید. در مورد تعداد نفرات در خارج از جلسه سئوالاتی شد باید بعرض برسانم بجز کادر فرماندهی و ستادی افراد عادی یکهزار و پانصد الی دو هزار نفر معرفی شوند چون امکان واخوردگی چه از نظر اعتقادی و چه از نظر رزمی، در دیگر موارد اجتناب ناپذیر است اگر اضافه بر سازمان معرفی شوند اشکالی ندارد. موضوع دیگر اینکه در جلسات بعدی چه از نظر تبادل افکار و چه از نظر بررسی طرح و رابطه مستقیم با نهادهای شرکت کننده در این جلسه [illegible] همکاری بیشتر از افراد ذیصلاح خود را جهت ایجاد [illegible] من دیگر عرضی ندارم.
حضرت آیت الله خاتمی: با تشکر مجدد از تمام حاضرین خواهش دارم چنانچه در جهت کارآئی هرچه بیشتر این واحد اگر پیشنهاداتی در مد نظر است کتباً بوسیله نماینده‌ای که معرفی مینمایند فرستاده شود تا مورد استفاده قرار گیرد. ضمناً اینکه چون صورتجلسه از روی نوار کاست بروی کاغذ خواهد آمد موافقت فرمائید صحبتهای غیر رسمی از آن حذف شود. چنانچه فرمایشاتی در این زمینه نیست بجلسه پایان دهیم.
جلسه در ساعت ۲۴ پایان یافت این صورتجلسه پس از حذف مطالب غیر ضروری از روی نوار جلسه تهیه شده و مورد تائید اینجانبان میباشد.

رئیس سازمان نهضتهای جهانی اسلام – هاشم
۶۲-۳-۰۵

منشی جلسه
۶۲-۳-۰۵

SELECTED TERRORIST GROUPS

(pp. 136-175)

This selection of terrorist groups serves to demonstrate a cross-section of terrorist movements, some of which constitute insurgents and guerrillas, that resorted to state-sponsored and sub-state terrorism against U.S. interests around the world.

The information on these groups is drawn from unclassified material, including open literature and personal files of the authors.

AFRICA

ANGOLA

National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)

Torn by internal political struggles, this largely defunct group has attacked U.S. business targets in the past. In 1984, it still claimed to be operating in the north.

ETHIOPIA

Eritrean Liberation Front/Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF)

One of several Eritrean separatist groups, the ELF-PLF was founded in Cairo in 1958. It peaked in the 1970s under the leadership of Osman Saleh Sabeh, receiving supplies from Libya, and during that period it attacked U.S. servicemen in Ethiopia. The ELF-PLF has since been debilitated by internal factional fighting.

LESOTHO

Basotho Congress Party (BCP) and the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA)

The latter group is the militant guerrilla force of the former, trained in Libya. In September 1981 the Hilton Hotel and a U.S. cultural center were two targets in a series of bombings in Maseru. The BCP was originally founded in 1952.

NAMIBIA

South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)

SWAPO evolved in 1960 out of the liberation movement for Namibia/Southwest Africa and a desire for socialist economic reform. Led by Sam Nujoma, the armed wing, known as the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), is trained by Cubans and East Germans. SWAPO also receives military and political support from the Soviet Union.

SOUTH AFRICA

African National Congress (ANC)

This is the most prominent group in South Africa dedicated to Pan-African liberation, and is allied with the pro-Soviet, multi-racial South African Communist Party (SACP), although that has been a source of policy dispute between factions. Founded in 1912, the ANC formed an armed wing in the 1960s, Spear of the Nation, party trained by Cubans. Led by Oliver Tambo, that wing is responsible for numerous acts of sabotage in South Africa.

ZAIRE

National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FLNC)

Has attacked U.S. businesses in the past. Supported by Angola.

ASIA

INDONESIA

Free Aceh Movement

Secessionist movement for Atjeh or Aceh, a northern province of Sumatra. Responsible for the death of an American construction worker after a 1978 attack on an oil field.

JAPAN

Battle Flag Mainstream Faction

Marxist group opposing U.S.-Japanese security treaty. Very active in 1983-1984 with attacks on U.S. military bases.

Middle Core Faction

Radical Marxist group composed of some 2,000 members. Attacked U.S. military facilities in 1983-1984.

Revolutionary Worker's Association

Origins in the student movements of the 1970s. Some 800 members.

United Red Army

Formed in 1969 out of opposition to the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, this notorious terrorist group has members trained in Lebanon and links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The Red Army attacked U.S. business facilities in Singapore (1974) and seized the U.S. consulate offices in Kuala Lumpur (1975). It has plans to merge with worldwide terrorist groups to form an international organization devoted to an armed campaign for revolution.

PAKISTAN

Islamic Democratic Revolutionary Party

Formed in 1979 with designs of creating a fundamentalist revolution in Pakistan modelled after the revolution in Iran.

PHILIPPINES

April 6 Liberation Movement

This group's name derives from the date of an anti-martial law demonstration held in 1978. Predominantly engaged in urban terror in Manila, this group has close ties with the Movement for Free Philippines.

Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

Established in 1968 out of the Mindanao independence movement, this militant Moslem organization has been checked by government security measures, losing perhaps 45,000 supporters. It remains active, though, attacking small targets and government institutions. It has a membership of about 9,000, primarily led by Nur Misuari.

Movement for Free Philippines

This U.S.-based group was founded by an exiled former Christian Democratic Senator, Raul Manglapus. The Movement was responsible for a series of bombings including one in 1980 on a convention of U.S. travel agents at which both President Marcos and the U.S. ambassador were present. Also in 1980, President Marcos uncovered an alleged plot by this group to overthrow the government.

New People's Army (NPA)

Notorious guerrilla faction that is an offshoot of the Communist Party of the Philippines. It broke away to start a rural guerrilla campaign that, although anti-imperialist, is primarily aimed at the Marcos government and local officials, particularly in Mindanao.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)

Korean Christian Action Organization

Body founded out of increasing anti-American sentiments. Played a key role in a 1982 arson attack on a U.S. cultural center in Pusan.

SRI LANKA

People's Liberation Army/People's Liberation Front/Liberation Tigers

Militant spin-offs of the larger Tamil separatist movement being waged by the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. The group claimed credit for a May 1984 kidnapping of an American businessman and his wife. The Tamil separatist movement and its terrorist counterpart are both composed of several smaller groups and factions.

TAIWAN (ROC)

Bamboo Gang

Largest crime syndicate, originating in mainland China and operating in Taiwan. Two of its members were arrested in connection with the October 15, 1984, murder of Chinese-American writer Henry Liu in the San Francisco Bay area.

Taiwan Independence Movement

Responsible for bombings at the USIA offices at Tainan (1970) and at the Bank of America offices (1971). China Airlines and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) in Washington, D.C. were the subjects of two 1979 bombing attacks by an American offshoot, the United Formosans for Independence.

EUROPE

BELGIUM

Commando Andreas Baader

One of three left-wing groups which claimed responsibility for an unsuccessful attempt on the life of NATO Supreme Commander in Europe General Alexander Haig in June 1979. Not active 1983/1984.

Communist Combatant Cells

Emerged in Belgium in October 1984 when they declared "class war" on NATO and international imperialism. The CCC has ties with the Red Army Faction, Action Direct, and FP-25. The group has attacked NATO targets as part of a concerted anti-NATO campaign by European terrorists. On January 15, 1985, a CCC communique stated the bombing campaign would end since its goals had been achieved.

Julien Lahaut Brigade

Extreme left-wing group, also responsible for an attempt on the life of General Alexander Haig in 1979. Not active 1983/1984.

Vengeance and Liberty

Third of three groups responsible for attempt on General Alexander Haig's life in June 1979.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG)

Gudrun Ensslin Commando

Attacked U.S. military installations (1981); not active 1983/1984.

Red Army Faction

Founded in 1967/1968; led by Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, this group has been known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang. Attacks have been anarchistic, anti-bourgeois, and anti-American in nature. Attacked U.S. property and installations in Europe, including U.S. military, diplomatic, and NATO facilities. The new leadership is highly sophisticated. In the summer of 1984, German authorities uncovered plans to attack U.S. and NATO troops. Surviving members merged in June 1982 with the "Second of June Movement." Some 20-25 activists remain.

Revolutionary Cells (RZ)

Women known as Red Zora are in small autonomous cells of 3-8 each, totalling some 300-400 members. Active in the Ruhr, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and West Berlin areas, RZ has attacked U.S. military and commercial facilities and NATO. Extremely difficult to track down.

Sigurd Debus Commando

Linked with the Red Army Faction (RAF), this group attacked U.S. military installations in 1981. Not active 1983/1984.

FRANCE

Bakunin-Gdansk-Paris-Guatemala-Salvador Group (CBGPGS)

Formed in 1982, active against Soviet and rightist Latin American targets and defense related facilities in Paris. Has attacked U.S. businesses.

Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)

Formed in May 1976, calling for the independence of Corsica and the rehabilitation of the Corsican language and culture. A 1978 communique stressed an anti-western, anti-imperialist, pro-PLO orientation. Has ties with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Direct Action, may be associated with "Carlos," the Venezuelan revolutionary. Uses assassination tactics.

Direct Action

Formed in 1979 when the International Terrorist Action Group merged with Armed Core for People's Autonomy. Group is headed by GARF veteran Jean Marc Rouillan, who was pardonned by Mitterand in 1980. Has attacked U.S. diplomatic and NATO installations. Has international links with the PLO and the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction. Has attacked U.S. military installations in France (1982).

Movement Brothers of Palestine (MBP)

Has attacked U.S. businesses in France. Not active 1983/1984.

Self-Defense Against All Authority (SDAAA)

Has attacked U.S. businesses in France (1980). Not active 1983/1984.

We Must Do Something (WMDS)

Has attacked U.S. businesses in France. Not active 1983/1984.

Worker's Direct Action

Has attacked U.S. businesses in France. Not active 1983/1984.

Youth Action Group

Has attacked U.S. businesses in France. Not active 1983/1984.

GREAT BRITAIN

Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army

Emerged in 1969 as the military wing of Sinn Fein. This group broke away from the main body of the Irish Republican Army. Its main goal is to end British rule in Northern Ireland through revolutionary action. Has connections with the Bretan and Basque movements and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Has support from the Irish-American population in major U.S. cities. Some members have trained with Libya's Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, who has supported them with money and arms.

GREECE

Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth (GADY)

Has attacked U.S. diplomatic grounds (1973) and U.S. businesses.

Greek Military Resistance (GMR)

Has attacked U.S. businesses.

Greek People

Has attacked U.S. businesses.

Independence, Liberation Resistance

Has attacked U.S. military (1972).

National Front (NF)

Has attacked U.S. military.

People's Resistance Army (PRA)

Has attacked U.S. businesses. Not active 1983/1984.

GREAT BRITAIN

Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army

Emerged in 1969 as the military wing of Sinn Fein. This group broke away from the main body of the Irish Republican Army. Its main goal is to end British rule in Northern Ireland through revolutionary action. Has connections with the Bretan and Basque movements and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Has support from the Irish-American population in major U.S. cities. Some members have trained with Libya's Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, who has supported them with money and arms.

GREECE

Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth (GADY)

Has attacked U.S. diplomatic grounds (1973) and U.S. businesses.

Greek Military Resistance (GMR)

Has attacked U.S. businesses.

Greek People

Has attacked U.S. businesses.

Independence, Liberation Resistance

Has attacked U.S. military (1972).

National Front (NF)

Has attacked U.S. military.

People's Resistance Army (PRA)

Has attacked U.S. businesses. Not active 1983/1984.

November 17 Organization

An anti-American group which has attacked U.S. military personnel and U.S. diplomatic facilities.

People's Revolutionary Struggle (ELA)

Offshoot of November 17 Organization, it is the largest terrorist organization in Greece, with most of its activity centered around Athens and Thessaloniki. The ELA has attacked U.S. military grounds and U.S. businesses.

Popular Revolutionary Resistance Group

Has attacked U.S. diplomatic targets (1972). Not active 1983/1984.

ITALY

Armed Communist Nuclei

Responsible for January 1982 bomb threat on U.S. Consulate office in Milan. Bomb failed to go off but a note was found which said "GET NATO OUT OF ITALY."

Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP)

Terrorist group emerging in 1974. Attacked U.S. business facility in 1974, but activities have been slowed by police measures.

Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR)

Right-wing, neo-fascist group.

Front Line (PL)

Notorious terrorist group emerging in 1974, Prima Linea was responsible for an attack on a U.S. business facility in Milan in October 1974. Activities have been curbed by police security measures. Works closely with Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) in Milan, Turin and Naples.

Partisan Action Groups (GAP)

Has attacked NATO installations in the past; not active 1983/1984.

Proletarian International/Communist Groups for International Proletariat

Extremist organization claiming responsibility for attack on the Rome offices of the U.S. Republican Party in May 1982.

Proletarian Squads

Left-wing group, particularly active in 1980.

Sardinian Separatists

Most of its members were arrested in 1982 on charges of planning sabotage at the NATO base at Decimomannu and for the abduction of a U.S. officer.

Red Brigades ("Brigate Rosse" or BR)

Anti-imperialist in nature, this Marxist-Leninist urban guerrilla group styled itself after the Tupamaros of Uruguay in 1969. Aiming to promote class struggle, the BR has links with the RAF, ETA, IRA, and PLO, with members trained in South Yemen and Lebanon. The notorious group is most famous for kidnapping NATO Brigadier General Dozier in 1981, and former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978.

Red Brigades Fighting Communist Party

Emerging in 1982 as a militaristic offshoot of the Brigate Rosse, this group murdered director general of the Sinai Forces Leamon Hunt, in February 1984.

PORTUGAL

Popular Forces of April 25 (FP-25)

Founded in Portugal in 1980 as an advocate of armed revolution, FP-25 has attacked numerous U.S. diplomatic and NATO targets in addition to attacks on U.S. businesses. Has been linked to the IRA through attacks on British property in 1981. FP-25 may also have acted with the Red Army Faction, Action Direct, and other groups opposing NATO activity in early 1985.

SPAIN

Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commando (CAA)

Active 1983/1984.

Catalan Socialist Party for National Liberation

Has attacked U.S. businesses. Not active 1983/1984.

ETA or Basque Homeland and Liberty ["Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna"]

Sprang from a radical group that broke away from the Basque National Party in 1959. It is Marxist-Leninist in orientation, calling for the liberation of Euzkadi from French and Spanish control. Has contacts with the IRA and some Palestinian and South American groups. May have been associated with the attempt to assassinate anti-Sandinista leader Eden Pastora in May 1984. Has attacked U.S. military and businesses in Spain. Estimated strength: 200.

First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)

This group began operating in October 1975 as the military wing of the reconstituted Spanish Communist Party. Has ties with the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades. Has attacked U.S. business in addition to numerous kidnappings, bombings, and assassinations. Security operations nearly neutralized the group in 1979-1981 as key leaders were arrested or killed. In November 1982, GRAPO announced a "truce."

Revolution (IRAVLTZA)

Attacked U.S. businesses in 1983.

Revolutionary Anti-Fascist and Patriotic Front (FRAP)

FRAP attacked the United States military in 1975. It is the fighting arm of the Maoist Communist Party.

TURKEY

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)

Headquartered in Beirut, this Marxist-Leninist group is dedicated to an independent Armenian state, primarily focusing on the murder of Turkish officials and bombing Turkish targets under several different names. ASALA attacks institutions considered favorable to Turkey and Turkish institutions. Strong links to Soviet Union, the PLO, and worldwide revolutionary movements. Founded in 1975, ASALA attacked U.S. businesses in 1979. Operations occur mostly in Europe.

Federation of Turkish Revolutionary Youth (Dev Genç)

Beginning in university circles in 1969, Dev Genç has been torn by factional problems since its founding. Primarily targeting the military, the group was responsible for a number of operations against U.S. military personnel in Turkey in 1970, and against NATO in 1972. Not active 1983/1984.

Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU)

Founded as an ultra-leftist terrorist group in Paris in the early 1970s. Members were trained in the Mideast by Palestinian guerrillas. MLAPU assassinated two United States servicemen in Turkey in 1979, and also attacked U.S. businesses in 1979. MLAPU has close links to other European terrorist groups.

Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA)

Established in 1970, the TPLA kidnapped U.S. service personnel during 1971. Operations against U.S. and NATO targets followed in 1972, 1975 and 1977. Thought to be under the control of the East Germans and armed by the Czechs through Bulgaria. TPLA members have trained with Al-Fatah in Syria. Not active 1983/1984.

Warriors of the Turkish People's Liberation Front (WTPLF)

Pro-Soviet, Marxist-Leninist organization vehemently anti-American. Involved in numerous abductions of U.S. military personnel, killed a U.S. serviceman in 1979, and a U.S. sergeant in 1979.

LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA

Argentina Liberation Front or Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL)

Frente Argentino de Liberacion, a pro-Cuban group, has attacked U.S. businesses in the past, but has not been active in 1983/1984.

Argentine National Liberation Front (ANF)

Attacked U.S. military in 1963-1964. Not active 1983/1984.

Montoneros (M)

Practicing terrorist operations until 1976, the Montoneros have not been very active since, but have attacked U.S. business facilities.

People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)

In 1974, the ERP set up a revolutionary coordinating junta which provided links with Bolivia's ELN, Chile's MIR and Uruguay's MLN. Attacked U.S. businesses in 1973, but was inactive 1983/1984.

Peronist Armed Forces (FAP)

Attacked U.S. diplomatic targets (1974) and U.S. business (1969); not active 1983/1984.

BOLIVIA

National Liberation Army (ELN)

Attacked U.S. business interests in 1970 and coordinated activity with the ERP of Argentina, the MLN of Uruguay, and the MIR of Chile. Not active 1983/1984.

BRAZIL

Action for National Liberation (ALN)

Attacked U.S. diplomatic mission in 1969. Formed by Carlos Marsighela. Not active 1983/1984.

National Liberation Front

Has attacked U.S. business in the past. Not active 1983/1984.

Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR)

Attacked U.S. military (1968) and diplomatic target (1970), as well as U.S. business targets. Not active 1983/1984.

Revolutionary Movement of the Eighth (10-8)

Kidnapped the U.S. Ambassador in 1969. An offshoot of the Brazilian Communist Party. Not active 1983/1984.

CHILE

Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)

Has attacked U.S. diplomatic missions and U.S. businesses in the past.

COLOMBIA

April 19 Movement (M-19)

Founded in 1974 as a revolutionary movement to bring succession to Colombia. The movement split in 1982 with Rosemberg Pabon Pabon leading the most powerful faction. M-19 is increasingly connected to the drug trade and has threatened U.S. officials in retaliation for arrests of sixteen members. M-19 has links with Cuba and

Nicaragua, both of whom furnish arms, training and sanctuary. In a recent round-up of M-19 activities, West Germans, Ecuadorians, and Argentinians were among those arrested. M-19 is most noted for the abduction of Chester Allen Bitterman in 1981.

National Liberation Army (ELN)

Pro-Castro paramilitary group operating closely with FARC. Founded in 1964 using Cuban instruction, the ELN's strength has been declining since 1980. Attacked U.S. oil interests (1983), a U.S.-Colombian cultural center (November 1983) and kidnapped U.S. citizens (1981, 1983).

People's Revolutionary Army

On March 7, 1983, this rebel insurgent group kidnapped a U.S. oil company executive and released him a week later. The executive's bodyguards were killed in the abduction.

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Has attacked U.S. business and military targets (1977, 1983). Led by Manual Valez and founded in 1966, the pro-Soviet FARC's overall activity has declined. No apparent links with Moscow or Havana.

United Front for Guerrilla Action

Composed of four guerrilla groups, this organization was formed and disbanded in March 1979. Inactive since.

Worker's Self-Defense Movement (MAO)

Led by Oscar Puerto, MAO has been the urban branch of the EPL or Popular Liberation Army. Although it has attacked U.S. business interests, MAO has been inactive in 1983/1984.

COSTA RICA

Carlos Arguero Echeverria Commando (CAEL)

Left-wing group claiming responsibility for a 1981 attack on three U.S. marines. Not active 1983/1984.

Revolutionary Commandos of Solidarity

Has attacked U.S. military and U.S. businesses in 1977, but was inactive in 1983/1984.

CUBA

Alacran Scorpion

Has attacked U.S. businesses. Not active 1983/1984.

Cuban Action Communists (CAC)

Has attacked U.S. businesses.

El Condor (EC)

Has attacked U.S. businesses.

El Poder Cubano (EPC)

Has attacked U.S. businesses.

Latin American Anti-Communist Army (LAACA)

Has attacked U.S. businesses.

Omega 7

Emerged in 1975 as a militantly anti-communist right-wing Cuban exile organization. Omega 7 has claimed responsibility for dozens of incidents, most in New York. It is believed to be the underground action arm of the Cuban Nationalist Movement, which is widely supported by the Cuban exile community in the United States. Highly resistant to law enforcement measures.

Pedro R. Botera Command

Has attacked U.S. business interests.

EL SALVADOR

Armed Revolutionary Party of the People (ARPP)

Has attacked U.S. businesses. Not active 1983/1984.

Cayetano Carpio Movement (CCM)

Has attacked U.S. businesses. Not active 1983/1984.

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Forces (FMLN)

Taking its name from a peasant leader, this group is comprised of other groups, including the FPL, PCS, ERP, FARN, and PRTC, controlled by a Unified Revolutionary Directorate known as the DRU. The political arm is the Revolutionary Democratic Front led by former junta member Manuel Ungo of the MNR. Strength estimated at 8,000. Have attacked U.S. military (1983) and U.S. business interests. Controls up to one-fourth of the country, FMLN is Cuban backed and trained.

Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)

The most active military group, attacking U.S. business interests in the past.

People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)

Castroite group founded in 1972 by Joaquin Villalobos. Has attacked diplomatic targets (1980) and U.S. businesses (1983, 1984) in an urban terrorist campaign.

Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR)

Has attacked U.S. businesses. Not active 1983/1984.

Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC)

Has attacked U.S. businesses before. Not active 1983/1984.

White Warriors Union (UGB)

Has attacked U.S. businesses in the past. Not active 1983/1984.

GUATEMALA

Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)

Joined with three other organizations to form the National Revolutionary Union dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Guatemalan goal. Over 2,000 guerrillas have been trained in Cuba and supplied with U.S. weapons captured in Vietnam. Linked with El Salvadoran rebels, the EGP has attacked U.S. businesses.

31 January Popular Front (FP-31)

A coalition of six smaller groups, FP-31 has attacked U.S. businesses.

Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)

Not active in recent years. Attacked U.S. diplomatic and military targets (1970) and U.S. businesses in 1973.

Revolutionary Movement of November 13 (MR-13)

Attacked U.S. military in 1965; not active recently. Split into two groups.

Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA)

Formed the National Revolutionary Union with the Guatemalan Communist Party, EGP, and FAR.

Worker's Party of Guatemala

Has attacked U.S. businesses in the past. Not active 1983/1984.

HAITI

Hector Riobe Brigade

Formed by Jean-Claude Luis-Jean, a Haitian trained in Libya and Lebanon by the PLO, this brigade is composed of 10-15 hard-core members. Links with Libya, GDR, Angola, Cuba and Nicaragua. Is active in Port-au-Prince. Followers in New York, Miami, Paris and Montreal.

HONDURAS

Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement (or: Chinchoneros National Liberation Movement)

Guerrilla arm of People's Revolutionary Union. Appearing in January 1981, the Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement (MLP) protested the American military and the presence of U.S. military advisers through bombings and the occupation of a Honduran chamber of commerce building in 1981 and 1982, respectively.

Popular Revolutionary Front of Lorenzo Zelaya (FPR)

This Marxist-Leninist terrorist group operating in Honduras wounded two U.S. military advisers in a 1981 shooting. An FPR offshoot, the Lorenzo Zelaya Revolutionary People's Command, claimed responsibility for a series of bombings in 1982/1983, including attacks on U.S. enterprises and American officials. The Honduran government foiled an FPR plot to kill the Pope.

Revolutionary Action Front

Has attacked U.S. businesses. Not active 1983/1984.

MEXICO

Armed Vanguard of the Proletariat

Attacked U.S. businesses in 1972 and 1976, U.S. diplomatic grounds in 1980, and the U.S. military in 1981. Not active 1983/1984.

Mexican People's Revolutionary Army (MPRA)

Attacked U.S. diplomatic grounds in 1973. Not active 1983/1984.

Poor People's Party (PLP)

Has attacked U.S. businesses. Not active 1983/1984.

People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FRAP)

Attacked U.S. diplomatic targets 1973/1974. Not active 1983/1984.

Twenty-Three September Communist League

Has attacked U.S. businesses. Not active 1983/1984.

NICARAGUA

Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

Attacked U.S. businesses.

PERU

Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)

Has attacked U.S. businesses. Inactive 1983/1984.

Shining Path (SL)

Founded in 1963 when the Peruvian Communist Party split into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions, this pro-Maoist group has been increasingly active, attacking government offices, private businesses and political leaders. Symbols of U.S.-Peruvian cooperation, most notably Coca Cola and Sheraton Hotels, have been attacked. Sendero Luminoso also attacked U.S. diplomatic personnel in 1982 at the U.S. embassy, and made an attempted attack on the Ambassador's residence in 1983. Estimated strength: 500-3,000.

PUERTO RICO

Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN)

While advocating Puerto Rican independence, the FALN has been involved in various acts of violence in the United States since 1979. Has links with the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (supported by Cuba). See, also, United States of America heading.

Puerto Rican Armed Resistance Movement (MRAP)

An offshoot of the FALN, this group has perpetrated numerous bomb attacks in the United States.

URUGUAY

Tupamaros (also known as National Liberation Movement or MLN)

Attacked U.S. diplomatic missions (1970) and U.S. businesses (1969-1970).

VENEZUELA

Argimiro Gasbaldon Revolutionary Commando

Kidnapped a U.S. businessman in 1976. After a general amnesty in 1979, has been inactive.

Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN)

Has attacked U.S. businesses in the past. Not active 1983/1984.

Committee for Revolutionary Integration (CRI)

Has attacked U.S. businesses in the past. Not active 1983/1984.

Organization of Revolutionaries

Has attacked U.S. businesses in the past. Not active 1983/1984.

Red Flag (BR)

Offshoot of FALN, this Marxist-Leninist group has attacked U.S. business interests in the past. Its armed wing is the Americo Silva Front. Sporadic regional activities in 1983/1984.

Revolutionary Party of Venezuela (PRV)

Has attacked U.S. businesses. Not active 1983/1984.

MIDEAST

ALAOUITE GROUPS

COMMUNIST GROUPS

PALESTINIAN GROUPS

SHI'ITE GROUPS

SUNNI GROUPS

Alaouite

Ali Eid Partisans

Based in Tripoli, this group is pro-Syrian.

Arab Democratic Party

A pro-Syrian group based in Tripoli under the leadership of Souheil Hamade.

Red Knights or Pink Panthers

Alaouite group under Rifaat Assad. It is the direct arm of the Syrian army in Tripoli. Opposed to the Islamic Unification Movement.

Communist

Lebanese Communist Party

Led by George Hawi, a former member of the National Movement and now a member of the National Democratic Front, this group is pro-Syrian.

Organization for Communist Action in Lebanon

This is a pro-Syrian group led by Mohsen Ibrahim.

Palestinian

The Abu Ibrahim Faction or The Arab Organization of May 15

Composed of fifty to seventy activists under Muhammad Amri, known as Abu Ibrahim. This group has close ties with Iraqi intelligence which provides funds, documents, training and weapons. Most members are now in Iraq, others have been sent into the Gulf States and Europe. Unstable relations with other terrorist groups with the exception of the Fatah Loyalists. The group has made two dozen attacks on Israeli targets, moderate Arabs, and foreigners, generally using sophisticated weapons and bombs.

The Abu Nidal Faction [Fatah Revolutionary Council]

Formed in 1973 when Sabri al-Bana or Abu Nidal broke with Fatah. Under Iraqi patronage until November 1983, when it was expelled from Iraq. Most members are now in Syria and Lebanon, with a current membership of around five- to eight-hundred. With Syrian backing, the Abu Nidal group has made over sixty attacks, including mass murder missions, in the Middle East and Europe.

Arab Liberation Front

Established by Iraqi Ba'ath Party, this group is composed of a few hundred terrorists led by Abd al-Rahim Ahmad out of Baghdad, now backing Arafat. Its policies change with those of the government of Iraq. Forces are stationed in Europe.

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Under the leadership of Naif Hawatmeh, this group group is Marxist-Leninist and is allied with the Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon. It is supported by Syria and the U.S.S.R. with a membership of around one thousand. Group plays a moderating role between loyalist Fatah and rebel Fatah factions. It has four infantry and one artillery battalions in Lebanon with a command center at Ta'albiye under Khaled Abd al-Rahim.

Fatah

Led by Yassir Arafat, it is a "moderate," pro-Soviet group supported by Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and others. It is the largest of the PLO groupings. Opposed by the Syrian rebels led by Abu-Musa.

Naji Allush Faction or Popular Arab Liberation Movement

This group is an offshoot of Abu Nidal, founded in 1979. It has supporters in the Middle East and Europe.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

The dominant "Rejectionist" group, it is led by Dr. George Habash, and its membership totals some five hundred operatives. One of these is under the joint command of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The PFLP also supports a group called Subjugated Lands, which carries out attacks on Israel (principally rocket attacks). A Marxist-Leninist group, it has close ties with the Communist countries and terrorist movements around the world.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)

A small breakaway group of the PFLP led by Ahmed Jibril, which has an estimated 800 terrorists headquartered in Damascas. It is pro-Syrian, with close ties to Libya. Its Lebanese headquarters is at Deir Znun.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Special Command

Led by Salim Abu-Salem or Abu Mohammad, this group is composed of about one hundred members and supporters. Its military chief is Zaki Hilu. In charge of recruitment and organization is Sidqi al-Atari or Abu Fares, and in charge of administration is Sharif al-Hasni. It has offices throughout the Mideast which act semi-autonomously; terrorist activities require leadership approval.

Popular Struggle Front

A pro-Syrian, Marxist group believed to have six hundred terrorists under the command of Dr. Samir Ghosha. It has ties with Sa'eqa and the Jibril Front, and its headquarters are located in Damascas.

Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF)

Composed of several hundred members who split from Jibril. It has since then split again into three groups: 1) pro-Syrian faction headed by Abd al-Fatah al-Ghanem, 2) pro-Arafat led by Abu al-Abbas, with command located in Tunis and South Yemen, and 3) a middle faction, similar in goals to the Habash Front, headed by Tala'at Ya'qub.

Sa'iqa

Terrorist arm of the Syrian Ba'ath party, composed of one thousand terrorists loyal to Syrian policy. It was formed in 1968, led by Assam Al-Qadhi. During the 1983 rebellion, many joined Arafat's side and were evacuated to Tunis and Cyprus. Command is in Damascas, but there is a Lebanese command at Ta'anil. There are also five battalions, a militia and terrorist groups in Lebanon.

Shi'ite

Al Daawa Movement

Established during the mid-1950s in Iraq. Led by Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi al-Asfi and headquartered in Tehran, most of its members are Iraqi. Activities possibly included an attempt on the life of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in July 1982, and the 1984 attacks in Kuwait.

Amal ('Hope')

Founded in Lebanon in 1974 by Imam Musa Sadr as the Movement of the Disinherited. In 1978, Musa Sadr disappeared during a trip to Libya. The present leader is Nibih Berri; estimated strength: four- to five thousand. Closely allied with Iran.

Front for the Islamic Struggle or Islamic Resistance Front

This anti-Israel group conducts attacks against Israeli troops and Lebanese army troops in southern Lebanon.

Guardians of the Revolution

Iranian group formed to promote Islamic state formation in Lebanon: to some extent Syrian controlled, yet often clashes with Syrian troops primarily in the Bekka Valley area.

Hezballah or Party of God

Seceded from Amal, this group operates primarily in West Beirut, Baalbeck, and South Lebanon, under the leadership of Abas Musawi and Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah. Possible links with Islamic Jihad and Al Daawa.

Imam Hussein Fedayeen

Composed of several dozen members led by Abdullah Musawi, known as Abu Haidar, this group operates in Beirut.

Islamic Amal

Seceded from Amal in July 1981, and was founded by Hussein Musawi. More radical than Amal and is believed to be the organization behind the Islamic Jihad which is responsible for a number of notorious terrorist acts, including the April 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy, and the bombings of the U.S. Marine and French military compounds. Estimated membership: one thousand, half of which are Lebanese Shi'ites and the rest being Iranian revolutionary guards. Most are in the Baalbeck area. Syrian supported, pro-Iranian.

Islamic Jihad Organization

Operating in Lebanon, this is a terrorist group that is possibly an umbrella organization under which many groups operate.

Lebanese Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners

Group responsible for a number of attacks against foreigners and institutions in Lebanon in 1982-1983.

Lebanese National Resistance Front

Formed in July 1984, it is an anti-Israel group.

Martyrs of the Islamic Revolution

Operates in Europe against the United States and its allies.

Mujahideen

Under the control of the Iranian government, the membership is primarily of Iraqi origin, although it also includes Shi'ites from other Arab countries and allegedly some European Moslem converts. Its declared objective is to change all Arab regimes in the spirit of Iranian revolutionary fundamentalism. Reportedly under the leadership of Aziz al-Hakim, a younger brother of Bakr al-Hakim, leader of the Iraqi Islamic Revolutionary Council. Headquarters are in Tehran with Jullal a-Din Sreir as organization operations officer. Claims to have carried out attacks in Iraq.

Shi'ite High Council

Led by Sheikh Mohammad Mehdi Chamseddine in West Beirut, it is a religious organization for the Shi'ite community. Chamseddine often clashes with Berri or Amal, advocating more radical approaches. It is fundamentally anti-Israel.

The Student Association

Established in the mid-1970s by Musa Sadr among high school and university students in Beirut. Seceded from Amal, it is now composed of several dozen members in Beirut and southern Lebanon. Small militant faction also operates under the leadership of Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah.

Sunni

Atonement and Flight

Established in 1971 in Egypt by Shukri Mustafa, this group is a breakaway from the Moslem Brotherhood. Claimed responsibility in 1977 for the assassination of Dr. Mohammad el-Dahabi, former minister of Islamic affairs, and is held responsible for the 1981 murder of Anwar Sadat. Possible ties with Libya.

Holy War

Loosely associated with Al Tafkir Wal Hijira, it is active in promoting attacks upon the Coptic community. Five members were sentenced to death for their role in the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

Islamic Unification Movement

Based in Tripoli and led by Sheikh Said Shaaban, this group advocates an Islamic Lebanon. It sided with Yassir Arafat in 1983-1984 and has fought against Alaouite and Syrian troops in Tripoli.

Independent Nasserite Movement

Political arm of the Murabitoun. It was founded in 1958 as a socialist group supported by the urban poor. Membership: 2,000.

Moslem Brotherhood or Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Musalamin

Operating in Egypt, it was founded in 1928 to regenerate Islam. Has been dissolved and reformed several times, linked to political violence since 1946. Chief spokesman is Omar Telmessani ('Supreme

'Guide), who is in prison. In 1928 it was believed that the Brotherhood was being encouraged by the Egyptian government as an alternative to extremist groups.

Murabitoun

Led by Ibrahim Koleilat, it is a pro-Syrian group with some PLO elements. Speaks for Sunni interests in Beirut.

Sunni Popular Resistance Council

Founded in 1984.

Sunni Popular Resistance

Militia in Tripoli. It has been included in the Islamic Unification Movement, but was anti-Syrian and anti-Alaouite.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN)

In operation since the 1930s, the FALN seeks the liberation of Puerto Rico through revolution. It has claimed 120 attacks on civilian and military targets. Has suffered serious setbacks in recent years as its leadership cadre, led by Carlos Alberto Torres, have been imprisoned. The group enjoys support from and has contact with the Weather Underground and the May 19th Communist Organization. It maintains links with Cuba and Nicaragua.

Boricua People's Army or Macheteros

Came to attention in August 1978 as a violent, pro-Independence Puerto Rican terrorist group. Has attacked U.S. military installations. In January 1981, attacked nine National Guard planes at Muniz Airport, Fola Verde. In December 1979, attacked a U.S. Navy personnel bus. The incident was also claimed by the Armed Forces of Popular Resistance (FARP).

Black Liberation Army

Emerged from the Black Panther Party. At one time it had 100 members. It attacked police forces before it was weakened, and in 1973 the group's leader, Joanne Chesimard, was arrested. She escaped six years later. Maintains links with other U.S. revolutionary groups.

May 19th Communist Organization

Established in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist group. Inspired by the Weather Underground, it had originally been the East Coast Faction of the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee. Its proclaimed goal is the support of national liberation movements; it also aims to establish a force to conduct a "people's war" against U.S. authorities.

United Freedom Front

Opposes U.S. policy in Central America. Is composed of elements of the Weather Underground and cooperates with the "Armed Resistance Unit." Together, they carried out a number of bombings in 1983-1984. Some links with the May 19th Communist Organization and the Black Liberation Army. Most recently, the group has targeted U.S. companies doing business with South Africa (August 1984 bombing of General Electric offices in Long Island; September 1984 bombing of South African consulate in New York).

Weather Underground Organization (WUO)

Founded in June 1969 led by Mark Rudd under the banner of revolutionary anti-imperialism, most of its leaders were arrested by the late 1970s. Yet the 1981 Brinks robbery, in which two leading members were included (Judith Clark and Katherine Boudin), indicates the group's ability to strike. The WUO has ties with black extremist groups and Puerto Rican terrorists.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adeniran, Tunde and Alexander, Yonah, eds. *International Violence.* New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983.

Alexander, Yonah, ed. *International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives.* New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.

______. *The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict: Ideological and Religious Aspects.* New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.

______; Browne, Marjorie; Nanes, Ann and Allen, eds. *Control of Terrorism.* Crane Russak and Company, 1979.

______; Carlton, David; Wilkinson, Paul, eds. *Terrorism: Theory and Practice.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

______ and Ebinger, Charles K., eds. *Political Terrorism and Energy: The Threat and Response.* New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.

______ and Friedlander, Robert A., eds. *Self-Determination: National, Regional, and Global Perspective.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

______ and Gleason, John M., eds. *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism.* Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1981.

______ and Kilmarx, Robert A., eds. *Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response.* New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.

______ and Kittrie, Nicholas. *Crescent and Star: Arab-Israeli Perspectives on the Middle East Conflict.* New York: Ams Press, 1972.

______ and Myers, Kenneth A., eds. *Terrorism in Europe.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

______ and O'Day, Alan., eds. *Terrorism in Ireland.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.

______ and Seymour, M. Finger, eds. *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives.* Maidenhead: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1978.

Asmal, Kader. "The Legal Status of National Liberation Movements (with particular reference to South Africa)," *United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, Seminar,* Lagos, Nigeria, 13-16 August 1984. Doc. no. 84-17233.

Bassiouni, M. Cherif, ed. *International Terrorism and Political Crimes.* Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1975.

Baumann, Carol Edler. *The Diplomatic Kidnappings*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973.

Becker, Jillian. *Hitler's Children.* London and New York: Panther, 1978.

Bell, J. Bowyer. *The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice.* New York: Knopf, 1971.

______. *On Revolt*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976.

______. The Secret Army: *The IRA, 1916-1974.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974.

______. *Terror out of Zion: The Irgun, Lehi, Stern and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977.

______. *A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence.* New York: Basic Books, 1978.

______. *Transnational Terror.* Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975.

Beres, Louis Rene. *Terrorism and Global Security: the Nuclear Threat.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Buckley, D. Alan and Olson, Daniel D., eds. (special consulting editor, Sloan, Stephen). *International Terrorism: Current Research and Future Directions.* Wyne, N.J.: Avery Publishing Group, 1980.

Burton, Anthony M. *Urban Terrorism: Theory, Practice and Response.* New York: The Free Press, 1975.

Carlton, David and Schaerf, Carlo, eds. *Contemporary Terror: Studies in Sub-state Violence.* London: Macmillan, 1981.

______ and ______, eds. *International Terrorism and World Security.* London: Croom Helm, 1975.

Chailand, Gerald. *The Palestinian Resistance.* Baltimore: Penguin, 1972.

Clark, Richard C. *Technological Terrorism.* New York: Devin-Adair, 1978.

Cline, Ray S. and Alexander, Yonah. *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection.* New York: Crane Russak, 1984.

Clutterbuck, Richard L. *Guerrillas and Terrorists.* London: Faber and Faber, 1977.

______. *Kidnap and Ransom: The Response.* London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1978.

______. *Living with Terrorism*. New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1975.

Crelinsten, Ronald S.; Laberge-Altemeja, Danielle; Szabo, Denis, eds. Terrorism and Criminal Justice. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978.

Crenshaw, Martha, ed. Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence. Wesleyan University Press, 1983.

Crozier, Brian. The Study of Conflict. London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1974.

Debray, R. Revolution in the Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.

_______. Strategy for Revolution. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973.

Demaris, Ovid. Brothers in Blood: The International Network. New York: Scribner, 1977.

Dobson, Christopher. Black September: Its Short, Violent History. New York: MacMillan, 1974.

_____ and Payne, Ronald. Counterattack: The West's Battle Against the Terrorists. New York: Facts on File, 1982.

_____ and _____. The Terrorists: Their Weapons, Leaders and Tactics. New York: Facts on File, 1979.

_____ and _____. The Weapons of Terror: International Terrorism at Work. London and Basingstoke. MacMillan, 1979.

Elliot, John D. and Gibson, Leslie K., eds. Contemporary Terrorism: Selected Readings. Gaithersburg: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1978.

Evans, Ernest. Calling a Truce to Terror: The American Response to International Terrorism. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979.

Francis. Samuel T. The Soviet Strategy of Terror. Washington, D. C.: Heritage Foundation, 1981.

Freedman, Lawrence Zelic and Alexander, Yonah. Perspectives on Terrorism. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1983.

Friedlander, Robert A. Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1979, v. 2.

Guevara, Ernesto. Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. Translated by Harries-Clichy Peterson. New York: Praeger, 1961.

_____. Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Random House, 1961.

Guillen, Abraham. Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla. Translated by D. C. Hodge. New York: Morrow, 1973.

Gurr, Ted Robert. *Cross-National Studies of Civil Violence.* Washington, D.C.: American University Center of Research in Social Systems, 1969.

Gurr, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel.* Princeton: University Press, 1970.

Hacker, Frederick J., *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Time.* New York: Norton, 1976.

Hinze, Paul B. *The Plot to Kill the Pope.* New York: Scribner's, 1983.

Hutchinson, Martha Crenshaw. *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-62.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

Hyams, Edward. *Terrorist and Terrorism.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974.

Kupperman, Robert H. and Trend, D. *Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

Laqueur, Walter. *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1976.

______. *Terrorism.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.

______, ed. *Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960.

Liston, Robert A. *Terrorism.* Nashville: Nelson, 1977.

Livingston, Maurius, ed. *International Terrorism in the Contemporary World.* Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978.

Livingstone, Neil C. *The War Against Terrorism.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982.

Lodge, Juliet, ed. *Terrorism: A Challenge to the State.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981

Mallin, Jay. *Terror and Urban Guerrillas: A Study of the Tactics and Documents.* Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1971.

______. *Terror in Vietnam.* Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1966.

Mao Tse-tung. *Basic Tactics.* New York: Praeger, 1966.

______. *On Guerrilla Warfare.* New York: Praeger, 1961.

Marighella, Carlos. *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla.* Havana: Tri-continental, N.D.

Mickolus, Edward F., Compiler. The Literature of Terrorism: A Selected Annotated Bibliography. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980.

Miller, Abraham H. Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980.

Morris, Michael. Terrorism. Cape Town: H. Timmins, 1971.

Moss, [illegible]bert. Urban Guerrillas. London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1972.

______. The War for the Cities. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1972.

Netanyahu, Benjamin, ed. International Terrorism: Challenge and Response. Jerusalem: Jonathan Institute Press, 1978.

O'Ballance, Edgar. Terror in Ireland: The IRA and the Heritage of Hate. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1981.

Paine, Lauran. The Terrorists. London: Hale, 1975.

Parry, Albert. Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat. New York: Vanguard Press, 1976.

Rapoport, David C. Assassination and Terrorism. Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 1971.

______ and Alexander, Yonah, eds. The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications. Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1982.

Schamis, Gerardo Jorge. War and Terrorism in International Affairs. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980.

Shaw, Jennifer, ed. Ten Years of Terrorism: Collected Views. London: Royal United Services for Defense Studies. New York: Crane Russak, 1979.

Sloan, Stephen. Simulating Terrorism. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981.

Sobel, Lester A., ed. Political Terrorism. New York: Facts on File, 1975.

______. Political Terrorism, 1974-1978, v.2. New York: Facts on File, 1975.

Sterling, Claire. The Terror Decade: A Biopsy of International Terrorism, 1970-1980. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, c. 1981.

______. The Terror Network. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981.

Stohl, Michael, ed. The Politics of Terrorism. New York: M. Dekker, c. 1979.

Tavin, Eli and Alexander, Yonah, eds. Psychological Warfare and Propaganda: Irgun Documentation. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1982.

Turi, Robert T. et al. Descriptive Study of Aircraft Hijacking. Huntsville, Texas: Institute of Contemporary Corrections and the Behavioral Sciences, 1972.

United Nations, General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, Report, New York: United Nations, 1973.

Van den Haag, Ernest. Political Violence and Civil Disobedience, New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

Walter, Eugene Victor. Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Wardlaw, Grant. Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter Measures, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Watson, Francis M. Political Terrorism: The Threat and the Response, Washington, D.C.: R.B. Luce, 1976.

Wilkinson, Paul. Political Terrorism, New York: Wiley, 1975.

______. Terrorism and the Liberal State, New York: Wiley, 1979.

______. Terrorism Versus Liberal Democracy: The Problem of Response, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1976.

Wolf, John B. Fear of Fear: A Survey of Terrorist Operations and Controls in Societies, New York: Plenum Press, 1981.

U.S. Congress

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, International Terrorism, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1974.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Internal Security, Terrorism, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1974.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, International Terrorism, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1978.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and Terrorism, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, Aircraft Piracy, International Terrorism, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, International Terrorism, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1977.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Affairs, An Act to Combat International Terrorism, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1978.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Affairs, Omnibus Antiterrorism Act of 1979, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1979.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, The Terrorist and his Victim, July 21, 1977, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, West Germany's Political Response to Terrorism, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1978.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Terroristic Activity, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1974.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Trotskyite Terrorist International, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1975.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion, 97th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1982.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Soviet, East German and Cuban Involvement in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa, 97th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1982.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa, Addendum, v.2., 97th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1982.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Terrorism: Origins, Direction, and Support, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Terrorism: The Turkish Experience, 97th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1981.

U.S. Military Sources

Commanders Guide to Terrorism Counteraction, Brigade and Battaltion Commanders. Pre-command Course, compiled by Jon Michael, Captain, Inf. (84-0340), N.D.

National Security Affairs Institute, National Defense University, The 1980s: Decade of Confrontation? The Eighth National Security Affairs Conference, 1981 Proceedings, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D. C.: 1981.

U.S. Air Force, Air Force Academy Library, Terrorism, Colorado Springs: U.S. Air Force Academy Library, 1977.

U.S. Air Force, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Air Command and Staff College, Unconventional Warfare: The Hidden Challenge, N.D.

U.S. Department of the Army, Command and General Staff College, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, Readings on Terrorism, October 1980, (82-0471).

U.S. Department of the Army, Command and General Staff College, Terrorism Counteraction Office, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, Readings on Terrorism, compiled by Jon Michael, Captain, Inf., October 1983 (84-0239).

U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Criminal Investigation Command, Personal Security Assessments, January 30, 1983 (CID Pamphlet).

U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Personnel Security Precautions Against Acts of Terrorism (PAM 190-52, June 1978).

U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, Military Operations, U.S. Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction, March 19, 1984 (TRADOC Pamphlet No. 525-37).

U.S. Department of the Army, INSCOM, Counterintelligence/Signal Security Battalion, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, Tips for Countering Terrorism, 902d Military Intelligence Group, 6 March 1981.

U.S. Department of the Army, Military Police School, Countering Terrorism on U.S. Army Installations, Fort McClellan, Alabama, N.D.

U.S. Department of the Army, Military Police Headquarters, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia, Countering Terrorism and other Major Disruptions on Military Installations (Supplement 1 to AR 190-52), (effective 15 August 1983).

U.S. Department of the Army, Military Police School, Use of Barriers (To Deny High Speed Approach) in Countering Terrorism Situations, Field Circular 19-112.

U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Headquarters, Personnel Security Precautions Against Acts of Terrorism, June 1978.

U.S. Department of Defense, Protection of DOD Personnel Against Terrorist Acts, April 1983 (DOD 2000.12-H)

Miscellaneous Government Documents

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Facing Tomorrow's Terrorist Incident Today, Report prepared by Robert Kupperman, Washington, D. C., October 1977.

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, Report, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1976.

National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Assassination and Political Violence by J.F. Kirkham and S. Levy, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1969.

National Governor's Association, Emergency Preparedness Project, Center of Policy Research, Domestic Terrorism, Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1979.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, International Terrorism in 1976, Washington, D. C.: CIA, 1977, 1978.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center. International Terrorism in 1978, Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1979.

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Reports.

U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, Terrorism Section, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI Analysis of of Terrorist Incidents in the United States, 1983.

U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Prevention of Terroristic Crimes: Security Guidelines for Business, Industry, and Other Organizations, prepared by Arthur J. Bilek, Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 1976.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Combatting Terrorism, Washington, D. C.: September 1982.

U.S. National Security Council, Special Coordination Committee, The U.S. Government Antiterrorism Program, An unclassified Summary Report, prepared by the Executive Committee on Terrorism, June 1979.

Articles in Journals

Alexander, Yonah. Communications Aspects of International Terrorism, International Problems, v. 16, n. 1-2, Spring 1977, pp. 55-60.

______. The Nature of the PLO: Some International Implications. Middle East Review, v. XII, n. 3, Spring 1980, pp. 42-51.

______. Some Perspectives on Terrorism and the Soviet Union. International Security Review, v. VII, n. 1 Spring 1982, pp. 35-45.

______. Some Soviet-PLO Linkages, Middle East Review, v. XIV, n. 3-4, Spring-Summer 1982, pp. 64-69.

______. and Levine, Herbert M. Prepare for the Next Entebbe. Chitty's Law Journal, v. 25, Sptember 1977, pp. 240-242.

Beres, Louis Rene. International Terrorism and World Order: The Nuclear Threat. The Stanford Journal of International Studies, v. XII, Spring 1977, pp. 131-146.

Clutterbuck, Richard. Terrorist International. Army Quarterly and Defense Journal, v. 104, January 1974, pp. 154-159.

Deakin, T. J., Legacy of Carlos Marighella. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, v. 43, n. 10, October 1974, pp. 19-25.

Dugard, John. Towards the Definition of International Terrorism. American Journal of International Law, v. 67, November 1974, pp. 94-102.

Elliott, John D. Contemporary Terrorism and the Police Response. Police Chief, February 1978, pp. 40-43.

Evans, Alona E. Terrorism and Political Crimes in International Law. The American Journal of International Law, v. 67, n. 5, November 1973, pp. 82-95.

Fearey, Robert A. International Terrorism. Department of State Bulletin, v. 74, March 29, 1976, pp. 394-403.

Friedlander, Robert A. Terrorism and National Liberation Movements: Can Rights Derive From Wrongs? Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, v. 13, n. 2, Spring 1981, pp. 303-308.

Krieger, David M. Terrorists and Nuclear Technology: The Danger is Great, the Question is not Whether the Worse Will Happen but Where and How. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1975, pp. 28-34.

Hoffacker, Lewis. The U. S. Government Response to Terrorism: A Global Approach. Department of State Bulletin, v. 70, March 18, 1974, pp. 274-278.

Hutchinson, Martha Crenshaw. Transnational Terrorism and World Politics. Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, v. 1, Winter 1975, pp. 109-129.

Jenkins, Brian. International Terrorism: A Balance Sheet. Survival, v. 17, July-August 1975, pp. 158-164.

Joyner, Christopher. Offshore Maritime Terrorism: International Implications and the Legal Response. Naval War College Review, v. XXXVI, n.4, July-August 1983, pp. 14-21.

Laqueur, Walter. Interpretations of Terrorism: Fact, Fiction and Political Science. Journal of Contemporary History, v. 12, January 1977, pp. 1-42.

Moore, John Norton. Toward Legal Restraints on International Terrorism. American Journal of International Law, v. 67, November 1974, pp. 88-94.

Pisano, Vittorfranco S. Clandestine Operations in Iraly: The Bulgarian Connection. Conflict Quarterly, v. 4, Winter 1984, pp. 28-38.

Romaniecki, Leon. The Soviet Union and International Terrorism. Soviet

Studies, v. 26, n. 3, July 1974, pp. 417-40.

Tanham, George K.: Jenkins, Brian; Weinstein, Eleanor S.: and Sullivan, Gerald. United States Preparation for Future Low-Level Conflict. *Conflict: An International Journal,* v. 1, 1978, pp. 1-19.